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ABSTRACT
THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE GENESIS OF COMMONWEALTHS
IN HOBBES'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
SEPTEMBER 1997
THOMAS J. FRYC, B.A., UNION COLLEGE
M.A., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John G. Robison
A careful reading of Hobbes's philosophical writings
reveals that this author forwards no fewer than three
distinct conceptions of the pre-political situation which he
labels "the natural condition of humankind," or "the state
of nature." By examining the relevant passages from The
Elements of Law
, De Give and Leviathan
.
Hobbes's three
principal works of political philosophy, I demonstrate that
Hobbes's state of nature should not be interpreted as a
single invariant concept but rather as a series of three
distinct heuristic or expository models. Further, I claim
that distinctions between Hobbes's various conceptions of
the state of nature reflect differing background assumptions
concerning such factors as the prevailing degree of group
stability and the level of abstractness with which
representative human beings are characterized
.
After establishing this framework, I examine why Hobbes
chose to include three distinct conceptions of the state of
nature within his writings, and explore the relationship
VI
which appears to obtain among these three conceptions. I
next examine the manner by which each of Hobbes's three
types of commonwealth, namely commonwealth by institution,
commonwealth by preservation and commonwealth by
acquisition, can be understood to arise from each of
Hobbes's three conceptions of the state of nature. In this
section, I focus my analysis upon the transitions which
occur when the unencumbered and isolated individuals who
inhabit the state of nature (in its various forms) enter
into the social contract by "transferring" their respective
rights of nature to the sovereign of their incipient
commonwealth. Moreover, I examine Hobbes's explanation of
why each subject incurs an obligation to obey his
sovereign's decrees and I address the apparent difficulty of
maintaining the subjects' allegiance to their sovereign in
light of Hobbes's portrayal of human beings as passionate
and predominantly self-serving creatures. I conclude by
arguing that given Hobbes's characterization of humans as
passionate and predominantly self-serving creatures, one can
probably not expect commonwealths to arise in the manner
that Hobbes describes, and one can certainly not expect such
commonwealths, if established, to endure for any substantial
period of time.
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CHAPTER I
HOBBES’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
A. Introduction
Hobbes’s theory of human sensation plays a significant
role in his theory of motivation, and within Hobbes’s
system, human motivation significantly affects the behavior
which human beings can be expected to exhibit when they
confront one another in the state of nature. ^ Thus, by
understanding Hobbes’s beliefs concerning the nature of the
individual human organism, we might better understand the
character of Hobbes’s pre-social or pre-political
interactive state.
A discussion of Hobbes’s conception of the human
organism is also appropriate since the state of nature,
political commonwealths, and all other types of human groups
are composed of human beings, whom Hobbes alleged to possess
a specific and inflexible nature. Indeed, in his
introduction to De Cive
. Hobbes contends that ’’everything is
best understood by its constituent causes,
. . . so to make
a more curious search into the rights of states and the
duties of subjects, it is necessary that we rightly
understand what the quality of human nature is, [and] in
what matters it is, in what not fit to make up civil
government
.
Accordingly, I will devote the first chapter of this
dissertation to an exploration of Hobbes’s analysis of human
beings in abstracto
,
so that I might describe and consider,
in the following chapters, the "social” or interactive
condition which Hobbes thought likely to result when two or
more human beings are forced to confront each other without
the benefit of some coercive power that is sufficiently
powerful to constrain or control the actions of these
bsings. Since Hobbes began the body of his masterwork
athan with a discussion of human sensory activity, and
since this topic of human sensation plays a significant role
in Hobbes's theory of human motivation and behavior, this is
a fitting topic with which to begin.
B. Hobbes on Sensation
Before beginning my actual discussion of Hobbes's
doctrine of sense, it should be mentioned that Hobbes uses
the term 'sense' to refer to two related, though clearly
different bodily processes. Specifically, Hobbes employs the
term 'sense' to refer to (A) the process by which ideas,
thoughts or phantasms come to be generated within, and come
to be experienced by, the percipient subject; and' (less
familiarly) to (B) the process by which the sensations of
pleasure and pain come to be generated within, and come to
be experienced by, the percipient subject.
Further, it should be noted that Hobbes forwards a
"dua 1 -aspect " model of both of the abovementioned varieties
of sense, according to which each instance of sensory
2
activity can be identified as both (C) a purely mechanical
act occuring within the relevant sensory subject's body, and
as (D) an appearance, "seeming" or feeling which is
experienced, as an object of immediate conscious awareness,
by the relevant sensory subject. Indeed, Hobbes identifies
the first variety of sense (A) as both (C) "the reaction and
endeavour outwards in the organ of sense caused by an
endeavour inwards from the [perceptual] object,"^ and as
(D) such phenomenal images or ideas as colors, shapes,
etc. Moreover, Hobbes identifies the second variety of
sense (B) as both (C) "the quickening or slackening, helping
or hindering of vital motion within the sensory subject's
body and as (D) instances of pain or pleasure within the
consciousness of the sensory subject.^
Unhappily, during his various discussions of the first
type of sense (A), Hobbes frequently conflates (C) the
notion of a phantasm of sense as motion within the sensory
organ of a percipient subject with (D) the notion of a
phantasm of sense as a phenomenal appearance or an immediate
object of awareness. However, for the sake of brevity, I
will forego presenting a needlessly extended discussion of
this distinction. Nevertheless, the reader should be alerted
that during my forthcoming presentation of Hobbes's first
variety of sense (A), I will be using the term 'sense' [or
phantasm of sense] to refer both to (C) a mechanico-
3
physiological action and to (D) the immediate object of
conscious awareness.^
In this initial section of Chapter 1, I will concisely
present Hobbes's theory of human sensation as this is set
forward in Leviathan and De Corpora
. I will be presenting a
recapitulation of what Hobbes actually wrote about the
physiological process which he identifies as human
sensation. I will, however, refrain from commenting upon the
specific difficulties which can be seen to emerge throughout
Hobbes s discussions of this topic and instead concentrate
upon what Hobbes believes it means for a human being to
, 7experience a sensory episode.
In Leviathan
, Hobbes begins his account of the human
organism with a rather brief discussion of the human sensory
faculties. In the opening sentences of the initial chapter
of this work, Hobbes explains that each thought which arises
in the mind of man "is the representation, or appearance, of
some quality, or other accident of a body without [him],
Q *
which is commonly called an object." In turn, the basis of
each of these thoughts or ideas is that which Hobbes calls
sense. Hobbes immediately explains that there exists no
conception in a man's mind which "hath not at first,
totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of
sense. Hence, as we will go on to discuss in more
detail later in this chapter, each consciously perceived
4
thought, idea, or mental image, whether it is perceived in
the act of sensation, or stored in the mind and later
recalled, as in the case of memories and "imaginations,"^^
is ultimately derived from some instance of human sensory
activity. Although the "raw data" which is presented in the
form of sensory images may be combined, parcelled, separated
and reorganized in a potentially limitless number of ways,
and the human mind possesses the capacity to carry out these
reorganizations, such operations can be carried out onl
y
upon those images which have at some earlier time been
acquired through sense.
Hobbes introduces his account of the causes of
sensation (A) in his 1656 work De Corpora by inviting his
readers to notice that our "phantasms or ideas are not
always the same; but that new ones appear to us, and old
ones vanish, according as we apply our organs of sense now
to one object, now to another." Thus, we may notice that
when we are awake, possess properly functioning organs of
sense, and fail to experience any external hindrances to the
functioning of these organs (such as, in the case of sight,
blindfolds or other opaque objects), we experience a
succession of phenomenal states which Hobbes refers to as
"ideas," as "images," and sometimes as "phantasms."
Hobbes reasons that since we continually experience
this successive flow of images (often against our will).
5
some cause must exist which accounts for the generation of
new images and the "perishing" of old or formerly
experienced ones. Hobbes concludes that these generations
and perishings are ultimately due to "some change or
mutation in the sentient," that is, in some portion of the
body of the person who experiences such sensat i ons
.
Throughout his various considerations of the topic of
sensation, Hobbes is careful to distinguish between the
subject of sensation, that is, the sentient being or subject
in whom the aforementioned alteration is effected, and the
pb j e c t of sensation, which Hobbes takes, in all instances,
to be some physical object which, by imparting motion within
the sentient being, accounts for such alterations, and thus
for the phenomena of sense. Indeed, Hobbes claims that
sense is "some internal motion of the sentient, generated by
some internal motion of the parts of the object and
propagated through all the media to the innermost part of
the organ," and that "the cause of sense is the external
body, or object which presseth the organ proper to each
sense, either immediately ... or mediatel y
.
(immediately in the case of touch or taste, and mediately in
the case of sight, hearing and smell). In turn, this
"pressure, by the mediation of the nerves and other strings
and membranes of the body, continueth inwards to the brain
and heart, causeth there a resistance or counterpressure of
6
the heart to deliver itself, which endeavour, because
outward, seemeth to be some matter without."^®
Thus, Hobbes maintains that once the impulse or
"pressure” which had originally been generated by the object
of sense reaches the innermost part of the organ, the end of
the transit line, as it were, the organ generates a
counterpressure, or reacts by producing a quantity of motion
which Hobbes specifies as being opposite (though not
necessarily equal) to the motion of the external object
which initiated this process. As a result of the organ's
endeavour outward, which may be construed as a reaction
against an externally generated endeavour to the "innermost
part of the organ," there occurs a phantasm or idea such as
"light and color," and "heat and sound.
Hobbes goes on to mention that "the motion of an organ,
by which a phantasm is made, is not commonly called sense
1 fiunless the object be present." "The phantasm remaining
after the object is removed," he asserts, "is called fancy
and in Latin imaginatio.'^^^ Although he concedes that the
Latin word 'imaginatio' properly refers to the image (or
afterimage) made in seeing, he claims, nevertheless, that
the term is often (though improperly) used to refer to the
afterimage made by any of the five senses. Following common
usage, however, he stipulates that he will use 'imagination'
in this wider signification, that is, to describe the
7
phantasm or the motion remaining in any of the sensory
organs after the object which caused it has been removed.
Thus, imagination, as Hobbes tersely defines it, is "nothing
but decaying sense, or "sense decayed or weakened, by the
absence of the object.
Hobbes contends that imagination (or fancy) and memory
differ only in "that memory supposeth the time past, which
fancy doth not
. Moreover,
[i]n memory, the phantasms we consider are as ifthey were worn out with time; but in our fancy we
consider them as they are; which distinction is
not of the things themselves, but of the
considerations of the sentient.
Similarly, in Leviathan
. Hobbes explains that "[t]his
decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, (I
mean fancy itself), we call the imagination,
. . . but when
we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is
fading, old, and past, it is called memory. Thus, the
distinction between memory and the imagination consists not
fh® nature of the previously produced, and presently
retained phantasm which is presented to the sentient, but
rather in the sentient's consideration of that phantasm.
Interestingly, at the beginning of section 12 of
chapter 25 of De Corpore
.
Hobbes announces that^^
8
there is another kind of sense.
.
. namely the
sense of pleasure and pain, proceeding not fromthe reaction of the heart outwards but from the
continual action of the outermost portion of the
organ toward the heart. For the original of lifebeing in the heart, that motion in the sentient
which is propagated to the heart, must necessarily
make some alteration or diversion of vital motion,
namely by quickening or slackening, helping orhindering the same. Now when it helpeth, it is [my
emphasis] pleasure, when it hindreth, it is pain,
trouble, grief &c.
Though his description of this "second type of sense" (B) is
rather brief, and not terribly detailed, what Hobbes appears
to be saying is that when an external object presses upon,
or transfers motion to the outermost portion of some sensory
organ of a particular human body, and as this pulse of
energy makes its way from the outermost, toward the
innermost portion of that organ (viz, that human's heart),
the motion associated with this pulse, by disturbing
adjacent internal bodily tissue, sometimes has the effect of
either helping or hindering the vital motion within that
human body (when such vital motion is understood to be "the
motion of the blood which circulates in the veins and
arteries
. )
Crucially, Hobbes notes that the sense of pleasure and
pain should be distinguished from the variety of sense
"which is made by the reaction of the organ." Thus, while
the variety of sense which Hobbes associates with phantasms
of colors, shapes, smells, etc. are said to be "made" (in
9
Hobbes's words) by the heart's reaction to externally
generated motion, which is transferred to the heart through
the internal bodily tissue which constitutes the sensory
the variety of sense which Hobbes identifies as
pleasure and pain can be conceived of as being "made" as
that pulse of energy moves from the outermost portion, to
irinermost portion of the individual 's relevant sensory
organ. Specifically, if that parcel of externally generated
motion, as it makes its way t oward the innermost portion of
the organ of sense, has the effect of enhancing the vital
motion within that individual's body, then the individual
will experience the sense of pleasure, and if that parcel of
motion has the effect of hindering the vital motion within
that individual's body, then the individual will experience
the sense of pain. Clearly, however, before we can
adequately understand the workings of this process by which
the sensations of pain and pleasure are generated, it
behooves us to examine Hobbes's descriptions of vital and
animal motion.
C. Hobbes's Account of Vital and Animal Motion
Hobbes identifies, and goes on to discuss two types of
motion specific to the human body, namely, vital motion and
voluntary (or animal) motion. In Leviathan , Hobbes
charact eri zes vital motion as that which is "begun in
generation, and continued without interruption through
10
[one's] whole life; such as the course of blood, the
breathing, concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc. to which
such motions there needs no help of imagination."^^ In De
^rpore
,
Hobbes describes vital motion as "the motion of the
blood, perpetually circulating.
. . in the veins and
arteries
.
Animal or voluntary motion, on the other hand, is
characterized as "depend[ing] always upon a precedent
thought of whither, which way and what," that is, in such
manner as is first fancied in our minds. As might be
expected, Hobbes describes both types of bodily motion in
terms of mechanical processes, and characterizes animal
motion as a feature of the organism which functions
primarily to enhance or preserve vital motion.
We might reasonably interpret Hobbes's vital motion as
the sum of the involuntary or autonomic motions of the human
body, which are necessary to sustain the proper functioning
of the organism. If, to use a convenient example, the heart
of a particular individual ceased to function, that is,
ceased to circulate blood, and thus to provide oxygen to the
various portions of that person's body, life in that
person's body would come to an end. Indeed, within his
writings, Hobbes identifies life with the vital motion which
serves to distinguish living from inanimate matter (which
is, nevertheless, subject to being moved). In fact, in the
11
Introduction to Leviathan
. Hobbes characterizes life as ’’but
motion of the limbs, the beginning whereof is in some
principal part within,” and in De Corpore states that "the
original of all life [is] in the heart
. Presumably, what
*^^^^^^9^ishes living objects such as men, dogs and insects,
from such non-living objects as stones, metal ingots, and
brick walls is not that objects of the former but not of the
latter variety are subject to local motion or motion
simpliciter, but rather that these former objects, unlike
those of the latter type, are subject to vital and animal
motion
.
Hobbes asserts, in section 12 of chapter 25 of De
Corpore
, that vital motion is from time to time^^
hindered by some motion made by
sensible objects, [and] may be r
either by bending or setting str
the body; which is done when the
carried now into these, now into
till the pain, so far as possibl
away. But if vital motion be hel
by sense, then the parts of the
disposed to guide the spirits in
conduceth most to the preservati
augmentation by the help of the
animal motion, this is the very
found even in the embryo, which
limbs with voluntary motion for
whatsoever troubleth it, or for
what pleaseth it.
the action of
estored again
aight the parts of
spirits are
other nerves,
e, be quite taken
ped by motion made
organ will be
such manner as
on and
nerves . And in
first endeavour
. . . moveth its
the avoiding of
the pursuing of
Thus, for example, an appetite toward some object can be
conceived as arising within a human being's body when a
12
sensation of pain (caused by a hindering of vital motion)
motivates or moves that body in the direction of an object,
the acquisition of which will, in the estimation of that
human being, relieve his presently experienced sensation of
by restoring to a healthy state his bodv * s currently
inhibited level of vital motion.
Crucially, both of the previously described varieties
of Hobbesian sensation are involved in the process by which
an appetite or an aversion, that is to say, a tiny motion
toward or a tiny motion away from some external object, is
generated or experienced. Thus, for example, a sensation of
pain might be identified as the factor which initiates this
sequence, since such a sensed pain essentially establishes a
goal to be achieved (namely the alleviation of pain within
the sensory subject's body) while a sensory survey of the
objects within one's environment (that is, instances of
sensation as it relates to the perception of external
physical objects) can be understood to provide suggestions
to the sensory subject regarding how the established goal
can be achieved.
In fact, Hobbes characterizes this imagining (in this
instance, the thought which arises in the mind of the
sensory subject) as "the first internal beginning of all
voluntary motion. "These small beginnings of motion,
within the body of man, before they appear in walking.
13
sleeping, striking, and other visible actions,” maintains
Hobbes, are commonly called endeavours
. Though at this
point, one might infer that all endeavours result in or lead
to such visible actions as walking, speaking and striking,
Hobbes s subsequent discussion makes clear that this is not
the case.
Immediately after beginning his discussion of the
interior beginnings of voluntary motion, Hobbes draws a
distinction between the two types of such small interior
motions, namely appetites (or desires) and aversions. An
"endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it,"
Hobbes announces, "is called appetite or desire.
.
.
[a]nd
when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally
called aversion." Hobbes further opines that while some
appetites such as the appetite for food, the appetite for
excretion "and some others not many" are born with man, all
others, which are appetites of particular things, are
acquired through experience. Moreover, Hobbes claims that
"of things we know not at all or believe not to be," we can
have a desire only "to taste and try."
Therefore, Hobbes believed that from birth, human
beings possess (or generate) a small number of general (that
is, generally directed) appetites, which are appetites for
objects that are necessary to maintain the vital motion of
14
that organism. Indeed, in section 12 of chapter 25 of De
Corpore
, Hobbes claims that^’
little infants, at the beginning and as soon as
they are born, have appetite to a very few things,
as also they avoid very few, by their want of
experience and memory; and therefore they have not
so great a variety of animal motion as we see in
those that are more grown. For it is not possible,
without such knowledge as is derived from sense,
that is, without experience and memory, to know
what will prove pleasant or hurtful.
Hobbes contends further that "afterwards, by accustoming
themselves little by little, they come to know readily what
is to be pursued and avoided; and also, to have ready use of
their nerves and organs, in the pursuing and avoiding of
good and bad .
Thus, the ability to successfully maintain a
pleasurable state of bodily constitution, or a condition of
vigorous vital motion within one's body (through one's own
efforts), is an acquired skill which depends upon or
presupposes experience and memory. In turn, one's phantasms
of memory depend upon the prior realization of phantasms of
sense which are "made" when the innermost portion of the
individual's sensory organ reacts to a pulse of energy which
is transferred to it, through the now familiar pathway, from
39
an external sensory object or stimulus.
The most prominent instance of an appetite which is
born with man, namely the appetite for food, would be
15
characterized as a minute internal motion toward most any
type of nutritive foodstuff which will sustain the life of
that man, rather than a tiny motion toward a particular type
of food such as cherry pie or Beef Wellington. Hobbes does
contend, however, that the overwhelming majority of the
Particular appetites which a man's body possesses or
experiences come to be developed as a result of the
individual's interaction with the objects in his
envi ronment
.
Thus, an individual (designated p) might be imagined to
advance through the following sequence of events throughout
the course of his life: at time tl, person p, who has never
tasted a pineapple, is brought into contact with such a
piece of fruit (object F^)
,
places the interior portion of a
piece of this fruit in his mouth, and through the usual
process, comes to experience a particular (pleasing)
gustatory sensation, which Hobbes would describe as a type
of phantasm. In turn, at some subsequent time, t 2
,
person p
might find himself in the vicinity of some object F2, which,
as a result of comparing presently sensed with formerly
sensed visual phantasms, he is able to identify as being
sufficiently visually similar to F^, to establish a mental
association between supposed objects F2 and F^. P might
recognize, in some not completely conscious manner, that the
phantasms caused by F2 bear a striking resemblance to those
16
which had been caused by F^, and that at time tl, ingesting
a portion of provided him with a pleasurable sensation.
Hence, at time t2, p*s body can be conceived of as
experiencing an endeavour, that is, a tiny movement in the
apparent direction of object Fj
. Though this endeavour
toward Fj might eventually result in a fully-fledged,
perceptually observable corporeal movement toward the object
in question, it is crucial to understand that by appetite,
Hobbes means merely an instance of minute movement (in this
case, toward object F
2 )
. Hobbes emphasizes this point by
registering his disapproval of those Scholastic philosophers
who "find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion
at all; but because some motion they must acknowledge, they
call it metaphorical motion; which is but absurd speech.
In this example, at time p had no specific desire
for, and experienced no endeavour toward F^ based upon a
previous experience with a pineapple. This is true because,
up to point tl, p had never tasted or experienced the
gustatory sensation (or the visual sensation) specific to
pineapples. Hobbes's doctrine would allow, however, that at
time tl, p had a desire to "taste and try" the previously
untasted type of object which was then situated before him.
At time tl, for example, p might have been experiencing
feelings of hunger (a specific feeling of uneasiness or
pain),^^ and might have decided to explore the possibility
17
of satisfying his (general) appetite for nourishment by
consuming part of the still mysterious though present object
Pj. Hobbes cautions, nevertheless, that we have aversion for
things "not only that we know have hurt us, but also that we
do not know whether they will hurt us, or not
.
D. Hobbes on the Will
Appetites and aversions, which are tiny internal
motions, respectively, toward and away from the apparent
locations^^ of specific external objects, figure
prominently in Hobbes's account of the will. For example,
Hobbes contends that from time to time, human beings
experience a succession of appetites and aversions for the
same object. These successive appetites and aversions, hopes
and fears concerning a single object, Hobbes explains, arise
as one successively contemplates the "divers good and evil
consequences of the doing, or omitting of the thing [he has]
propounded
,
the thing propounded, for example, being to
attempt to gain access to the object in question. In turn
whole sum of appetites and aversions which proceed
through the mind when the thing propounded is either done or
"thought impossible," is called deliberation.^^
Thus, if at time tl, person p has a desire to obtain
object o, based upon his estimate of the pleasant
consequences which are likely to redound to him as a result
of obtaining o, and at time t2, p has an aversion to
18
obtaining object o based upon his estimate of the probable
unpleasant consequences to himself of obtaining o, and if p
has no further appetites or aversions with respect to the
obtaining of o, then his deliberation with regard to
attempting to obtain object o between times tl and t2 would
consist of the one appetite and the one aversion previously
mentioned
.
Deliberation comes to an end, "when that whereof [one
deliberates] is either done or thought impossible; till then
[one retains] the liberty of doing or omitting; according to
[his] appetite or aversi on
. Thus, each deliberation may
come to an end in one of two ways. Specifically, one can opt
to either perform the act propounded or to refrain from
performing that act.
In turn, the last appetite or aversion immediately
adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that
which we call the will . Hence, it is the case that some,
though by no means all of the appetites and aversions which
one experiences result in such observable actions as
extending one's arm, or lurching one's body in the direction
of a desired object. That is to say, the appetite of person
p which is p's will or ''last appetite in deliberation" is
separate from the observable action which results from or is
caused by the former. This is true simply because appetites
and aversions are defined as endeavours or tiny, sensorially
19
imperceptible motions. rather than the voluntary motions
themselves. In fact, in De Corpora
, Hobbes details a three-
step process by which these minute, internally generated
motions lead to discrete, observable bodily motion. Hobbes
claims that the ’’first endeavour" either toward or away from
the object ’’ is followed by a swelling and relaxation of the
muscles; and lastly, these are followed by contraction and
extension of the limbs which is animal motion."'*^
One might be tempted to believe, especially in light of
Hobbes s discussions of physical science or natural
philosophy in De Corpore
, that the will of a person, on any
given occasion, constitutes a resolution of the various
appetites and aversions which have affected him throughout
the corresponding deliberation. However, this position,
which construes the will as the vector sum or resultant of
the various appetites and aversions which were experienced
through the deliberative process, was not embraced by
Hobbes. Rather, in his various discussions of deliberation
and the will, Hobbes presents deliberation as the varying
succession of appetites and aversions, and the will as
simply the last appetite or aversion in the deliberative
process
.
We will now move on to examine and discuss two features
of human nature which Hobbes believed to necessitate that
the natural interactive state of human beings is (was, or
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conflict and
would be) characterized by unrestrained
surreption, namely, ( 1 ) the apparent 1
y
.egoist i c psychology
which Hobbes attributes to humankind and (2) the approximate
physical and intellectual equality of every human being with
every other.
—Hobbes and Predominant Egoism
Gregory Kavka has recently categorized the
psychological theory which was held by Hobbes as
'predominant egoism." Predominant egoism is the position
"that self-interested motives tend to take precedence over
non-sel f
-interested motives in determining human actions
[and that] non-sel f
-interested motives usually give way to
self-interested motives when there is a conflict."^®
I take it to be the case that from the standpoint of
his political philosophy, what is interesting and
significant is that Hobbes is committed to the position that
in most instances, men will act so as to primarily benefit
themselves, and will not primari 1
v
consider the effect that
their action will have upon examples of human behavior which
are motivated by a passion or a desire to benefit another
person (when an alternative course of behavior open to the
agent will, in the estimation of that actor, likely result
in the realization of a greater benefit to the actor)
even according to the most optimistic reading of Hobbes,
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instances of such behavior can be assumed to be few and far
between
.
Stated somewhat crudely, what can be gathered from
Hobbes's various discussions of this topic is that we should
not expect Hobbesian men to enter into, or to remain parts
of already established commonwealths because they possess a
general desire to benefit their fellow humans. Rather, such
men can be expected to enter into commonwealths, and thus to
voluntarily subordinate themselves to the will of the
established sovereign, precisely because they reckon that
doing so will likely result in more advantageous (long-term)
consequences to themselves than will any available
al ternative
.
F. Hobbes on the Natural Equality of Human Beings
In the final section of this chapter, I will present
what I take to be Hobbes’s concept of the natural equality
of human beings. I will base my presentation primarily upon
Hobbes '
s
discussions of the natural equality of human beings which
are contained in Chapters 13 and 15 of Leviathan
.
(although
I will, on a number of occasions, make reference to parallel
passages in other of Hobbes's works of political philosophy)
Throughout this section, I will be concerned not to critique
the doctrine of natural equality forwarded by Hobbes, but
rather, to explain precisely what this doctrine entails.
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Once again, I am including this discussion because I believe
that Hobbes’s doctrine of the natural equality of human
beings plays a significant role in determining the character
that the state of nature or the natural condition of
humankind assumes within Hobbes's writings.
Hobbes begins the thirteenth chapter of Leviathan by
discussing the natural equality of human beings. He asserts
that^^
[njature hath made men so equal in the faculties
of the body, and mind; as that though there be
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in
body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when
all is reckoned together, the difference between
man and man is not so considerable as that one man
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to
which another might not pretend as well as he.
As is stated in this passage, Hobbes believes that the
natural equality of humans consists in some combination of
physical and mental capabilities (the combination of which
he characterizes as "all . . . reckoned together.")
Curiously, however, rather than immediately discussing why
the combined or "all reckoned together" type of natural
powers of all human beings are basically equal, Hobbes
chooses to consider, in turn, the two varieties of natural
power
.
With respect to physical strength, Hobbes claims that
even the weakest of (fully grown) individuals possesses
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strength sufficient to kill the strongest "either by secret
machination or by confederacy with others
. Indeed, this
concept of equality consists in (1) equali
each man is capable of taking the life of
either singly (i.e.
,
by exercising merely
in league with other men, as well as, (2)
as each man is subject to being killed by
fellowman or by some combination of his fe
Hobbes contends that^^
ty in so far as
any other man,
his own power),
equality in so
either a single
1 1 owmen
.
f
or
ar
to the faculties of the mind.
. . I find yet
a greater equality among men than that of
strength
. For prudence is but experience
; whi ch
equal time equally bestows upon those men in those
things they apply themselves equally to.
In this passage, Hobbes is asserting that human beings are
intellectually (roughly) equal, since all mature men possess
a sense of prudence, of "know how," regarding the conduct of
life, which their lives' experiences have bestowed upon
them.
When discussing the natural human intellectual
faculties, Hobbes contends "that prudence is but experience
which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things
they apply themselves equally to." I wish to suggest that
in this passage, Hobbes is attempting to further the claim
that equal experiences affect all, or nearly all human
beings partaking of those experiences in an approximately
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equal manner. Further, as the quotation on page 24 of this
chapter indicates, Hobbes is similarly forwarding the claim
that the life's experiences of all mature human beings are
sufficiently similar to allow one to posit the doctrine of
mental or intellectual equality which he was interested to
forward
.
As we have seen, in the opening paragraphs of chapter
13 of Leviathan
, Hobbes offers a series of relatively
straightforward reasons for believing (1) that men are
naturally equal to each other with respect to the faculties
of the body, and (2) that men are naturally equal to one
another with respect to the faculties of the mind. It seems
clear, however, that Hobbes was similarly interested to
advance the claim that human beings are naturally equal with
respect to the "all reckoned together” sense of their
physical and mental faculties. One is therefore naturally
lead to wonder what this "all reckoned together” conception
of the natural equality of humans is meant to entail.
It seems clear that Hobbes does not mean to suggest
that all men in the state of nature are equal to each other
with respect to the ability to perform any specific task.
Indeed, this equality which Hobbes attributes to men in the
state of nature, in the De Give and El ements renderings,
consists of the equal ability of men to do "the greatest of
all things.” Surely, Hobbes's frequent references to "the
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weaker" and "the stronger" (in both strength and wit) make
clear that Hobbes was not blind to the rather obvious fact
that we do not all develop into a state of strict physical
and intellectual equality.
In section 6 of chapter 11 of De Homine
. Hobbes
characterizes the greatest of goods for each man to be "his
own preservation," and the greatest of "all evils" to be his
own death (especially, Hobbes wryly adds, when the latter is
accompanied by torture). In light of this passage, we can
understand why Hobbes characterized killing another person
"the greatest thing." If the preservation of person p's
life constitutes p's greatest good, and the destruction or
termination of p's life constitutes p's greatest evil, then
causing the cessation of p's vital motion or vital
functioning constitutes inflicting the greatest evil which p
can suffer. Further, if person q can cause the termination
of the vital motion within p's body (which given the
brittleness of the human frame, Hobbes considered to be
rather easy), then q can inflict upon p the greatest of
evils or more colloquially, can do "the greatest thing" to
P-
What is significant in Hobbes's analysis (and what
Hobbes's "all reckoned together" sense of natural equality
appears to entail) is that no man naturally possesses the
power to secure his future good through his own physical or
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intellectual capabi 1 i t i es
. In this sense, all men can be
spoken of as being "naturally equal" to every other, since
none is individually capable of guaranteeing the continuance
of his own life. The possibility of securing such a
position, and thereby, of protecting oneself against the
danger of death as a result of the aggressive behavior of
others, is clearly ruled out of the question by Hobbes, who
continually emphasizes that the precivil condition is
charact er i zed by a lack of personal security on the part of
each of its "members
. Thus, remarks Hobbes, "it is
supposed from the equality of strength and other natural
faculties of man, that no man is of might to assure himself
for any long time of preserving himself thereby. Though
in the state of nature, irresistible might (and only
irresistible might) assures its possessor of such security
(as well as natural dominion over others), because Hobbes
judged no man to be naturally possessed of such might, he
similarly believed that each man is naturally incapable of
so guaranteeing his own future well-being.
Further, and in a related sense, human beings in the
state of nature can be judged equal in so far as no man can
be expected to assure to himself the possession and
enjoyment of any socially desirable object or set of objects
for any considerable period of time.
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We may suppose, as above, that although in the state of
nature, diverse men possess differing levels of probable
success with respect to the activity of attaining the
— mporary possession of socially desirable objects (based
upon considerations of physical strength, intellectual
acuity, etc.), all men might nevertheless be spoken of as
being equal in so far as no man possesses the natural power
to secure his possessions against the united depredations of
his opponents. Significantly, this equality is to be
measured not by the probabi 1 i t
y
of one's success in either
preserving one's life or in maintaining the possession of
some desired good, but rather by the possibi 1 i t
v
of losing
one's life or one's goods.
Interestingly, Hobbes touches upon the topic of the
^^^tural equality of human beings during his consideration of
the law of nature "against pride" in chapter 15 of
Leviathan ^^
. However, at this point in the text, Hobbes's
commitment to the doctrine of natural equality seems a bit
precarious, and the reason which he offers for regarding
each of one's fellowmen as a natura
1
equal appears somewhat
pecul iar
.
Hobbes begins his discussion of this law of nature in
Leviathan by reminding his readers that he has already shown
that all men are by nature equal, and that the presently
observable inequalities of "riches," "power," and "nobility
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of kindred" have their basis in the civil law. He then
opposes Aristotle's doctrine that some men are by nature
more worthy to command while others are by nature more
worthy to serve, « as being both against reason (as he
claims to have demonstrated before), and against experience.
For, announces Hobbes®^
there are very few so foolish that had not rathergovern themselves than be governed by others; nor
when the wise in their conceit contend by force
with those who distrust their own wisdom do they
always, or often, or almost any time get the
victory.
In this passage, Hobbes registers the belief that nature
does not divide men into two classes, namely, those who are
created fit to govern (those who possess a certain kind of
natural knowledge), and those who are born fit to serve
(those who lack this type of knowledge) since (1) members
of the second category seldom, if ever, acknowledge the
supposed natural superiority of their "betters" and since
(2) when contests or battles between the "naturally wise"
and the "naturally strong" or "naturally ignorant" have
occurred, the former have seldom if ever been able to emerge
victorious. Let us now consider, in order, these two reasons
forwarded by Hobbes.
First, Hobbes believes that if such natural divisions
between natural governors and natural servants did exist.
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then such divisions would be readily apparent to those
people who occupy the latter, as well as to those who occupy
the former category. That is to say, Hobbes appears to be
harboring the implicit assumption that if such natural
divisions existed, any human being (after due observation
and reflection) would be able to determine whether he, or
any other particular human person, was created to be a
leader or a follower, and would be willing to acknowledge
and assume the appropriate station (either that of a ruler
or that of a ruled person) within the society which he
occupi es
.
Simply, Hobbes is attempting to convince his readers
that because almost no man judges it better to be ruled by
another than to rule oneself, it is thereby the case that it
is actually better for any man to rule himself than it is to
be ruled by another.®^ Of course, Hobbes meant this
argument to relate especially to those men who are supposed,
or who would be supposed by "elitist” philosophers such as
Aristotle, to be natural servants, but who, by their actions
srid their opinions, show themselves to be in disagreement
with such a supposition. Since such men show themselves to
disagree with the claim that they are natural servants (who
would be better off if they were governed by natural
rulers), it is thereby the case that such men are not
natural servants.
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Secondly, Hobbes is suggesting that if natural
distinctions of the aforementioned types did exist, then
when contests” (presumably battles or skirmishes) between
the wiser and the stronger occur, the wiser (that is to say,
those who are presumed to be naturally fit to govern) would,
through the imposition of clever strategies, find some way
to defeat or control the stronger (that is, the presumed
natural servants) all or most of the time. However, Hobbes
observes that since in such contests, the wiser seldom if
ever have the upper hand over the stronger, such natural
<^ist inct i ons must not exist. As had been the case with
Hobbes's first reason for denying this type of natural
inequality, this second reason appears to be based upon some
body of empirical evidence. That is to say, Hobbes is
suggesting that throughout the history of humankind (or, at
least, that portion of it of which he is aware), contests,
battles, or one-on-one encounters have taken place in which
those who have presumed themselves to be possessed of the
kind of wisdom which allows them to govern well, have been
haplessly unable to subdue those men who are physically
stronger, but are less intellectually skillful.
Unfortunately, Hobbes does not offer any specific instances
of such occurrences, but merely assures his readers that
such contests have often occurred in times of sedition and
civil war.
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Hobbes concludes his discussion of the ninth law of
nature in Leviathan with the following curious passage:^^
If nature therefore have made men equal, that
equality is to be acknowledged; or if nature have
made man unequal
;
yet because men that think
themselves unequal, will not enter into conditions
of peace but upon equal terms, such equality mustbe admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of
nature, I put this. That every man acknowledge
other for his equal by nature.
What I find to be curious is that in this passage, as well
as in parallel passages from his other political writings,
Hobbes is saying that men should account each man equal by
nature whether or not nature has made men equal. Indeed,
during his treatment of this law of nature in The Elements
.
Hobbes forwards the astonishingly modest claim that since it
cannot be imagined how peace can be achieved if men do not
acknowledge equality with one another, men considered in
mere nature ought, for peace's sake, to admit such
7(1
equal i ty
.
On one level, we can see why Hobbes might have included
such an injunction among his laws of nature. If men consider
themselves to be superior to, or to value themselves more
highly than they value others, then they will be more
likely to "invade" and to contest for dominion. Roughly, if
one man considers himself to be superior to another, he will
likely think himself capable of gaining dominion over that
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other, either by force or by wiles. In turn, if one thinks
himself likely to gain the ’’upper hand" over another, he
will have a tendency to attempt to exert (or demonstrate)
his putative superiority over that person by adroitly
employing his physical and intellectual powers. However, if
one considers another to be his equal, he (the former) will
be much less likely to attempt to overcome the latter
through force and (especially) strategy. Nevertheless, we
remember that Hobbes had spent time and effort
attempting to show that human beings are by nature equal
.
Why then did he feel it necessary to discuss the "contrary
to fact claim that even if men are significantly unequal by
nature, they should, nevertheless be esteemed as equal?
Interestingly, what Hobbes appears keen to establish is
that those such as Aristotle who claim that the wiser sort
of men, those who claim to possess an inherent virtue or the
appropriate type of "aptness" or natural knowledge, or
worthiness to command are clearly wrong. Indeed, Hobbes’s
claim is that the skill of establishing dominion or of
gaining and consolidating political power is not, and has
never been based upon any variety of philosophical or
technological know-how, but rather, is based upon one’s
ability to subdue one’s opponent, principally through
physical compulsion. As has been well documented, Hobbes
believes that a science of politics, that is, a type of
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can be devised and
philosophical or technological knowledge,
utilized to regulate the commonwealth.’^ Nevertheless,
Hobbes’s claim that in the state of nature "there is no
place for industry ... no culture on earth, no arts and
letters, [and] no society"” clearly indicates that he
considered impossible the development of any such science of
politics in mankind's natural condition.
The doctrine of the natural equality of humans is
presented at the beginning of chapter 13 of Leviathan as one
of the main causes of, as well as the basis for one of the
potential solutions to, what Hobbes characterizes as the
central problem of political philosophy. Specifically, the
natural equality of human beings gives rise to a "social"
condition which is unbearable, and from which all rational
men desire to escape. Conceivably, if men were not created
equal by nature, that is, if nature had created natural
rulers and natural servants, men could live in harmony in a
naturally hierarchical society. Nevertheless, the manner in
which Hobbes treats the crucial claim of natural equality in
chapter 15 of Leviathan suggests that the actual natural
equality of human beings may not play the fundamental role
which this author explicitly assigns to it.
Perhaps Hobbes was attempting to suggest that it is
merely the "acknowledgement" of an in-principle potentially
spurious natural equality on the part of all of the citizens
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within a commonwealth, or of all the individuals within some
geographic area, which is essential to provide the forces of
social cohesion required to establish a commonwealth or to
prevent a commonwealth from dissolving. That is to say, even
though Hobbes continually stresses the claim that human
beings at^ fundamentally equal to one another, perhaps it is
the mere acknowledgement of a natural human equality by most
or all of the citizens of the commonwealth which is of
primary significance in maintaining conditions of peace and
avoiding the calamity of the natural state.
^orisidering this conundrum, we must admit that
to his derivation of the state of nature, what
emerges as the most significant feature of Hobbes’s doctrine
of the natural equality of human beings is the fact that
since no man possesses the natural powers to successfully
resist the (possibly united) depredations of one or more of
his fellow men, and since each man possesses the natural
power, either singly or in concert with other men, to put an
end to the life of any man, then no man can be spoken of as
possessing a natural dominion over any other. As we will be
going on to see in chapter 2 of this dissertation, Hobbes
believes that a recognition of this fundamental "equality of
ability" on the part of all or most men gives rise to an
"equality of hope in the attaining of [one's] ends,"^^ and
35
thus helps to determine that the character of the resulting
natural condition will be a rather nasty one indeed.
However, from the standpoint of the formation and
Oj^iritenance of such multiperson groupings as commonwealths,
what emerges as the most significant feature of Hobbes's
doctrine of the natural equality of human beings, is not the
— that human beings are naturally equal to one another
(according to Hobbes's somewhat idiosyncratic conception of
human equality), but rather, the fact that human beings can
be persuaded, for the sake of fostering peace, and creating
a tranquil and comfortable social setting, to acknowledge,
and to behave in accordance with the claim that human beings
are fundamentally equal to one another. Further, this
admission of equality, and a concomitant willingness to act
in accordance with this admission might rest upon the rather
obvious and rather easily perceived fact that each human
being is susceptible to having his life terminated by (for
example) the attack of some other human being or human
beings
.
Provided as we are with an understanding of Hobbes's
somewhat less than firmly-embraced belief in the natural
equality of human beings, as well as a familiarity with
Hobbes's predominantly self-interested, though not quite
egoistic conception of human behavior, we may now proceed to
examine the effect that these two features of Hobbes's
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anthropology have upon the character of the natural,
social or pre-political state of human interaction.
pre-
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NOTES
1. Specif ical ly, I will be attempting to show how Hobbes'sheory of human motivation and volition helps give rise tow at has been termed "a predominantly egoistic psychology."
s will become clear during the course of the first chapter
ot this dissertation, an adequate understanding of Hobbes's
predominant 1
y
egoistic theory of human psychology depends,in part, upon an understanding of Hobbes's theory of human
will and motivation, which, in turn, depends, in part, upon
an understanding of the basic features of Hobbes's "dual
aspect theory of human sensory activity.
This developmental sequence can be understood in terms of
the following linear representation:
Sensation -* Motivation & Will Predominant
Egoism
so that human sensory activity (as understood by Hobbes)
plays a significant role in determining the character of how
an individual human being will act on any particular
occasion, and in turn, the manner in which human beings are
motivated to act helps give rise to a psychol ogical theory
which has been characterized as "predominant egoism."
2.
Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen , Bernard Gert
,
editor,
(Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978), pages 98-99.
3
.
Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes in 11
Volumes
,
William Molesworth, editor, (London: Bohn, 1839),
Vol . I
,
page 391
.
4.
Hobbes, Engl ish Works
, Vol. I, page 405.
5.
Hobbes, Engl ish Works
,
Vol. I, pages 406-407.
6. Perhaps additional light can be cast upon the four
categories discussed in this and the previous two paragraphs
when one considers the following two-by-two matrix:
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A B
C. Mechanico-
Physiol ogical
Processes
D. Seemings,
or
Representations
(of C)
* =
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Thoughts
,
Ideas
,
Phantasms
Minute reactions
at the innermost
portion of the
organ of sense.
(See p. 6-7)
Such ideas or
immediate
objects of
awareness as
colors, sounds
and odors
.
(See table in
endnote #12)
P 1 easure
,
Pain
Helping or
hindering of
the body's
vital motion.
(See pp. 9-10)
The
conscious 1
y
perceived
feel ing
of pain and
pi easure
.
(See pp . 9-10)
Within his writings, Hobbes speaks of two relatively broad
varieties of sense, namely (A) that variety which involves
or includes such categories as colors, odors and sounds, and
(B) that variety which involves or includes such categories
as pain and pleasure. Further, Hobbes specifies that each
individual instance of sensory activity (of both variety A
and variety B) can be understood as both (C) a mechanico-
physiol ogical process that occurs within the sensory
subject's body, and as (D) a representation, appearance,
seeming, feeling or other immediate object of awareness
which arises within the consciousness of the sensory
subject. In each such instance, the pain, pleasure, color,
sound, etc. of which the subject is consciously aware, is to
be understood as a representation to that subject of some
physiological process occurring contemporaneously within his
own body
.
7
.
Accordingl y , I will discuss Hobbes's first variety of
sense (A) on pages 4-8, and Hobbes's second variety of sense
(B) on pages 8-10 of this chapter.
8.
That is, of those faculties which relate directly to the
first variety of sense (A) mentioned above.
39
9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
. Edwin Curley
Indianapolis, 1994), page 6.
editor
,
(Hackett
:
10.
Hobbes, Leviathan
. page 6.
11.
For a fuller explanation of Hobbes's thoughts concerningtne imagination and memory, see below, pages 7-8.
12.
Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore ( Engl ish Works
. Vol
. I, page389.) During the course of his various discussions of
specific phantasms (or phantasm types) in Leviathan and Degorpore
,
Hobbes identifies the following phantasm types asbeing associated with the five conventionally recognized
sense modalities:
SENSE MODALITY
SIGHT HEARING SMELL SAVOUR TOUCH
c * Light Sound Odor Taste Hardness
H * Col or Softness
A P * Smoothness Heat
R H * Roughness Cold
A A * Rarity Wetness
C N * Density Oi 1 iness
T T it (Figure) Smoothness
E A it Motion Roughness
R S it Rest Rarity
I M * Magnitude Density
S S it (Figure)
T it Motion
I it Rest
C it Magnitude
**************************************************
It should be noted that Hobbes's most sustained discussions
of the various types of phantasms occur in Chapters 7, 8 and
25 of De Corpore
,
and in Chapter 1 of Leviathan .
Interestingly, on page 405 of De Corpore
, Hobbes
contends that smoothness, roughness, rarity and density
"refer to figure and are therefore common to both touch and
sight." Thus, Hobbes appears to register a belief in the
existence of so-called common sensibles.
13. Thomas Hobbes, English Works , Vol. I, Page 391.
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14. It should be noted that in chapter 25 of De CornoreHobbes presents his theory of human sensatioiT not as aA
doctrine, but rather, as a "ways andmeans by which the appearances or effects of nature"(i.e., phantasms of sense) "may be, I do not say they are,generated. (Hobbes, Eng 1 ish Works
. Vol
. I, page 388.)
15. Hobbes, English Works, Vol. I, page 391; Hobbes, Leviathanpage 6. '
16
.
Hobbes
,
17 Hobbes
18 Hobbes
1 9
.
Hobbes
Leviathan
.
page 6.
Engl ish Works
. Vol
. I
,
English Works
. Vol. I,
Engl ish Works
, Vol. I,
page 392.
page 396.
page 396.
20 .Unhappi ly , as has already been seen to be the case with
phantasms of sense, Hobbes frequently conflates (1) the
notion of a phantasm of the imagination or of memory as
residual motion within the sensory organ of the percipient
subject with (2) the notion of a phantasm of the imagination
or of memory as a phenomenal appearance or an immediate
object of awareness. However, for the sake of brevity I will
refrain from presenting a lengthy discussion of this
distinction
.
21. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 8; Hobbes, English Works
.
Vol. I,
page 396. Hobbes adds, somewhat surprisingly, that the decay
of sense should not be understood as a decay or weakening of
the motion made by the object. If this were the case, then
phantasms would "always and necessarily" be less clear (or
in the memorable words of Hume, less forceful and vivacious)
than they are in sense.
However, Hobbes observes, our experiences of dreams
should convince us that on some occasions, specifically,
during exceedingly vivid or "convincing dreams," phantasms
of the imagination, which are to be equated to or correlated
with residual motion in the sensory organ after the
perceptual object which caused it has been removed, are
equally vivid to those which result when the object is
present and imparting motion to the relevant organ.
Hobbes claims that dream images are often as vibrant as
those which are immediately caused or imparted by the motion
of currently present external objects, precisely because in
sleep, the organs of sense are not moved at present external
objects
.
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Indeed, Hobbes tersely defines 'sleep' as "theprivation of the act of sense," and ’dreaL’ as "tLimaginations of them that sleep." (Thomas Hobbes, The
iTitor^2nd Politic , Tdnnies, Ferdinand,ed tor, 2n ed. (London: Cass, 1968), page 8.) Thus in thisslumbering condition, the motions which had been previously
tTllt
transferred by external objects, and wh^cr^Zln,some not precisely specified sense, in the sensoryorgans, are not obscured by immediate motions, and can thusgive rise to rather vivid phantasms in dreams. Hence, indreams, the previously experienced phantasms of sense ofwaking life are reexperienced as often as their
motions come to be predominant.(Hobbes, Engl ish Works
. Vol
. I, page 398).
22.
Hobbes, English Works
. Vol. I, page 398.
23.
Hobbes, English Works
. Vol. I, page 398.
24.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
pages 8-9.
25. Hobbes, English Works
. Vol. I, page 406. It should be
noted that in Chapter 6 of Leviathan
. Hobbes does mention
the pleasures of sense," and does contend that the "motion
which is called appetite, and for the appearance of itdelight and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital
motion and a help thereunto." (Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 29-
30) Unhappily, the description of this second type of sense
(B) which is contained in Leviathan is even less detailed
than that which can be found in De Corpore
.
26. See my discussion of vital motion, below, pages 10-12.
27. Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 27.
28. Hobbes, English Works
. Vol. I, page 407. It should be
noted that, within his writings, Hobbes does not, to the
best of my knowledge, specifically discuss the distinction
between vital motion, which applies specifically to (the
bodies of) living organisms, and motion simpl iciter which
relates to living, as well as to non-living material bodies.
Nevertheless, on page 109 of De Corpore (Hobbes, English
Works
,
Vol. I, page 109.), Hobbes defines motion
(simpl iciter
)
or local motion as "the continual
relinquishing of one place and acquisition of another," and
on page 407 of the same work defines vital motion as "the
motion of the blood perpetually circulating in the veins and
arteries." (Hobbes, English Works
,
Vol. I, page 407.)
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cLntrr9t'’^r pleasure and pain inhapter 25 of e^ Corpore
,
we might reasonably forward thefollowing claim:
From a physiological standpoint, if some activity in theindividual's sensory organ supports or enhances vital
mo ion, then that activity results in a conscious feeling ofpleasure to the individual.
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Conversely, if some activity in the individual's
sensory organ constricts or limits vital motion, then thatactivity results in a conscious feeling of pain to theindividual. It should be noted that the sensation ofpleasure or pain within the consciousness of the individualIS caused directly by the enhancement or restriction of
vital motion in the body and only indirectly by the factthat the organ's motion causes such enhancement or
restriction.
Further, it is not necessary that the individual inquestion recognizes that his experienced feeling of pleasure
or pain results from the enhancement or constriction of
vital motion in some portion of tissue within his body. Eventhough Hobbes would probably expect anatomists and other
relevant specialists to recognize that pleasure or pain is
caused by the enhancement or constriction of vital motion,
it is doubtful that he would expect non-specialists or "men-in-the-street" to recognize the relationship between
sensations such as pleasure and pain, and such vital bodily
motion as the circulation of blood throughout the body.
It would seem that in this process, the individual
consciously pursues an object because he believes that the
acquisition or consumption of that object will result in his
t’s^lization of some quantity of pleasure. For example, if
under such circumstances, we were to ask the individual why
he pursues the object in question, the individual would
likely respond that he does so because he believes that the
acquisition or consumption of the object will make him feel
better or will produce some quantity of satisfaction or
pleasure, and not because he believes that the acquisition
or consumption of the object will likely have the effect of
enhancing the vital motion (i.e., the circulation of blood,
etc.) within his body.
Thus, we can understand that in a purely physiol ogico-
mechanical sense, the individual's attraction to, or
motivation toward the object in question is a physical
reaction which has as its goal the preservation or
enhancement of the vital motion within the individual's
body, (and hence, the preservation of that individual's
life)
However, when we consider the individual as a sentient
or conscious being, we can understand that the enhancement
of the body’s vital motion results in the individual’s
experiencing pleasure, so that the individual consciously
pursues a desired object (of which kind he recalls having
had previously extracted pleasure) precisely because he
expects its acquisition or consumption to provide him with
some degree of pleasure.
44
33. See Hobbes, Leviathan, page 27, where Hobbes states thatit IS evident that the imagination is the first internalbeginning of all voluntary motion."
3 4 . Hobbes
,
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. Hobbes
3 6 .Hobbes
Leviathan
.
page 28.
Leviathan
.
page 28.
Leviathan
.
page 28.
37.
Hobbes, English Works
. Vol
. I, pages 407-408.
38.
Hobbes, Engl ish Works
. Vol. I, page 408.
39.
Thus, an experienced actor, that is, one who has "come to
know readily what is to be pursued and avoided" and who has
a ready use of his nerves and organs, in the pursuing and
avoiding of good and bad’* (i.e., pleasures and pains) can be
conceived of as being one who has attained a high level of
facility in (1) producing or maintaining the sense of
pleasure and in (2) eliminating or avoiding the sense of
pain within his body. Since this skill is characterized as
depending upon experience and memory, we may infer that
phantasms of sense and phantasms of memory play a
significant role in the process of creating appetites and
aversions in the body of a human being and eventually of
determining how that individual will act on a given
occasion
.
40.
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 28.
41.
Hunger might be characterized as pain caused by a
slackening of the type of vital motion related to the
nutrition of the human body, (see Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page
27
. )
In turn, such a feeling of discomfort might give rise
to an appetitive passion, which minutely moves the
individual's body in the direction of some object, the
possession of which that individual believes will have the
probable effect of alleviating his present state of
discomfort or pain by enhancing the vigorousness of the
vital motion within (the appropriate portion of) his body.
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42. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 28. Interestingly, Hobbes isasserting that human beings possess a (second order) desireo sensorial ly experience hitherto unexperienced objectswhich might eventually be discovered to prolong or enhancelife by promoting vital motion, as well as a general
aversion to heretofore unexperienced objects, the latter ofwhich appears to be grounded upon a desire to avoid any
with which might result in a hindering
of the body s vital motion. Thus, with respect to this
matter, the human organism is endowed with a generalinquisitiveness or curiosity regarding the effects of
unexperienced objects, as well as a general diffidence
regarding the effects of such objects, that is to say, ageneral tendency toward, as well as a general tendency awayfrom these unfamiliar potentially life enhancing, yet
potentially destructive objects.
43. It should be noted that when one asserts that an
individual experiences an endeavor toward some object o,
what he means to suggest is that that individual experiences
an endeavor toward the apparent location of o. This is true
since the location of the object cannot be directly known or
discerned, but can only be indicated to the sensory subject
via representative phantasms of sense.
44. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 33. Hobbes maintains that "[t]hat
which men desire, they are also said to love: and to hate
those things for which they have an aversion." (Hobbes,
Leviathan
,
page 28.) Thus, Hobbes rather unremarkably
defines love of an object or hatred of an object to be
relative to the individual who either loves (that is,
experiences a motion toward) or hates (that is, experiences
a motion away from) the object in question . Somewhat more
remarkable, however, is Hobbes's claim that the terms 'good'
and 'evil' are to be defined in terms of the preferences,
appetites and aversions of the person who uses those terms.
For example, Hobbes states that when a person refers to
some object x as 'good,' the latter person is simply
expressing the fact that he has a desire or appetite for the
object in question, and when he designates some object y
'evil,' he is expressing the fact that he finds y to be an
object of hate or aversion. Hence, Hobbes contends that "we
all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either
feel at present or expect hereafter," and that "the words
'good' and 'evil' . . . are ever used with relation to the
person that useth them." (Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 28-29.)
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, .
t»e going on to discuss in greateretail in chapter 3 of this dissertation, in the absence ofa coercive power sufficiently strong to guarantee compliancewith sovereign commands, in the prepolitical social
condition which Hobbes variously refers to as the Natural
the State of Nature, each person ispermitted to fix the referents of the terms 'good' and
evil based upon his own individual appetites and
aversions, that is based upon how he is "moved' by the
various objects, the ideas or images of which come into his
mind
.
Indeed, Hobbes denies that there exists anything which
IS simply or absolutely good or evil, "nor any common rule
of good or evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects
themselves; but from the person of the man, when there is no
commonwealth." He does concede, however, that within a
commonwealth, a "common rule of good and evil" is to be
taken from the judgment of "the person that representeth it;
or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall
by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof."(Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 29.)
Clearly, Hobbes does not mean to suggest that while in
a p r e -po 1 i t i ca 1 condition, the nature of the objects which
are variously called 'good' and 'evil' do not serve to
determine the manner in which such objects are designated,
once the commonwealth has been established, the rules
governing good and evil are to be taken from the nature of
such objects. Rather, what he is claiming is that, once a
commonwealth has been erected, the definitions and measures
of what is to be deemed 'good' and what 'evil' are to be
determined by the will of the person who has been authorized
to fix such definitions and to determine such rules (i.e.,
the sovereign).
However, since in this initial chapter I intend merely
to present a discussion of the salient features of Hobbes's
conception of the human organism, I will postpone a more
robust account of the process by which men surrender, among
other things, the right to fix the definitions of good and
evil until a later chapter.
45. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 33.
46. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 33.
47. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 33.
48. Hobbes, Engl ish Works
,
Vol . I, page 408.
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49^Perhaps at this juncture, it should be noted that a
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wate^ ef^r ^ survival (auch aa food,
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ter, tc.) are present in insufficient supply to sunnort
dp^
this condition's inhabitants. Rather, Hobbes'sescriptions appear to render it the case merely that sinces respective appetites for the same desirable,
nonshareable and indivisible objects (which in someinstances might be characterized as nonessential or
scarcity mutTl satisfied, some conception ofst be associated with this milieu.
example, while describing the character of thenatural condition of humankind in The Elements
. Hobbes
men's appetites carry themselves to one
nor
neither be enjoyed in common(Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 71.) He claimsthat in such cases, the stronger must enjoy it alone, andthat It must be decided by battle who is stronger." (HobbesElements of Law
, page 71.)
In Be Give
,
Hobbes mentions that very often the objects
which men commonly desire can be neither enjoved in common
nor divided. Thus, it Is clear that, at least in some cases,the objects which men commonly desire are either in short
supply, or are not easily accessible, that is, are properly
characterizable as scarce resources. It does not appear tobe the case, however, that these scarce objects are
necessarily resources which must be possessed by the
appropriate desirous or appetitive man in order to
facilitate his continued survival. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
page 115.)
we may note that in Leviathan
. Hobbes presents
the common appetite for a single object as the most
significant factor in determining that the natural
interactional condition of humankind is properly
characterizable as a "war of each against all." A
comprehensive examination of Hobbes's Leviathan derivation
of the state of nature will be presented on pp . 61-75
below.
50. Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory ,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), page 64.
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Sl.See for example, Hobbes’s discussion of the passions
Chanfer Q f ’charity’ in sections 16 and 17 of
page^43-44 )— (Hobbes, Elements of Law .
52. This point is forcefully confirmed in Section 2 ofChapter 1 of ^ Give , where Hobbes asserts that ”[w]e do noterefore by nature seek society for its own sake, but thathonour or profit from it.” (Hobbes, Manand Citizen
, page 111.) '
53.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 74.
54.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 74.
55. Indeed, in chapter one of De Give , we find Hobbes
commenting upon the brittleness of the frame of the humanbody, and in chapter fourteen of The Elements we find himobserving how little force is needed to effect the ’’taking
away of another man’s life.” See Hobbes, Man and Citizen ,page 114; and Hobbes, Elements of Law
, page 70.
56. Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75.
57. Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75. Since ’’prudence is but
experience,” and since experience is ultimately reducible to
sequences of sensory perception(s ) , we can see that Hobbes’s
theory of^human sensation plays a crucial foundational rolein Hobbes’s theory of prudence or natural wit.
58.
Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
page 48.
59.
Recall Hobbes’s claim that ’’when all is reckoned
together, the difference between man and man is not so
considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself
any benefit to which another might not pretend as well as
he.” (Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 74.)
60. For a more robust description of the state that
interpersonal relationships are likely to assume in the
state of nature, see my extended discussion in chapter 2 of
this dissertation.
61. Hobbes, Elements of Law
,
page 74.
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63 See my discussion of competition for desired physical
?haptet a"
'^'’e state of nature on pp . I5-66 ofC r 2 of this dissertation.
65. A doctrine which effectively denies that humanfundamentally naturally equal to one another.
beings are
66. Hobbes, Leviathan
.
pages 96-97.
67. In this matter, I construe Hobbes's argument to be
roughly the following:
1.
(Almost) every person judges it to be the case that it isbetter for him (understood reflexively) to rule himself thanIt IS to be ruled by another.
2. If (1), then for each person, it is better to rule
oneself than it is to be ruled by another.
3. Therefore, for each person, it is better to rule oneself
than it is to be ruled by another.
or, if you prefer.
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1. (Almost) every person judges it tobetter for him (understood reflexivelit is to be ruled by another.
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y) to rule himsel f
it is
than
2
If (1), then for each person, it
oneself than to be ruled by another
is better to rule
3.
If, for each person, it is better to
IS to be ruled by another, then natural
exist (and human beings are fundamental!
another (in the relevant sense)).
rule oneself than
servants do not
y equal to one
i t
4.
Therefore, natural servants
beings are fundamentally equal
relevant sense)).
do not exist (and human
to one another (in the
This argument can be seen to embody the informal
al lacy commonly referred to as argumentum ad populum, or anappeal to popular opinion, to wit, the conditional statementin premise (2) asserts that if (virtually) every personjudges it better to rule himself, than to be ruled by
another, it is thereby the case that, for each person, it is
actually better for him to rule himself than it is to be
ruled by another. Obviously, however, an opponent of Hobbes
might enquire as to why the united opinion of mankind shouldguide us in making decisions about what is true in this
matter
.
Moreover, premise (1), apparently an empirical premise,
IS subject to debate. Surely Hobbes presents us with noincontrovertible (or even compelling) evidence that this
statement is true.
68. See, for example, Hobbes's claim in The Elements of Law
that "when there was any contention between the finer and
the coarser wits (as there hath been often in times of
sedition and civil war) for the most part these latter hath
carried away the victory," (Hobbes, Elements of Law. naae
88
. )
as well as his assertion in De Give that "neither if the
wiser and the stronger do contest, have these ever or after
the upper hand of those ." (Hobbes
,
Man and Citizen, paae
143
. )
69, Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 97.
In the parallel passage from De Give
,
Hobbes contends that
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[w]hether therefore men be equal by nature theequality is to be acknowledged, or whether
' unequa 1because they are like to contest for domini”? '
be
obtaining of peace that theyesteemed as equal.
.
. .(Hobbes, Man and
^
Citizen
, page 143.)
Hobblrurg;s'?hat^
corresponding passage from The Element s,
as long as men arrogate to themselves more honourthan they give to others, it cannot be imaginedhow they can possibly live in peace: and
consequently we are to suppose, that for peace
sake, nature hath ordained this law. That every
man acknowledge other for his egua i .( Hobbes
,Elements of Law
, page 88.)
70. See endnote # 69.
71.
Which Hobbes believed at least some men had a strongtendency to do; see below, ch. 2, pages 56-57.
72.
For example, see Quentin Skinner's discussion of Hobbes's
science of politics" in Chapter 8 of Quentin Skinner'sReason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes
. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996), pages 294-326.
73.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 76.
74.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75.
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CHAPTER II
HOBBES'S DERIVATION OF THE STATE OF NATURE
A. Introduction
Each of Hobbes's three major works of political
philosophy contains a chapter in which he purports to derive
or deduce the bellicose state of nature from a consideration
of (1) the natural equality of human beings, and (2) the
passions which motivate human beings to act in particular
ways.^ In this chapter of my dissertation, I will carefully
examine the derivation of the state of nature (or the
natural condition of mankind) which can be found in Chapter
13 of Leviathan
.
By considering this derivation, I will explain why
Hobbes believes that the interactional situation which would
result from the placement of two or more men (each of whom
possesses the previously described human character) within
the same geographic region would be a rather uncertain,
belligerent and licentious state. I will devote a healthy
portion of this chapter to a discussion of the two types of
human beings whom Hobbes respectively designates "moderate
men" and "dominat ors , " and to an analysis of the function
that each plays in determining the character of the state of
nature. Even though I will concentrate my presentation
upon the account which is set forward in Leviathan
, I will,
from time to time, make reference to interesting
similarities and differences between the Leviathan
derivation and those derivations which can be found in De
Eleraents of T.aw
. I win reserve for chapter
3 a discussion of the three conceptions of the state of
nature which I believe can be legitimately culled from
Hobbes s various political writings.
Despite the differences which are apparent among the
various ’'deductions'* of the state of nature, Hobbes’s
strategy remains essentially the same in his three major
political works. Specifically, Hobbes begins each
"derivation” by remarking upon the natural equality of the
physical and intellectual qualities of all human beings, and
proceeds thereafter to draw a distinction between two types
of men, which distinction is purportedly based upon a
corresponding diversity of passions, or diversity of bodily
constitution. Specifically, Hobbes contends that some men
[sc. "dominators"] are frequently affected by overwhelming
passions which cause them to challenge, perturb, and
eventually to lash out against other men. Hobbes describes
such men as being affected by "a vain glory" and a false
esteem of their own powers [inani gloria et falsa virium
aes t imat i o ] . ^ This combination of passions^ has the
following effects upon those men who are bedeviled by them:
Primarily, such men are convinced of the falsity of the
doctrine of the fundamental natural equality of human
beings, in so far as they believe themselves to be
significantly superior to all or most of those men who
54
upon
happen to be around them. Secondly, such men are intent
validating their own feelings of, and claims to superiority
over others by actively "challenging" those others for
publicly acknowledged "respect and honors." Thirdly, such
men purportedly "take pleasure in contemplating their own
powers in acts of conquest," that is, enjoy "demonstrating"
their supposed superiority above others by undertaking
(voluntary) acts of physical aggression.
Hobbes contrasts men of the former variety with those
men [sc. "moderates"] who "rightly value their own powers,"
who "look for but an equality of nature," and who would "be
glad to be at ease within modest bounds."^ Thus, while
dominators refuse to acknowledge an equality of their powers
with those of other men, moderates freely admit an equality
of nature. Moreover, while dominators are eager to engage in
physical battles with other men for the purpose of garnering
honors, respect and praises, moderates are described as
being disinclined to undertake such potentially dangerous
battles for the mere purpose of buttressing the level of
esteem with which they are regarded by their peers.
^
Finally, while dominators are described as sometimes
endeavoring to conquer other persons "for delectation only,"
that is, because they genuinely enjoy doing so, moderates
can be expected to engage in such imperious and
"anticipatory" activity only for the purpose of preserving
their goods and their lives (i.e. "for conservation.")
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A significant point in Hobbes's analysis is that the
presence of (some) dominators within a social milieu
increases the incidence of acts of interpersonal violence,
and moreover, that the presence of dominators within that
milieu can be understood to have a pervasive and deleterious
effect upon the voluntary behavior not only of other
dominators, but of moderate men as well. Importantly then,
even though dominators are described as constituting merely
part of the social milieu, their presence can, nevertheless,
be understood to have a profound effect upon the behavior of
most or all of the men in their vicinitv.^
Dominators and moderates differ not only because the
actions of the members of the former category are more
likely than are those of members of the latter to be
motivated by such passions as anger and vain-glory, but
moreover, because the opinions and actions of members of the
former category are much less liable to be affected by
rational arguments than are the opinions and actions of
members of the latter category. In light of the various
comments Hobbes makes about this issue, I believe that
dominators can be properly understood as men whose violent
passions predominate over their faculties of reason,^
Before presenting Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the
state of nature, I will briefly discuss Hobbes's explicitly
acknowledged distinction between dominators and moderates.
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B^ some Thoughts on the Di sHnctlon
and Dominators
It appears certain that the widespread known presence
of dominators within a social milieu has the effect of
coloring the character which the resulting interactional
situation among those constituent individuals assumes. As
will become clear during the course of chapters 3
, 4 , 5 , and
6 of this dissertation, the known presence of dominators
within a population can be similarly understood to have
enormous consequences upon (1) the willingness of the
members of that population to enter into collective
organizational units such as commonwealths, as well as (2)
the willingness of members of already established
organizational units such as commonwealths to remain members
or parts of such units. Thus, my immediately forthcoming
exploration of the distinction between dominators and
moderates can be seen to be relevant to my subsequent
discussions of the formation and maintenance of the
commonwealth, and should thus be included in this present
chapter
.
It is apparent that we can trace much of the
disharmonious temper of the condition which Hobbes
designates the state of nature” or ”the natural condition
of mankind" to the presence of certain antisocial passions,
most notably 'pride' and 'vain glory,' within the bodily
constitutions of some of the men who populate this
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condition. As we have seen, this is true both in Hobbes's
earlier political treatises, in which vanity or vain glory
is explicitly identified as the prime generating factor of
the bellicose natural condition of mankind, and in
Leviathan
, where the pernicious influence of such passions
is somewhat more carefully, if not intentionally, concealed.
Given the aforementioned equality of human intellectual
facilities, dominators presumably possess the ability to
reason from premisses to conclusions (which Hobbes describes
as a rather mechanical faculty).^® However, either because
of the overwhelming influence of their antisocial passions
(such as anger and a desire for vengeance), because of their
inclination to significantly overrate their own level of
power vis-a-vis that of other men, or because of a
disinclination to exercise their faculties of reason,
dominators do not make full active use of these rational
faculties. Thus, it would seem that dominators are
frequently prompted to act in an antisocial or imperious
fashion for the following two reasons:
(1) Although dominators can formulate and practically use
(i.e., employ through voluntary activity) valid arguments,
they have a tendency to insert in their arguments (or
instances of practical reasoning) premises which are based
upon false estimates of their own status vis-a-vis those of
other men. Such premises might be understood as statements
or claims based upon the belief that the reasoner is
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significantly more valuable or more worthy of respect than
those men around him.
(2) nominators are often unable to benefit from the
conclusions of reason because of the presence of such
violent passions as anger and an inveterate desire for
vengeance
.
In the first instance, (1), it might be true that
although dominators can reason correctly, they often arrive
at false conclusions due to the faulty nature of their
presuppositions, and the falsity of the corresponding
premises. Consequently, when dominators use such a
conclusion to guide or work in conjunction with a motive
passion, the resulting voluntary action, though perhaps
effective in securing the actor temporary access to some
desired good, will, in the long term, likely lead to
mistrust, social instability, and a rather unenviable living
situation
.
In the second case, (2), it might be true that even
though dominators can, and often do, reason correctly by
employing valid arguments and true premises, the results (or
true conclusions) of this reasoning process cannot be
properly employed or put into practice either because (2A)
such men possess insufficiently strong passions or endeavors
to comply with or motivate the course of action associated
with the result of this reasoning process or (2B) on those
occasions when such conclusions could be profitably put into
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voluntary actions of such men are motivated by
such perturbations as anger and which effectively by-
pass the conclusions of reason. In oases of type (2A), the
dominator can be understood as failing to act in compliance
with the conclusion or dictate of reason because he fails to
possess any sufficiently strong desire or other passion to
carry or "assist" that conclusion. In cases of type (2B),
the dominator can be understood as failing to act in
compliance with such a dictate because the passion or desire
u^hich would otherwise motivate acting in such a manner is
notably weaker or less persistent than the more violent
passion which, in a sense, overwhelms the former. In cases
of the former type (2A), the difficulty lies simply in the
reasoner's lacking a sufficient motive for acting in
accordance with his dictate of reason, while in cases of the
latter type (2B), the difficulty lies in the predominance of
violent passions which interfere with the reasoner's
internal process of translating the dictate of reason into
the utility of practice.
Thus, we may conclude that the voluntary actions of
dominators are less amenable than those of moderates to the
suggestions or precepts of reason. This will be true if we
understand precepts of reason to be those which, if
faithfully followed by all or most men, will lead to a
condition of peace, an avoidance of a violent death, and in
all likelihood, a maximization of one's life span. Because
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the moderate is not frequently affected by the disruptive
passions (of the above described type), he is better able
than the dominator to act in accordance with the laws of
nature which Hobbes describes as "precepts of reason," and
which we might understand as rules for interpersonal conduct
which, if widely observed, will foster a condition of social
peace. By contrast, since the disruptive passions have a
profound effect in determining the behavior of the
dominator, we might reasonably infer that such passions are
frequently of sufficient force to overpower or overrule
whatever (comparatively weak) "passions toward peace" the
dominator might experience, and hence to cause him to
refrain from acting in accordance with the precepts toward
peace (or laws of nature) which reason suggests.
C. The Leviathan Derivation
In his various derivations of the state of nature,
Hobbes endeavors to imagine how a number of solitary human
beings would most likely behave if they were forced to
confront one another in a condition bereft of a common
sovereign mechanism that is of sufficient strength to
guarantee a condition of peace and safety. In his
derivations, Hobbes presupposes a conception [or
understanding] of human beings as fundamentally equal,
predominantly egoistic creatures. Moreover, Hobbes believes
that some (never precisely specified) proportion of men can
be properly characterized as dominators, whose violent
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passions frequently effect the character of their voluntary
behavior
.
When he begins his actual Leviathan derivation of the
state of nature, Hobbes speculates that the natural equality
of human beings would give rise to a recognition of such
equality on the part of many or most men. This, in turn,
would foster an equality of hope for the attainment of those
physical objects which one desires. Further, this equality
of hope, coupled with the influence of Hobbes's
predominantly egoistic psychology, would give rise to a
general willingness to enter into interpersonal competition
for the purpose of establishing sole control over desired
objects. This, in turn, and would eventually lead to the
occurrence of actual, perhaps violent competitive struggles.
Further, since each man in this condition would eventually
come to recognize that those around him harbor a willingness
to enter into competitive struggles, and would eventually
come to observe (or be involved in) such struggles, then
each man would develop a general diffidence or uncertainty
regarding the future behavior of those around him. Such an
attitude of diffidence, coupled with (1) a recognition that
the behavior of those men around him could result in the
termination of his own life and (2) an intense fear of
losing his life, would eventually lead each man to recognize
that he must engage in "anticipatory" activity in order to
make more likely the continuance of his own life (and to
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make less likely his own violent death). Finally, Hobbes
contends that the social condition which would result from
these circumstances could properly be characterized as a
condition of war, since he understands war to consist "not
in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of
time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently
known
.
Even though Hobbes gives his reader the initial
impression that this derivation constitutes a direct
unilinear sequence of steps, it quickly becomes clear that
there are various elements or factors which impact upon this
process, but nevertheless are not directly caused by the
immediately prior step. Indeed, several of these elements or
factors are directly related to the presence of dominators
within the social mix.
For example, we might reasonably maintain that the
presence of dominators will make the competitive struggles
for material goods more intense or more frequent than would
be the case if the population were composed exclusively of
moderates. This would be due primarily to the fact that a
dominator can be expected to act unsociably by striving to
obtain and retain those goods "which to himself are
superfluous and to others necessary
. Moreover, we might
reasonably contend that the presence of dominators will
result in a greater number of aggressive acts intended to
assure to the actor honor, glory or praise than would be the
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case if the population were composed exclusively of
moderates
.
Further, Hobbes contends that the right of nature
licenses men to do anything which they consider necessary to
preserve their own lives, even though some of the
individuals in the social mix, (that is, dominators) can be
expected to engage in violent acts even whan they do not
sincerely believe that such acts constitute necessary means
to their own self-preservation. This third point is
forcefully confirmed when Hobbes asserts that some men can
be expected to engage in violent acts not for the sake of
conservation or self-preservation, but merely because such
activity provides them with some degree of "delectation.*'^^
Thus, the character of the derivation of the state of
nature as a direct linear sequence is undermined by the
following three considerations: (A) dominators (whose
influence would seem to fall outside of such a direct linear
sequence) can be expected to increase the number and
intensity of interpersonal competitive struggles by
attempting to gain access to and retain those goods which
they recognize to be necessary to support the "conservation"
of their rivals but not of themselves; (B) dominators can be
expected to add to the index of violent acts by engaging in
strategies designed to assure to themselves greater honor
and respect; and (C) dominators can be expected to initiate
violent acts even when they do not sincerely believe that
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such acts constitute necessarv ..y means to guarantee their own
P-seruation.
.one of these three elements can he seen to
neatly into the direct unilinear developmental seguence
described on pp . 62-63 above.
Moreover, the right of nature, which also does not fit
neatly into Hobbes's L^yi^ derivation, can he seen to
play a somewhat enigmatic role. Specifically, the right of
nature is introduced as licensing men to engage in whatever
acts they consider necessary to preserve their lives, yet
Hobbes specifies that some men can be expected to act in
violently aggressive ways even when they do not sincerely
believe that such acts are necess;,,-vce sary to preserve their own
1 i ves
.
This being said, I will now proceed to examine Hobbes’s
actual Layiathan derivation of the state of nature.
In paragraph 6 of chapter 13 of Leviathan
. Hobbes
enumerates three principal causes of quarrel among men in
their natural state, namely, competition, diffidence, and
glory.
Regarding the first, Hobbes was of the opinion that
man’s equality of ability^ naturally gives rise to an
equality in hope for the attainment of one’s ends. Thus, if
two men desire an object which only one of the two can
possess, the two become enemies with each endeavoring to
destroy or subdue"’* the other, since destroying one’s
adversary will allow one free (albeit, temporary) access to
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that desired object. Hobbea auggeata that a recoanitl^ef
the fundamental equality of human beinga will encourage men
to enter into such competitive struggles. For example, in
the state of nature, if both individual A and individual B
desire some object O, if A recognizes that B desires O, if B
recognizes that A desires O, if A recognizes that he is
roughly equal to E and if B recognizes that he is
roughly equal to A, then in all likelihood both A and B
would be willing to enter into a battle with the other for
the sole possession and control of O. This would be true
since each would think himself to be reasonably assured of
victory (or, a_t the very least
,
at no disadvantage) in such
a battle. Further, such an orientation toward the
acquisition and consumption of desired objects can be
understood to be fostered (or encouraged) by Hobbes's
predominantly egoistic psychology which specifies that
self interested motives tend to take precedence over non-
self-interested motives in determining human actions."^**
This tendency to be willing to enter into competitive
battles for the sole control of desired objects will be even
stronger if we take seriously Hobbes's claim that most men
have a tendency to overvalue themselves vis-a-vis other
humans
.
Moreover, Hobbes claims that given the previously
described ("all reckoned together" type of) equality among
human beings, if any man "plant, sow, build or possess a
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convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come
prepared with forces united to deprive him of'^^ his goods
as well as his life. Further, Hobbes contends that after
such plunder has occurred, the invader may expect to be in
like danger of invasion by another. Hence, there naturally
arises a general diffidence of one’s fellow men among persons
in this precarious condition. This diffidence, in turn,
gives rise to acts of "anticipation.”
Hobbes notes that by 'anticipation' he understands the
activity "by force or wiles, [of mastering] the persons of
all men that one can so long, till he see[s] no other power
great enough to endanger him."^^ Seemingly, anticipation
can take either of two forms. The first consists of striking
out against one (or more) of one's rivals because one
believes that that rival has designs upon attacking him (the
former )
.
For example, we might imagine that individual A has
secured possession of some physical object which he believes
individuals B and C desire. Further, we might suppose that A
believes that B and C (either individually, or more likely,
col 1 ectively ) are planning to attack him for the purpose of
dispossessing him of this coveted object. In this first
variety, anticipation might consist of A's attacking B and C
(presumably separately) before they can attack him. We can
quite easily see that the dynamics of the state of nature,
encouraged by a universal fear of death and a widespread
67
-spiciousn^ss fostered by uncertainty (regarding how one's
fallow inhabitants win voluntarily act), could give rise to
instances of "higher order" anticipation in which, for
^>=an,ple, B wi 1 1 attack A because he thinks that A will aoon
attack B in order to prevent B's attack on him (A).
Though it does seem plausible that such instances of
"atriking first" would occur in the state of nature, Hobbes
consistently characterizes anticipation as an activity
Wherein one attempts to systematically
"master or subdue"
(rather than simply to kill, destroy or harm) the "persons
of all the men he can." Therefore, the fundamental aim of
anticipation is not simply to destroy one's fell ow man. 25
but rather, to conquer, and consequently, to use the
latter's power for one's own defensive purposes.
Indeed, when discussing this issue, Hobbes claims that
even men "who would be at ease within modest bounds," i.e.
moderates, must seek to increase their power by invasion
since "they would not be able, long time standing on their
own defense to subsist. Further, he contends that "such
augmentation or dominion over men [is] necessary to a man's
conservation."^^ [my emphasis]
As has already been mentioned in chapter 1 of this
dissertation, Hobbes regards the termination of one's own
life (or the termination of the vital motion within one's
own body) as the surrmum malum or greatest evil that can
befall any man. Thus, because Hobbes attributes such
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importance to the passion which he designates "a fear of
death," we might safely infer that this passion plays a
significant role in determining the character of the
voluntary actions of men in the state of nature. Indeed, in
^ ements—of Law
, Hobbes lucidly states that^^
forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to
will and desire bonum sibi
,
that which is good forthemselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful:but most of all that terrible enemy of nature,
. it is not against reason that a mandoth all he can to preserve his own body and limbsboth from death and pain.
Certainly, in light of Hobbes's various pronouncements
concerning the fear of death and the desire to preserve
one s life, it would be difficult to overestimate the
significance that these two passions have in determining the
voluntary behavior of individuals, and the eventual
interactional character of the state of nature.
Thirdly, Hobbes introduces and describes what I find to
the most intriguing of the principal causes of quarrel in
the state of nature, namely, a desire for glory.
Specifically, Hobbes contends that in the state of nature
(where there exists no central authority or sovereign power
which is of sufficient strength to "overawe" all men),
"[e]very man looketh that his companion should value him at
the same rate he sets upon himself: and, upon all signs of
contempt, naturally endeavors ... to extort a greater
value from his contemners by damage, and from others by the
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example."” However, because most men net a higher value
upon their own intellectual powera than they net upon the
intellectual powers of nearly any other man, and because we
might reasonably assume that men who would be willing to
attack others in order to obtain "trifles, as a word, a
smile [or] a different opinion, "« would require but the
flimsiest of excuses in order to begin carrying out such
acts of "invasion," the state of nature would clearly be one
of unrestrained, unpredictable, and in many cases,
frivolously based violence.
With respect to the latter point, it is conceivable
that after becoming aware of the presence of dominators
within his vicinity, a moderate man will attempt to garner
honors and respect, but will do so for the sake of obviating
the offensive attacks of the other men in his vicinity, (the
latter of whom will, if the stratagem is successful, stand
in awe of the recipient of such honors and respect and will,
in consequence, be discouraged from assailing that
recipient )
.
Hobbes is quick to emphasize that such instances or
voluntary acts of invasion or preemptive violence are no
more than what the invader's conservation requires and are
generally allowed. Presumably, what Hobbes is saying is that
since in the state of nature, invasion is generally required
for a man's self preservation, it is generally allowed or
sanctioned by the right of nature. However, Hobbes states
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ler
that "some men," namely, those men we have called
dominators, take pleasure in contemplating their own pew,
in acts of conquest, and pursue such conquering activity
"further than their security requires.
Thus, in Leviathan, (as in Hobbes's earlier political
rks), engaging in the type of conquering activity which
some men pursue farther than they sincerely believe their
security requires is allowed (in a weak sense) to all men in
the state of nature (and exercised specifically by
dominators), but is not sanctioned by the right of nature.
Hence, the distinction apparent in Hobbes's earlier works
between an action's being sanctioned by the right of nature,
and an action's being permitted merely in virtue of not
being forbidden by any extant sovereign authority again
emerges in Leviathan
.
In Leviathan
,
Hobbes defines the 'right of nature'
as 32
the liberty each man has to use his own power, ashe will himself, for the preservation of his
nature; that is to say, of his life, and
consequently of doing any thing which in his ownjudgment, and reason, he shall conceive the aptest
means thereunto.
For example, since the use of force or wiles, that is, of
anticipatory strategies, to master the persons of other men
is necessary to insure one's safety or conservation, Hobbes
claims it is "generally al lowed. However, he does not,
in this location, specify who allows such activity (i.e..
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God or other men), and why the adjective 'generally- ia
used. (Does Hobbes mean to suggest, e.g., that some
"specific" instances exist in which self preservation
requires the dominion over other men but in which attempting
to gain such dominion is not allowed?)^*
Further, in De_Cive, when Hobbes discusses the desire
and will to hurt which all men in the state of nature
possess, he announces that this will is "not equally to be
condemned. That is, those men who are caused to desire
to harm others by vain glory and excessive self-esteem, are
worthy of a greater degree of condemnation than are those
whose desire to harm is caused by the necessity of
preserving their lives.
A unique feature of Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of
the state of nature concerns the apparent prominence of
place given to the common appetite for a single object among
two or more men in helping to generate a social condition
which is properly charact eri zabl e as "a war of each against
all." Though while in his earlier political works, Hobbes
had discussed the conflict caused by a common desire for a
single object, he had discussed the generation of such
conflicts only after having described the conflicts
generated by "vain glory" and "comparison," and had done so
in a rather cursory fashion. By contrast, in Leviathan 's
natural state chapter, a common appetite for a single object
is presented as the predominant interactional feature which
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fosters the generation of a wholesale war of each against
al 1
Strikingly, what uniquely emerges in Hobbes's Leviathan
derivation of the state of nature is an orientation among
Its inhabitants toward the bases of a commodious existence
and tbe presence of a desire to obtain tbe corresponding
goods (ratber than a desire for the bare necessities of lifa
or the bases for a mere subsistence level of existence). For
example, one will notice that when Hobbes discusses the
competition for desirable material goods, he lists as
examples of the latter a convenient seat, which a man can be
conceived of as building and possessing, as well as
agricultural crops which a man can be conceived of as
planting, sowing and harvesting.
In essence, in his Leviathan derivation, Hobbes imbues
his state of nature's inhabitants with somewhat more
sophisticated or highly developed desires and tastes than
had been explicitly included within his earlier derivations.
In fact, in an illuminating passage from the final paragraph
of chapter 13 of Leviathan
. Hobbes asserts that "the
passions that incline men to peace are fear of death; desire
of such things as are necessary to commodious living and a
hope by their industry to obtain them."^’^
Thus, according to Hobbes's Leviathan derivation, a
fundamental equality of human powers (and a widespread
recognition of such) coupled with some degree of
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interpersonal competition for desired goods, a widespread
and intense fear of death ^ a recognition of the presence
of dominators within one's vicinity gives rise to a general
diffidence among men. Such diffidence might be interpreted
as stemming from a widespread inability to reliably predict
the voluntary actions of one's fellow men, and as embodying
an attitude of justifiably chary suspicion and a tendency to
expect (or to actively prepare for) rapacious or violently
antisocial behavior from such men. Moreover, Hobbes believed
that this general diffidence would gradually give rise to
acts of "anticipation," and eventually, to a condition of
war of every man against every other man.
Nevertheless, it might serve us well to regard Hobbes's
Leviathan derivation of the state of nature as constituting
a change of emphasis from his earlier works, rather than a
wholesale change of the doctrine by which the state of
nature as a war of each against all can be imagined to be
generated
.
Even though on one level, the war of each against all
can be traced to the enmity and finally to the physical
conflicts which arise due to a common appetite among two (or
more) men for a single desired object, which eventually
prompts those two (or more) men to attempt to obtain that
object through some voluntary activity, it appears that on a
deeper level this process can be understood as being
predicated upon the necessity of adopting a confrontational
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mode of action in response to the presence of dominators in
one's vicinity. In turn, the behavior (i.e., the voluntary
activity) of dominators can be understood to he motivated by
the frequent presence, within their own bodies, of such
perturbational passions as those which cause "a vain esteem
of one's own powers
.
It is therefore due to the presence of men who are
bedeviled by the passions of vain esteem, pride and a desire
for glory that an augmentation of dominion of persons
becomes a necessary means to each man's conservation, and it
is for this reason that such passions (and the voluntary
acts which the latter motivate) can be understood to
determine the interactional character of Hobbes's Leviathan
presentation of the state of nature.
D. Concluding Remarks
To recapitulate, we have seen that Hobbes includes
within each of his three major works of political philosophy
a derivation of the interactional state of nature which is
based upon his construal of the nature of individual human
beings. Further, we have commented upon the significant role
which the natural equality of human beings plays in this
derivation, as well as the importance which can be
attributed to Hobbes's predominantly egoistic psychological
theory. Moreover, we have emphasized the importance which
the presence of so-called dominators in the interactive
lieu has in determining the character of Hobbes's state ofmi
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e perturbational
nature and, as such, the role which th
passions play in determining the interactional character of
this condition.
Although Hobbes initially presents a distinction among
men in the state of nature between those who are content
with an equality of nature and those who are eager to
demonstrate their supposed superiority over others in acts
of predation and conquest, by the end of each of Hobbes’s
three natural state chapters, all men can, for the reasons
indicated above, be expected to behave in roughly the same
40manner. We will now move on to consider the three
conceptions or varieties of the state of nature which I
believe can be found in, or reconstructed from Hobbes's
writings
.
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page 75.
6 Even though it is conceivable that some moderate men inhe state of nature will choose to attempt to garnish
praises, we must nevertheless understandthat they will do so n^ because of the influence of theirperturbational passions and the incidence of the
accompanying vainglorious beliefs, but rather because such
men sincerely judge this activity to be a necessary means topreserving their own lives. See below, pages 70-72.
7. Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75.
After discussing, in section 2 of chapter 14, of The
El ements
—
of Law the natural equality of human beings, Hobbesbegins section 3 by drawing a distinction between two types
of men, which distinction is purportedly based upon or
caused by a corresponding "diversity of passions."
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claims that "some [men] are vainly
their°f^'l
precedency and superiority abovefellows, while other men are moderate and look for
pagr?l )
nature." (Hobbes, Elements of
4=
Hobbes proceeds, in section 4 of chapter 1ot
gg.
Cive
,
to present and discuss the aforementioneddistinction between the temperate man who rightly values hispower (i.e., the moderate), and the vainglorious man whosupposes himself naturally superior to others (i.e., the
ominator)
. In this section, Hobbes proclaims that thetemperate man "according to that natural equality which isamong us^,^ permits as much to others as he assumes tohimself." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
page 114.) By contrastthe vainglorious man who possesses a "fiery spirit " and who
supposes himself above the rest, will have a license to do
as he lists and to "[challenge] respect and honors as due tohim before others." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
page 114.)Hence, the "moderate" or temperate man would appear to
possess a rather more realistic assessment of the natural
character of men, since he, unlike the "dominator,"
recognizes the natural equality of humans. As a consequence
of possessing this realistic view of the natural human
powers, the temperate man is disinclined to challenge others
for respect and honors." Since the moderate man recognizes
that he is fundamentally equal to other men with respect to
his physical powers, he would appear to be less likely than
the vainglorious man to confront situations in which he
believes that others are undervaluing his abilities. Because
the vainglorious "dominator" considers himself to be
superior to others, he will believe that he is being
undervalued (or treated with less than the appropriate level
of respect) even on those occasions when he is being treated
no less respectfully than are his fellows.
Moreover, the "dominator" is more willing than the
"moderate" to "do as he lists" by taking more than he allows
others and by aggressively challenging those whom he
believes have slighted him precisely because he is more
convinced than the moderate that he will be capable of
demonstrating his supposed superiority over a rival in a
physical conflict. That is to say, since the moderate man
correctly judges that the prospect of emerging victorious in
any one-on-one physical battle is rather uncertain, he will,
in all likelihood, take steps to avoid the possibility of
defeat (which might result in the loss of his life) by
endeavoring to eschew such battles. By contrast, since the
vainglorious man is likely to hold unrealistically
optimistic beliefs concerning his ability to defeat others
in battle, it seems that he will be willing to initiate and
engage in such battles somewhat more frequently than will
the moderate.
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8 Though Hobbes does not, in any of his three works onphilosophy, specify the precise percentage ofdominators (who are liable to act upon the desire to provokers through taunts or other signs of contempt or upon the
putatively scarce materialgoods) within the human population, he does nevertheless
state in the Elements that the "greatest part of men doupon no assurance of odds, through vanity or comparison
' orappetite provoke the rest who would otherwise by contented
with equality." (Hobbes, Elements of Law
,
page 71.) This
opinion should, however, be contrasted with Hobbes's claimin The Author's Preface to De Give that men are not evil by
nature, and that "the wicked [are] fewer than the
righteous." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
.
page 75.)
Additionally, note well Hobbes's somewhat troubling
asseveration in Chapter 13 of Leviathan that "almost all menpossess a vain conceit of [their] own wisdom." (Hobbes
Leviathan
.
page 74.)
Though Hobbes does waver a bit on the question of the
exact proportion of dominators among humankind, what does
emerge as significant in his various discussions of this
topic is that each sizable group of human beings contains
some proportion of men who might properly be designated
'moderates,' as well as some proportion of men who might
appropriately be labeled 'dominators.'
9 . The point made in this paragraph will be discussed at
greater length in the section entitled "Some thoughts on the
distinction between dominators and moderates" which begins
on page 57 of this dissertation.
10. See Hobbes's discussion of reason as a mechanical human
faculty in the opening paragraphs of Chapter 5 of Leviathan
(Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 22-23.), as well his discussion of
the relationship between reason and the passions
( speci f i ca 1 1 y those which he designates the "perturbations
of the mind which frequently obstruct right reason") in
Chapter 12 of De Homine
.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
pages 55-
56. )
11. See Hobbes's discussion of the specific perturbations of
the mind such as anger, pride, excessive self esteem and
Pnvi<; in Chapter 12 of De Homine . (Hobbes, Man and Citizen ,
pages 55-61
.
)
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12 Hobbes I
^_
iathan
,
page 76. Moreover, since Hobbesbelieves that human beings will eventually recognize thatthey must engage in anticipatory activity if they wish to
continued survival, we might reasonablyontend that the fully developed state of nature willinclude many actual instances of violent interpersonal
conflict and not just a mere willingness on the part of mento engage in such violent conflict.
13. Hobbes Leviathan, page 95. See Hobbes’s discussion ofthe law of nature concerning mutual accommodation and
endnote #36, below.
14.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75.
15.
Perhaps this developmental sequence can be diagrammed inthe following manner:
Equality + Predominant egoism
1
Recognition of Equality
i
Willingness to Engage «- Desire for Goods ^ Predominant
in Competitive Struggles Egoism
i
Actual Occurrence of Presence of nominators
Competitive Struggles
1 1
Diffidence of
Fellow Men
1
Interpersonal
Violence
Recognition of Need •-
for Anticipation
(Even among Moderates)
Interpersonal
Viol ence
Desire for
Glory
Presence
of
nominators
1
State of War
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hough we might initially conceive this developmentalsequence as encompassing only the elements on the left sideof this page, when we more closely consider Hobbes's
erivation, we find that the presence of dominators withinhas the effect of (A) increasing the
which competitive struggles occur, of (B)
number of "glory based" acts of violence and
. ^
^ widespread diffidence of one's fellow men(which, in turn, will foster a recognition of the need toengage in anticipatory acts), and of (C) increasing the
number of violent acts which are performed "for delectation
only. (and of further fostering a widespread diffidence
etc
. )
'
the social mix
frequency with
increasing the
thus fostering
16. See my discussion of the right of nature on pages 70-72.
17
.
Construed, most rudimentari 1 y , as an ability to strike
out against, and to take away the life of any other person.
18.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75.
l^'Io which case the rough equality which B recognizes
relates to the equal ability of A and B to take away the
life of the other (and, of course, the equal vulnerability
of A and B to have his life taken away by the other).
20.
Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory
,
page 64.
21.
Though perhaps only "slightly stronger." Since the
natural powers of one's own mind, which, in Leviathan
,
Hobbes thinks nearly all men have a tendency to overvalue,
might enable its possessor to concoct clever strategies with
which to outsmart his opponent, such (putatively superior)
intellectual powers would certainly not directly enable him
to defeat his opponent in hand-to-hand combat. See Hobbes,
Leviathan
,
page 75.
22. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 75.
23. In the El ements , Hobbes expressed a belief that in the
absence of any coercive restrictions, dominators will
actively take measures to demonstrate their supposed
"precedency and superiority over others through the use of
force." (Hobbes, Elements of Law
,
page 71.)
24.
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 75.
25.
Which nevertheless, does have its place in the state of
nature
.
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26. Hobbes, leviathan
. page 75
.
the text,
'H^fbif^^ls^?o%iscuss*'th'"^^^'benefits of being conan^rJ ^ Possible defensive
state of nature subdued by other men in the
28.
Hobbes, Element s of Law
, page 71.
29.
Hobbes, Leviathan
^ page 75.
30.
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 76.
31. See Hobbes, Leviathan
. page 75 Dararfrai-.K /i o u
seek^peaL^as far'^arhe^has^h enjoinf him to
does Lt sinLreW L^Lv^t^ar it) when he
guaran?erhil ini^ia^es are‘n:celsarr?rantee h s own survival
.
^
32. Hobbes, Leviathan
. page 79.
makefthi; Paragraph 4, line 5. Hobbesduring his explanation of how a widespread
thff point anfmv°a^
<=ondition of war. See my discussion of
conLnt of "anfi • ^°'"°"'P®Pyan9 explanation of Hobbes'sncep ticipation" on pages 67-68, above.
34^As mentioned earlier, Hobbes claims that some men in thestate of nature take pleasure in contemplating their ownpower in acts conquest which they pursue farther than theirsecurity requires." (Hobbes, Leviathan
, page 75 ) Telling y
"anora" : the actions of this typ^ar;
w^’ir w r"' though there is a clear sense inch such acts are physically possible and thus able to beperformed (and hence, allowed). By contrast, when Hobbesdiscussed those acts of invasion which men "who wouldbe glad to be at ease within modest bounds"
( obbes , Leviathan
,
page 75.) must employ in order to
lives and physical soundness, he proclaimsthat such augmentation of dominion over men
. . . ought tobe allowed.
.
, (Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75.)
35.
Hobbes, M_an and Citizen
,
page 114. Additionally, see mydiscussion of diffidence and anticipatory strategies onpages 66-68, above.
36.
During his discussion of the fifth law of nature, "that
every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest," in
Chapter 15 of Leviathan
. Hobbes points out
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that there is in men's aptness for society, adiversity of nature, rising from their diversity
of affections; not unlike that we see in stonesbrought together for building an edifice
that stone which by the asperity andirregularity of figure, takes more room from
others, than it itself fills; and for the
hardness, cannot be easily made plain, and therebyhindreth the building, is by the builders cast
away as unprofitable and troublesome: so also, a
man that by the asperity of nature, will strive to
retain those things which to himself are
superfluous and to others necessary; and for
the stubbornness of his passions cannot be
corrected, is to be left or cast aside, as
cumbersome thereunto. For seeing that every man,
not only by right but also by necessity of nature
is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain
that which is necessary for his conservation; he
that shall pose himself against it for things
superfluous is guilty of the war that thereupon is
to follow. (Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 95; Cf . Psalms
118:22)
In this passage, Hobbes is asserting that there exist some
men whose incorrigible tendency to take more than their fair
share from the stock of available material resources makes
them particularly unsuited for life within cooperative
social groupings. When he speaks of those men whose stubborn
passions cannot be corrected, "who will strive to retain
those things which to himself are superfluous and to others
necessary," and whose nature forces them to (figuratively)
take more room than they are entitled, Hobbes appears to be
making a clear reference to dominators . In turn, when Hobbes
contends (in Chapter 13 of Leviathan ) that a common desire
for some coveted material object gives rise to competitive
conflicts among men, and that such conflicts will eventually
lead to a wholesale condition of war, we might, in light of
the abovequoted passage, plausibly infer that Hobbes
considered dominators to bear special responsibility in this
process. That is to say, the presence of dominators might be
considered to make competitive conflicts for desired objects
more widespread than it would be in their absence since such
men would be willing to enter into competitive conflicts for
the control not only of those objects which they believe to
be necessary to sustain their continued existence, but
moreover, for those objects which they recognize to be
necessary to sustain the existence of other men in their
vicinity (their likely rivals), but not to sustain their own
lives.
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38. Hobbes, Levi a than
,
page 76. Indeed, Hobbes describes
dominators as "taking pleasure in contemplating their own
power in the acts of conquest which they pursue farther than
their security requires, while in the Latin version of
Leviathan
, Hobbes claims "that there are those who from
pride and a desire for glory would conquer the whole world."
(Hobbes, Leviathan
.
p. 76.)
39. An issue which remains questionable in my mind, however,
concerns the character which social relations in the state
of nature would assume if dominators were excluded from this
social milieu. I raise this issue because although Hobbes
consistently draws a distinction between moderates and
dominators, he nevertheless claims that since all men think
well of themselves and hate to see the same in others, "they
must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of
contempt and hatred." (Hobbes, Elements of Law
,
page 71.)
One naturally becomes curious as to whether Hobbes here
means to suggest that (1) because all human beings hate
perceiving others to be superior, or even equal to
themselves, and because some men experience strong
antisocial passions which they cannot or will not suppress,
there will necessarily arise verbal taunts, insults and
presumably acts of interpersonal violence which will be
perpetrated by dominators; or whether he means to suggest
that (2) because all human beings hate perceiving others to
be superior, or even equal to themselves, it is necessarily
true that even within a natural state populated wholly by
moderates, verbal taunts, insults, etc. would be initiated.
A careful (albeit isolated) reading of this passage seems to
reveal that Hobbes intended the second interpretation,
though it is unlikely that Hobbes was interested to discuss
such a count erf actua 1 situation.
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CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF THE STATE OF NATURE
A. Introduction
In this chapter, I will examine the expository feature
or heuristic device employed in Hobbes's political
philosophy which is commonly referred to as "the state of
nature" or the "natural condition of humankind." The state
of nature plays a prominent role in Hobbes's philosophy,
since it is meant to represent the pre-political state of
human interaction, that is, an interactive condition which
is characterized by the absence of an effective common
sovereign power and the retention of a "right to all things"
on the part of each individual inhabitant or "natural man,"
or, as we shall see later in this chapter, on the part of
each multiperson sovereign unit.^
Admittedly, Hobbes's account (or more properly, "series
of accounts") of the state of nature will strike the
attentive reader as being somewhat sloppily organized and
desultorily presented. In fact, an uncharitable critic might
judge that, taken together, Hobbes's various references to,
and descriptions of, the state of nature represent a
hodgepodge of inconsistent, mutually cont radi ctory
,
and
seemingly ad hoc pronouncements concerning a concept which
this author forwards as a significant expository device, but
which he seemingly expended little effort to clearly develop
and perspicuously express. For example, at times Hobbes
insists that the state of nature has never existed in the
course of human history, yet at other times he remarks that
such a state not only existed in the histories of "our
ancestors" but continues to exist in the savage parts of
America, as well as in the contemporary international arena.
Thus, I do not mean to suggest that within each of his three
major political works, Hobbes presents a systematic
discussion of the three conceptions of the state of nature
which I will discuss below, or that Hobbes makes a special
to describe, compare and contrast the three
conceptions which I will mention. I do mean to suggest,
however, that each of Hobbes's various references to, and
discussions of "the state of nature" can be associated with
one of three relatively broad conceptions of a pre-political
state. Each of these three conceptions can be designated
"pre-political" precisely because each lacks a common
coercive mechanism or common sovereign authority which is of
sufficient power to command obedience from or maintain a
condition of peace among the various individuals or
"persons" who inhabit, or constitute the "matter" of this
interactional condition.
I do contend further that Hobbes believed the state of
nature to be an abiding condition of human interaction. By
this I mean that Hobbes believed that given the nature of
the human organism, a condition approximating the state of
nature will be observable in the arena of human interaction.
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regardless of whether the entities interacting are natural
persons or such artificial entities as sovereign states.
Prel iminarv--A Note on Methnrl ^
In chapter 1 of Corpore
, Hobbes defines philosophy
as 'such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire
by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of
its causes or generations: and again, of such causes or
generations as may be had from knowing first their
effects."^ In turn, he asserts that^
the subject of philosophy, or the matter it treats
of, is every body of which we can conceive any
generation, and which we may, by any consideration
thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is
capable of composition or resolution; that is to
say, every body of whose generation or properties
we can have any knowledge.
Finally, Hobbes claims that the principal parts of
philosophy are two,®
[f]or two chief kinds of bodies, and very
different from one another offer themselves to
such as search after their generation and
properties; one whereof being the work of nature,
is called a natural body, the other is called a
commonwealth, and is made by the wills and
agreements of men.
Indeed, he asserts that "from these parts spring" the two
types of philosophy, namely, natural philosophy and civil
7phi 1 osophy
.
While attempting to elucidate the manner in which "the
knowledge of any effect may be gotten from the knowledge of
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the generation thereof," Hobbes offers as an example the
two-dimensional geometric figure known as a circle. Hobbes
contends that if a man were to visually examine a plane
figure resembling a circle which is drawn on a piece of
paper, that man could not, merely by exercising his sense of
sight, determine whether that figure is a circle or is
merely a figure which greatly approximates the shape of a
ciifcle. He contends, however, that "nothing is more easy
to be known by him that first knows the generation of the
propounded figure,"® that is, whether the propounded figure
is an actual circle or simply a figure which is shaped very
similarly to that of a circle. Thus, if the onlooker were
aware of the fact that the figure in front of him "was made
by the circumduction of a body whereof one end remained
unmoved, he would be certain that this figure is a true
circle, rather than a figure which merely appears to the
sense of sight to be, or significantly approximates the
shape of, a circle.
By considering Hobbes’s example of the generation of a
circle, as well as his definition of philosophy, we might
reasonably forward the following claim concerning the
significance of Hobbes's state of nature and Hobbes’s
various discussions of the generation of commonwealths:
Hobbes believed that, from a methodological standpoint
,
all philosophy can be characterized as being of one of two
broad types, namely analytic (or resolutive) philosophy and
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synthetic (or compositive) phi 1 osophy
. When discussing
the state of nature, and the generation of commonwealths
from out of that state, Hobbes can be understood to be
engaging in the variety of philosophy characterized as
synthetic, in which one acquires knowledge of a body by true
ratiocination from the knowledge which he first has of its
causes or generation. Specifically, Hobbes begins his
project with a knowledge of the **disposi tions
,
affections
and manners of men," imagines a situation in which a number
of men with such dispositions, affections and manners are
forced to confront one another without the benefit of an
effective peace-preserving sovereign power, and subsequently
reasons how such a collection of "masterless" men (or, as we
shall go on to see later in this chapter, masterless
collective sovereign persons)^^ can reasonably be
understood to generate durable political groupings or
political bodies which contain (more or less) effective^^
sovereign mechanisms.
If a man were to contend that one is able to acquire
adequate phi 1 osophi ca
1
knowledge concerning the nature of
political bodies merely by studying the history of such
bodies as have existed throughout the ages, Hobbes would
clearly disagree. Knowledge of this latter type would
constitute mere prudence or experiential knowledge and would
not be properly charact er i zed as sapience, scientific
knowledge or exceptionless knowledge of effects from known
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causes. Hence, although Hobbes includes accounts and
descriptions of actually existing historical commonwealths
within the corpus of his philosophical writings, one should
not conclude that in doing so he is attempting to equate
political history with political philosophy. Rather, one
should recognize and acknowledge Hobbes's claim that a study
of the history of political bodies will provide one with
insight into the nature of what must be true of any unit of
political organization.
Therefore, when Hobbes discusses the nature of the
organizational units of the types described on pages 86-104,
below, he can be understood to be describing units which
bear similarities to, but are not simply identical with the
various patrimonial units and fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS
which have appeared on earth at various times and in various
1 14places
.
Significantly, then, although Hobbes believes that
specific sovereign multiperson units (of the types described
on pages 99-119, below) have existed at various times and
places throughout the course of human history, the
analytical models of such units which Hobbes forwards in his
philosophical writings should be looked upon as examples of
"ideal limiting cases"^^ and not as examples of actually
existing states.
Perhaps significantly (and perhaps fortunately, for our
own purposes), in chapter 6 of De Corpore , Hobbes alters his
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definition of philosophy to read that philosophy is "the
knowledge we acquire by true ratiocination of appearances or
apparent effects, from the knowledge we have of such
possible production or generation of the same; and of such
production, as has been, gj^ may be , from the knowledge we
have of the effects. In light of this definition, we can
understand that when Hobbes discusses the modes of the
generation of commonwealths from out of the state of nature,
he is not attempting to describe the actual manner in which
historically existing commonwealths were formed out of some
previously existing "natural" interactional state, but
rather, the manner in which various political bodies can be
conceived as being created from out of previously existing
matter (viz, human beings, or less stable organizational
units). Thus, in a famous passage from chapter 17 of
Leviathan
, Hobbes claims that the unity of the natural
persons who constitute the commonwealth^^
is made by covenant of every man with every man,
in such manner every man should say to every
man, I authorize and give up my right of governing
myself to this man ... on this condition, that
thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all
his actions in like manner.
Even though it may not be, and probably is not the case that
any particular existing commonwealth was established as a
result of an explicit contract of the type of which Hobbes
speaks, one can, nevertheless, conceive of commonwealths
(either of the actually existing (historical) variety, or of
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the ideal general (philosophical) variety) being generated
in the manner that Hobbes describes. Thus, the explicit
entering into of a social contract among the natural persons
in the state of nature can best be understood as the result
of an exercise in philosophical speculation by which one
attempts to imagine how an ideal type of (political) body
be generated from out of preexisting matter.^®
C^. Hobbes’s Three Conceptions of the State of Nature
Unfortunately, attempting to understand precisely what
Hobbes meant to describe as the state of nature in his
political writings is somewhat complicated by the fact that
he does not use this term univocally. In fact, within his
writings, Hobbes uses the designation "state of nature” to
refer to (at least) the following three concepts:
(1)
a rational construct or construal of humankind's natural
condition "wherein particular men are in a condition of war,
one against another," that is, of each person against every
other person. ( Leviathan , p. 78) Significantly, Hobbes
believed that "there had never been any time, wherein
particular men were in a condition of war against another."
(ibid. )
(2)
A social condition in which small groups of human beings
contend against each other, and in which no common power
(i.e., no mechanism of sovereign authority which is common
to all individuals who populate this condition) exists.
Hobbes referred to the small groups of individuals which are
to be found in this condition as "f ami 1 ies
.
(3)
The "condition of war [of] one against another," which
"in all times" exists between "kings and persons of
sovereign authority." ( Leviathan , page 101.) Hobbes referred
to the large multiperson units which are to be found in this
condition as bona fide principalities or fully sovereign
states
.
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As has been noted above, Frangois Tricaud, following
Paul Johnson, suggests that Hobbes might have offered the
state of nature as a 'tendential law' a 'limiting concept,'
or 'an ideal limiting case,' so that one might understand
the state of nature as a representation that need not be
assigned to any definite moment in historical or prehistoric
»f 20time. Though I believe that such an interpretation, by
itself, fails to capture the complexity of Hobbes's state of
^^ture, I further believe that, in a sense, all three
conceptions of the state of nature which I have hitherto
presented can be looked upon as ideal limiting cases. The
character of these three respective ideal limiting cases can
be understood to vary as a function of the background
assumptions which Hobbes builds into each of the respective
conceptions. Thus, for example, one might suppose that the
state of nature-2 represents Hobbes's descriptive analysis
of the social condition which would obtain if a number of
small paternal or despotical groups were forced to interact
with each other in the absence of any terrestrial sovereign
which could determine the character of such encounters.
Hobbes's analysis of this condition (which should, I
believe, be reckoned as the result of a series of thought
experiments) was probably affected by his observations of
the behavior of men in civil societies, his observation of
the behavior of men during the English Civil Wars of the
mid-seventeenth century, his understanding of the character
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"savage parts of the world. If my objectives
realized, the following detailed discussion of
conceptions of the state of nature will make
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D. The State of Nature-1
The first conception of the state of nature is similar
to the conception employed by such twentieth century
commentators on Hobbes as Gauthier, Kavka and Hampton, who
have interpreted Hobbes's political philosophy according to
the norms of contemporary game theory and who, for the most
part, consider the state of nature to embody the
relationship between and among participants (or unitary
actors) which is commonly known as the "prisoners' dilemma."
These commentators, for the sake of analysis, consider the
participants in the state of nature to be rational actors
who are interested in maximizing their own utility and who
possess no interpersonal attachments of a familial, a
friendship-based, or any other variety. When discussing this
conception of the state of nature, Hobbes makes clear that
the actors in this state possess various civilized qualities
or "marks of civilization." Hence, even though Hobbes
contends that "there had never been any time, wherein
particular men were in a condition of war one against
95
another," he nevertheless believed that "it may be perceived
what manner of life there would be, were there no common
power to fear; by the manner of life, which men that had
formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate
into, in a civil war.”^^
Indeed, we might reasonably conclude that the state of
nature-1 represents the result of a thought experiment in
which Hobbes attempted to envision the participants in this
state as rational (and passionate)^^ actors who have had
the benefit of living under civil conditions but who find
themselves presently bereft of a sovereign mechanism which
can successfully maintain such peaceful (or non-warlike)
conditions. Hobbes himself suggests that the probable
behavior of men in such a condition is based upon his
observations of the modes of behavior assumed by men during
the English Civil Wars of the mid-seventeenth century.
However, the state of nature-1 appears to be ideal or
abstract in so far as all distinctions between master and
servant among human beings are denied. Thus, I contend that
the state of nature-1 represents Hobbes's most abstract
model of how human beings, who share many of the civilized
qualities of modern men, would interact with each other if
their social condition were reduced to one in which no
contractually established relationships of subordination and
domination were to exist.
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As a prelude to his discussion of paternal
conmionweal ths in each of his three principal treatises on
political philosophy, Hobbes presents a somewhat more
detailed description of the state of nature-1 than can be
found in that work's natural state chapter. For example, in
paragraphs 4-9 of Chapter 20 of Leviathan
. Hobbes presents a
description of the state of nature-1 in which he specifies
that (1) gender-based differences between males and females
exist, and that (2) human reproductive activity occurs, so
that infants can be expected to be biologically generated
within such a state. Further, in the same section of Chapter
20 of Leviathan
, Hobbes specifies that within the state of
nature-1, (3) "the natural inclination of the sexes one to
another and to the children" exists, (4) age-based
differences are present and a distinction is drawn between
(A) adults and (B) infants and small children and (5) a
significant difference with respect to the level of physical
and intellectual powers is drawn between (A) adults and (B)
infants and small children. Finally, Hobbes informs his
readers that within the state of nature-1, there exist
neither (6) laws of matrimony nor (7) laws for the education
of children. It should be noted that these seven
additional characteristics are presumably always present
among the human beings who constitute the state of nature-1,
even though Hobbes chooses to mention and discuss them only
in those chapters of his political writings which
97
specifically concern the topic of paternal dominion, what
appears to be significant about the state of nature-1 ia
that (1) It is a highly abstract rendering of tbe natural
human interactional condition and (2) it appears that Hobbes
believed it to be a rather contrived and potentially, a
rather evanescent condition which would quickly be
superseded or replaced by an interactional condition of the
type which I will call the state of nature-2. The second of
these two points does stand in need of further explanation.
Although I believe that Hobbes did not mean the state
of nature-1 to embody or describe an actually existing
historical condition, I do believe that Hobbes would endorse
the claim that if the circumstances which characterize the
state of nature-1 were to be artificially created, this
state would quickly develop into a condition characterized
by small (if, at first, only two-person) groups witbin which
relationships of servitude exist. This would be
predominantly due to two factors which encourage the
formation of groups, namely the persistence of anticipatory
activity, and the presence of human reproductive activity.
Thus, even though Hobbes famously denies the existence
of a natural sociability or gregariousness among human
beings (interpreted as ”a natural fitness to form
societies” ) he does, nevertheless, strongly suggest that
there exists a tendency for human individuals to form small
groups (due to procreation or conquest), and for smaller
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groups to coalesce (principally through conquest) into
larger ones.
I feel justified in treating the state of nature-1 as a
conception distinct from the state of nature-2 since the
state of nature-1, unlike the state of nature-2 represents
the analytical units which occupy this condition as natural
human beings or natural persons rather than as defensive
groups made up of two or more natural persons.
E. The State of Nature-2
While the state of nature-1 is intended to represent a
condition in which each natural person is understood to have
retained his/her right of nature, and in which no person has
(either explicitly or tacitly) subordinated him/herself to
another, the two conceptions of the state of nature which
remain to be considered do clearly support interpersonal
relationships of domination and subordination, as well as
multiperson groupings.
For example, at various locations throughout his
writings, Hobbes describes a state of perpetual war which
persists in America "even in the present age," and which had
existed in other nations "in former ages." In fact,
Hobbes includes within the natural state chapter of each of
his three major political works a description of this
bellicose state which he identifies as the state of
nature. Thus, in Leviathan , Hobbes claims that "the
savage people in many places of America, except the
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government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth
on natural lust, have no government at all; and live in that
brutish manner as [he had] said before."” Indeed, in each
of the three natural state chapters, Hobbes’s strategy is
similar. Specifically, in each of these chapters, Hobbes
briefly discusses the natural equality of human beings,
presents (or deduces) the natural Interactional state of
human beings as a war of each against all, discusses the
inconveniences which attend such a state, then goes on to
claim that the state of nature has existed in the history of
now-civil nations and continues to exist in some portions of
the world. Interestingly, however, with respect to his three
principal political works, it is only in the Leviathan
presentation that Hobbes explicitly identifies the units
which are engaged in this historically instantiated
perpetual war as "small families."^®
At a later point in each of these works, Hobbes
describes a historical period in which "men have lived by
small families to rob and spoil one another," and in which
"rapine was a trade of life."^^
Clearly, the concept of family which Hobbes has in mind
in these descriptions differs a bit from that which we
normally associate with a twentieth century nuclear family.
For example, in Leviathan
.
Hobbes contends that a family
might consist of "a man and his children," or "a man and his
servants," or "a man and his children and servants
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together. Interestingly, Hobbes does not indicate that
the mother or mothers of the aforementioned children is/are
normally reckoned to be part of families. Perhaps in
Hobbes s scheme such female members are normally to be
reckoned among servants, i.e., those who are subject to the
decision-making authority of the "man."
Nevertheless, Hobbes believes that from the standpoint
of history, those patrinomic groupings which he designates
"families" constitute the earliest basic unit. For example,
^ Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the
Common—Laws of England
, Hobbes deems it "evident that
dominion, government and laws are far more ancient than
history or any other writing, and that the beginning of all
dominion amongst men was in families. In fact, in the
section from the Di a 1 oque entitled "On the laws of meum et
tuum," Hobbes presents a fairly detailed sketch of the
social conditions which characterize such "families."
Specifically, Hobbes states that^^
1. The father of the family by the law of nature was
the absolute lord of his wife and children,
2. The father of the family made what laws amongst them
he pleased,
3. The father of the family was judge of all their
controversies
,
4. The father of the family was not obliged by any law
of man to follow any counsel but his own.
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5. What land soever the lord sat down upon and made use
his own and his family's benefit, was his
propriety by the law of first possession, in case it
was void of inhabitants before, or by the law of
war, in case they conquered it,
6. In this conquest, what enemies they took and saved,
were their servants. '
7. Such men as wanting possessions of lands, but
furnished with arts necessary for man's life, came
to dwell in the family for protection, became their
subjects, and submitted themselves to the laws of
the family.
Hobbes confidently asserts that "all this is consonant, not
only to the law of nature, but also to the practice of
mankind set forth in history.
In chapter 20 of Leviathan
.
Hobbes claims that^^
a great family, if it be not part of some
commonwealth, is of itself, as to the rights of
sovereignty, a little monarchy; whether that
family consist of a man and his children; or a man
and his servants; or of a man and his children,
and servants together: wherein the father or
master is the sovereign. But yet a family is not
properly a commonwealth; unless it be that power
by its own number, or by other opportunities, as
not to be subdued without the hazard of war.
In the El ements
,
Hobbes further obscures the distinction
between "families," which I interpret to be characteristic
of the state of nature-2 and fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS,
which I interpret to be characteristic of the state of
nature-3, when he states that "when a man hath dominion over
another, there is a little kingdom. And to be a king by
acquisition, is nothing else, but to have acquired a right
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of dominion over many."” Though the text is not entirely
clear on this point, what Hobbes appears to be saying is
that a tiny kingdom, if you will, a proto-commonwealth or
state of nature-2 type grouping, can be understood to arise
whenever a person gains dominion over a single (other)
person. However, it would seem that a fully-fledged
COMMONWEALTH or a COMMONWEALTH in the proper sense can only
be understood to arise once a sufficient (though not
precisely stated) number of servants or subjects are
acquired by a single master or sovereign.
Nevertheless, Hobbes claims that^’
where a number of men are manifestly too weak todefend themselves united, every one may use his
own reason in time of danger to save his own life
either by flight or by submission to the enemy ashe shall think best; in the same manner as a very
small company of soldiers, surprised by an army
may cast down their arms, and demand quarter or
run away, rather than be put to the sword.
Thus, the crux of the distinction between state of nature-2
and state of nature-3 type groupings concerns the
effectiveness of the group to repulse attacks from external
aggressive units. We might imagine that if a four member
state of nature-2 type grouping were to confront an
imperial istical ly-minded twenty member family, then each of
the four persons who comprise the smaller of the two groups
is justified in doing whatever he deems necessary to
preserve his life, including disobeying the directives of
that small group's leader.
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What I find to be somewhat troubling in Hobbes's
presentation of the distinction between families and
COMMONWEALTHS, however, concerns the statement that a family
is not properly a COMMONWEALTH unless "it be of that power
of its own number ... as not to be subdued without the
hazard of war
. Presumably, even when a twenty member
9^^oup launches an attack upon a four member group, the
members of the former group face the prospect of death while
attempting to subdue or destroy the members of the latter.
Thus, even when a group of twenty men strikes out against a
group of four, it is conceivable that in launching such an
attack, the members of the former group will be actively
involving themselves in the hazards associated with war.
Perhaps, Hobbes merely meant it to be the case that the
master of one group can be spoken of as being in a position
to conquer the members of another group without risking the
hazards of war when the members of that latter group
(sovereign and subjects included) decide (individually or in
unison) that attempting to defend the integrity of their
group would, in all likelihood, lead to the termination of
their natural lives, and thus opt to transfer allegiance to
the sovereign of that latter group without offering a shred
of resistance.
F. The State of Nature-3
In a famous quotation from Leviathan '
s
natural state
chapter, Hobbes maintains that 42
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^ kings, and persons of sovereign
authority, because of their independency, are incontinual jealousies, and in the state and posturegladiators; having their weapons pointing andeir eyes fixed on one another; that is, theirtorts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of
continual spies upon their
neighbors; which is a posture of war.
Hobbes hastens to add, however, that because such kings and
persons of sovereign authority ’’uphold thereby the industry
of their subjects; there does not follow from it that
misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men
.
Thus, I contend that Hobbes envisioned as one conception
of the state of nature an interactional condition composed
of hona fide principalities or fully sovereign states. In
this construal of the state of nature (which I will
henceforth refer to a the state of nature-3), each sovereign
COMMONWEALTH is to be looked upon as being an interactional
unit and as being headed by some institutional sovereign
authority (which need not be a sinql
e
natural person)
.
Moreover, I believe that the state of nature-3 can be
regarded as differing from the remaining two conceptions in
that the various natural persons who compose the several
sovereign states are capable of living relatively safe, in
some cases, relatively comfortable and flourishing lives. In
fact, Hobbes emphasizes this point when he responds to the
criticism that the lives of subjects within COMMONWEALTHS
are ’’miserable” and extremely deprived of liberty by
105
claiming that
incommodities
(A) the state of man can never be without some
and that (B) the greatest incommodi ty^^
to thl that can possibly happene people in general is scarce sensible inrespect of the miseries.
.
. of that dissolutecondition of masterless men, without subjection tolaws, and a coercive power to tie their hands fromrapine and revenge.
Further, in Leviathan's natural state chapter, Hobbes claims
that the state of nature is a rather incommodious condition
indeed, and bereft of the conveniences and comforts (both
material and psychological) which characterize bona fide
COMMONWEALTHS
.
The state of nature-3 is similar to the two remaining
construals of this state to the extent that within this
condition, there exists no terrestrial sovereign mechanism
which can force the relevant individuals or units (in this
case (the heads of) sovereign states) to keep the covenants
which they had previously made. It is the case that within
the state of nature-3, the heads of each independent
political unit retain their respective rights of nature to
exercise whatever strategies they deem necessary to preserve
the existence and vitality of their respective political
units. It is thus not the case that within this state the
head of each unit has transferred his right to exercise all
the means necessary to preserve its survival to some pan-
national sovereign authority. Rather, Hobbes clearly
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envisioned each state of nature-3 unit to maintain its
sovereign independency.
This does not, however, mean that covenants between the
heads of sovereign states cannot be entered into or that
such covenants will not bind the covenantors to the
performance of the terms to which they had agreed. Indeed,
Hobbes claims that "if a weaker prince, make a
disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear; he is bound
to keep it; unless.
. . there ariseth some new, and just
cause of fear, to renew the war.”^^ Absent the incidence of
such a "new fear," the covenant made is valid, i.e. binds
both covenantors, even though no terrestrial supra-natural
mechanism to insure such compliance exists.
An additional feature that characterizes the elemental
units (i.e., the COMMONWEALTHS or sovereign states) which
comprise the state of nature-3 is that within such units, a
good deal of organized effort is expended upon, and a robust
stock of resources is devoted to, the aggressively active
defense of that unit. Recall, for example, Hobbes's
previously quoted claim that "in all times," heads of
COMMONWEALTHS are "in the posture of gladiators, having
their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
that is, their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers
of their kingdoms, as well as his assertion that the
heads of states "live in a condition of perpetual war [my
emphasis] and upon the confines of battle, with their
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frontiers ar..ed, and oannons planted against their neighbors
round about."” Presumably, the oonditions of peace which
obtain within a COMMONWEALTH make possible not only the
development of the arts and industries which provide a basis
for commodious living, but moreover, the arts and industries
which provide a basis for the development of a sophisticated
and redoubtable system of defense against external
aggressors. Indeed, the extensive systems of forts,
garrisons, guns and cannons which are utilized by the heads
of sovereign states can hardly be imagined to be available
to the fathers" or "masters" who command the "families"
that characterize the somewhat aspersory state of nature-2.
In fact, it seems that the presence of vast stocks of
(desired and easily transferable) commodities within the
boundaries of sovereign states increases the likelihood that
the rulers of one's neighboring states will take the steps
required to establish adequately sturdy means of
fortification (and, it seems equally likely, the resources
required to launch a successful offensive invasion). This,
in turn, will give rise to a desire on the part of each
ruler to eschew being overrun by the armies of neighboring
states which, in all likelihood, will encourage the
development and utilization of such hardy and sophisticated
systems of defense.
In "A Review and Conclusion" of Leviathan
, Hobbes
somewhat awkwardly forwards a twentieth law of nature which
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enjoins ’’that every man is bound by nature, as much as in
him lieth, to protect in war the authority, by which he is
himself protected in time of peace. Further, proclaims
Hobbes "he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his
own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him by
whose strength he is preserved[
.
] ’’^^ However, it appears
that these directives apply only in cases where the
individual judges that his endeavoring to protect the
established authority will not lead to his (the former’s)
certain or probable ruin. Further, it would appear that
these directives apply only where there exists a sovereign
authority which is of sufficient strength to establish
conditions of internal peace. Thus, if the sovereign has
been able to maintain conditions of peace within a
COMMONWEALTH, and if the sovereign’s continuing ability to
maintain such conditions directly depends upon the active
support of his citizens, then those citizens are obligated
to preserve sovereign power by taking an active part in
defensive (or offensive) war. Hence, occasional active
fighting might be interpreted as an unpleasant pastime which
must be pursued in order to insure future conditions of
peace
.
Crucially, it appears that the war engaged in by men
living within (and fighting on behalf of) established
COMMONWEALTHS (1) is conducted in an organized manner,
(2) occurs somewhat less frequently than does war engaged in
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by men who do not live within established COMMONWEALTHS and
(3) contains a degree of predictability which cannot be
attributed to the war which affects men who live beyond the
pale of fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS.
With respect to the first factor, Hobbes’s already
mentioned references to the hardy means of defense which are
developed and employed within COMMONWEALTHS strongly
suggests that a standing army capable of carrying on an
effectively conducted battle will be at the disposal of many
or most successful established sovereigns. By contrast, one
would imagine battles waged outside the confines of a
COMMONWEALTH, that is battles waged between families, to be
rather disorganized, rather primitively conducted, and
rather less smoothly executed than are those which are
conducted under the auspices of COMMONWEALTHS.
Secondly, Hobbes claims that sovereigns can generally
maintain conditions of peace and safety within their
COMMONWEALTHS, and can thus make possible the development of
the arts which provide the technological basis for the
various industries. These industries, in turn, furnish the
basis for a comfortable or commodious mode of life.
Moreover, by dwelling within the COMMONWEALTH, subjects can
expect to spend much less of their time engaged in actual
preemptive or defensive battle, and much less of their time
concerning themselves with the prospect of being attacked by
men in their vicinity. Of course, men who live within
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COMMONWEALTHS, can, from time to time, be expected to be
called upon to perform military service, though it must be
remembered that defending one's COMMONWEALTH is the price
one normally pays for living under conditions of peace,
enjoying a comfortable life, and so forth.
Thirdly, when a subject within a COMMONWEALTH is
inducted into the armed forces, he must, while enduring the
conditions of battle, maintain a stance of vigilance.
However, when he is not situated within the precincts of
battle, he can normally expect not to be harassed by the
offensive (and defensive or anticipatory) acts of other men.
Thus, men who are called upon to perform military
service might be expected to obey this sovereign directive
for a variety of reasons: First, considerations of fairness
or reciprocity might be thought to dictate that since the
sovereign has made actual a social condition in which the
subject can live a relatively peaceful and comfortable life,
the latter owes to the former a debt of military service.
More importantly, by entering into the COMMONWEALTH, each
subject has submitted himself to the will and judgment of
the sovereign, and has agreed to be bound by the decisions
and directives of the latter.
However, a problem arises when we turn to consider that
within the "families" or small groups characteristic of the
state of nature-2, a man can "use his own reason in time of
danger to save his own life either by flight or by
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What differentiates the situation of a person who lives
within a fully-fledged COMMONWEALTH, from that of a person
who lives within a "family," depends upon the latitude
allowed to the latter, but not to the former, to determine
whether his endeavor to preserve the integrity of his group
will seriously threaten or endanger his life. Presumably, it
is taken as given that within a COMMONWEALTH, the
previ ous 1 y- remarked-upon robust means of defense will
furnish the subject with a reasonable assurance that the
fighting in which he is ordered to engage will not lead to
his probable demise. Of course, by engaging in actual
fighting, the subject thereby places himself in a position
of physical danger, and thus risks the loss of his life.
However, the willingness to engage in such fighting might be
encouraged by an awareness of the relatively low probability
that one will lose his life in this fighting, as well as by
a recognition of the benefits which one realizes by virtue
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of living within a COMMONWEALTH (accompanied, of course, by
a desire to enjoy the benefits of a civil existence). In
essence, the citizen exchanges his de facto right to
determine whether to defend his commonwealth for the
benefits and security which are normally provided by
conditions of peace.
Unfortunately, Hobbes fails to offer a compelling
reason why a man is obligated to obey his sovereign's order
to engage in a battle in which that man stands a reasonably
good chance of losing his life. Hobbes clearly indicates
that^^
no man is bound . . . either to kill himself or
any other man; and consequently, that the
obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the
command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous
or dishonorable office, dependeth not upon the
words of our submission; but on the intention,
which is to be understood by the end thereof.
"When therefore our refusal to obey," Hobbes continues,
"frustrates the end for which sovereignty was ordained then
c n
there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise there is." Thus,
even citizens within COMMONWEALTHS are allowed some latitude
in refusing to bodily defend the COMMONWEALTH of which they
are part. Furthermore, Hobbes contends that "[u]pon this
ground, a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight
against the enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to
punish his refusal with death may nevertheless in many cases
t 9
refuse without injustice."
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upon to
For example, Hobbes admits that a man called
perform military duty may substitute a
-sufficient soldier-
in his place. Moreover, Hobbes directs that allowance
should be madp fni- inatural timorousness; not only to women
• •
. but also to men of feminine courage.-” Further, he
contends that since avoiding battle is not injustice but
cowardice, some allowance must be made for those who are
naturally fearful of or averse to engaging in battle.
However, the manner in which Hobbes words these
exemptions suggests that he believed most men would not be
eligible for exemption from military service based upon
considerations of natural timorousness. Clearly, given
Hobbes's claim that for each man his own death represents
the summum maJum,” few sensible men can be expected to
embrace military combat as an especially desirable pastime.
In fact, fear would appear to be an appropriate passion for
a man to be affected by when he is confronted with the
prospect of entering into an activity as threatening to life
and limb as war. Seemingly, Hobbes believed that a desire to
maintain a commodious mode of life, as well as fear that
civil conditions will break down (and, perhaps, a strong
aversion to being ruled or dominated by the officials of a
rival conquering power) would, for most men, outweigh the
fear of losing one’s life even in a rather precarious
military battle.
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I therefore contend that the following conditions
characterize the three respective conceptions of the state
of nature:
Ap In the state of nature-1, no sovereign multiperson
associations! groupings exist
A
2
. In the state of nature-2, small multi-person groups
which are headed by an absolute ruler or leader exist
Aj
. In the state of nature-3, large multi-person groups
called "COMMONWEALTHS," each of which is headed by an
authentic effective sovereign power, exist
62 - In the state of nature-2, individuals living within such
groups are bound by sel f -incurred contractual agreements
to follow the rules and directives of the (absolute)
group leader, so that laws established by the heads of
exist and oblige members of these groups
. In the state of nature-3, individuals living within
COMMONWEALTHS are bound by sel f -incurred contractual
agreements to observe the laws of their sovereign, so
that laws established by the sovereign exist and bind
subjects of the COMMONWEALTH
C
2
. In the state of nature-2, the multi-person groups are
described as being comparatively unstable units which
can be easily conquered by, and thus incorporated into,
slightly larger groups
Cj . In the state of nature-3, the multi-person group or
"COMMONWEALTH" is described as being a stable unit whose
sovereign devotes a good deal of resources to the
defense of its borders
Dj . In the state of nature-1, a war of every man (and woman)
against every man (and woman) exists
D
2
. In the state of nature-2, a war of every group against
every other group (or of every group leader against
every other group leader) exists
Dj . In the state of nature-3, a war of every COMMONWEALTH
against every other COMMONWEALTH (or of every sovereign
against every other sovereign) exists
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Ej. In the state of nature-1, no common power to "keep themall in awe" exists
E
2
- In the state of nature-2, outside such small groups no
common power able to keep all men (or all group leaders)
"in awe" exists ’
Ej. In the state of nature-3, outside such COMMONWEALTHS, noterrestrial common power able to keep all men (or all
sovereigns) "in awe" exists. That is, no effective
terrestrial supra-national sovereign exists
F^. In the state of nature-1, there exists a common
disposition (presumably, among all) to fight
F
2
- In the state of nature-2, there exists a common
disposition among all group leaders to fight (in order
to preserve the integrity of their respective group)
Fj . In the state of nature-3, there exists a common
disposition among all sovereigns to fight (in order to
preserve the integrity of their respective COMMONWEALTH)
Gp In the state of nature-1, no laws of "mine and thine"
exist
G
2
. In the state of nature-2, laws of "mine and thine"
established by the respective group leader, exist
within, though not between and among (the leaders of)
such groups
G
3
. In the state of nature-3, laws of "mine and thine" exist
within, though not between and among (the sovereigns of)
such COMMONWEALTHS
H, In the state
purported!
y
of nature -1
bind)^’
the laws of nature exist (and
H
2
. In the state of nature-2, the laws of nature exist and
purportedly bind group leaders (as well as those who are
not group leaders)
Hj. In the state of nature-3, the laws of nature exist and
purportedly bind sovereigns (as well as those who are
not sovereigns)
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K, In the state of nature-1,
present
gender—based differences are
K. gender-based differences areacknowledged but are not emphasized by Hobbes. Wives orwomen are sometimes regarded as being subject to theabsolute rule of their group leader, though there is noin principle reason why a woman could not be a groupeader either in a "family” by acquisition, or(especially) in a "family" by preservation.^®
K
3
. In the state of nature-3, gender-based differences are
acknowledged but are not emphasized by Hobbes. Men and
women appear to be equally regarded as citizens oftheir respective COMMONWEALTHS
Lj
. In the state of nature-1, human reproductive activity is
conducted
L
2
. In the state of nature-2, human reproductive activity is
conducted, and the offspring of such unions are to be
regarded as subject to the absolute rule of the leader
of the group into which they are born.
L
3
. In the state of nature-3, human reproductive activity is
conducted, and the offspring of such unions are to be
regarded as members of the COMMONWEALTH of which their
parents are citizens^®
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M, In the state of nature-1, the "natural
the sexes, one to another, and to the
inclination of
children" exists
M
2
In the state of nature-2, the "natural
the sexes, one to another, and to the
inclination of
children," exists
M, n the state of nature-3, the "natural inclination ofthe sexes, one to another, and to the children"
presumably exists
Nj. In the state of nature-1, age-based differences arepresent and a distinction is drawn between infants (or
smaller children) and adults
N
2
. In the state of nature-2, age-based differences exist,
though the distinction between infants (and smaller
children) and adults does not seem to play a significant
role in Hobbes’s discussion(s ) of this condition
Nj
. In the state of nature-3, age-based differences exist,
though the distinction between infants (and smaller
children) and adults does not seem to play a significant
role in Hobbes's discussion(s ) of this condition
Oj . In the state of nature-1, differences with respect to
the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn
between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children
Oj. In the state of nature-2, differences with respect to
the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn
between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children,
but does not seem to play a significant role in Hobbes's
discussi on ( s ) of this condition
O
3
. In the state of nature-3, differences with respect to
the levels of physical and intellectual powers are drawn
between (A) adults and (B) infants and small children
but does not seem to play a significant role in Hobbes's
discussion of this condition
Pp In the state of nature-1, no laws of matrimony exist
?
2
. In the state of nature-2, laws of matrimony, as
specified by the group leader, may exist within groups
P
3
. In the state of nature-3, laws of matrimony, as
established by the sovereign, may (and in all
likelihood, do) exist within COMMONWEALTHS
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G. Concluding Remarks
Before concluding this chapter, a number of cautionary
notes or caveats are in order. First of all, I do not claim
that Hobbes anywhere sets forth the three conceptions of the
state of nature in a perspicuous and systematic fashion.
Indeed, as I asserted in the opening paragraphs of this
chapter, Hobbes’s respective discussions of the state of
nature might strike the casual reader as being sloppily
organized, and indeed as being internally inconsistent.
Secondly, I must admit that the model of the state of
nature presented in this chapter represents a reconstruction
of material which can be found in various of Hobbes's
philosophical writings.
I do not claim that Hobbes anywhere refers to the respective
conceptions of the state of nature in the way that I have
(namely, as the state of nature-1, the state of nature-2,
etc.), or that Hobbes was especially interested to draw
clear boundaries between the state of nature-1 and the state
of nature-2, the state of nature-2 and the state of nature-
3
,
and so forth. Moreover, I do not claim that the model of
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the three conceptions of the state of nature presented in
this chapter represents the sole faithful reconstruction of
Hobbes s state of nature which can be culled from the
latter s various pronouncements on this issue.
Nevertheless, I do contend that my presentation does
accurately capture a sense of the various interpretations of
the state of nature or natural condition of humankind which
Hobbes offers in his various writings.
My presentation in this chapter was motivated by a
desire to impose a sense of coherence upon the various
passages from Hobbes's oeuvre which advert to the natural
condition of humankind, and to defend Hobbes of the charge
that his state of nature represents a confused and perhaps
valueless philosophical contrivance. Within his writings,
Hobbes draws a clear distinction between historical and
hypothetical accounts of the state of nature, as well as an
explicit distinction between "families" and bona fide
COMMONWEALTHS. Thus, I believe that I possess a firm textual
basis for claiming that the three previously described
conceptions of the state of nature can be drawn or
reconst ructed from Hobbes's various philosophical writings.
I will now move on to discuss the three methods by
which Hobbes believed a commonwealth can come into existence
or arise from out of the state of nature. Thus, chapter 4 of
this dissertation will contain descriptions of the three
types of Hobbesian commonwealth which I have respectively
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des i gna
acquisi
ted
t i on
"commonwealth by institution," "commonwealth by
and commonwealth by preservation."
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NOTES1.
Por a description of raultiperson sovereign units see mvdiscussion on pages 99-119, below. ^ , y
2.
be they artificial or natural persons
noted that I am including this ratherelongated discussion of Hobbes’s understanding ofphilosophical method in order to show that the activity ofattempting to imagine how political bodies can be conceivedas being generated from the state of nature is a properlyphilosophical (as opposed, for example, to a merelyhistorical) one, and in fact, is an activity which canproperly be characterized as an exercise in syntheticphilosophy.
4.
Hobbes, English Works
. Vol
. I, page 3.
5.
Hobbes, English Works
. Vol. I, page 10.
6.
Hobbes, English Works
. Vol. I, page 11.
7.
Hobbes, Engl ish Works
. Vol. I, page 11.
8. Of course, Hobbes is speaking somewhat loosely when he
claims that a true circle can be drawn or inscribed on a
sheet of paper. Since true (ideal) geometric figures such as
squares and circles are composed of lines which have no
width, and since any graphic representation of a circle must
be composed of lines which have some width, we must look
with some suspicion upon Hobbes's use of this example.
Nevertheless, when Hobbes describes the construction of
a circle, the significance and cogency of his example
becomes somewhat more compelling.
9.
Hobbes, Engl ish Works
.
Vol. I, page 6.
10.
Hobbes, Engl ish Works
.
Vol. I, page 6.
11. As we have seen above, from the standpoint of the matter,
or the type of body studied, Hobbes draws a distinction
between natural and civil philosophy. See above, page 88.
12.
For a discussion of masterless collective sovereign
persons, see my discussion on pages 99-119, below.
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1 3 . More in the case of state of nature
fully fledged) COMMONWEALTHS, less in
relatively unstable organizational uni
characteristic of the state of nature-
following chapters, I will employ the
refer to the groups char act er i s t i c of
nature-2 or the state of nature-3, and
'COMMONWEALTH' [printed in capitals] t
to the groups characteristic of the st
my respective discussions of the state
state of nature-3, see below, pages 99
114.
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the case of the
ts which are
2 . In this and
term 'commonwealth'
ei t he r the state of
the term
o ref er specifica 1 ly
ate o f nature-3. For
of nature-2 and the
-104 and pages 10 4-
14. See, for example, his description of "the several kinds
of commonwealth" in chapter 19 of Leviathan and his
discussion of paternal and despotical dominion in Chapter 20
of Leviathan
.
(Hobbes, Leviathan
.
paaes 118-127 and pages
128-135. )
15. In an article entitled "Hobbes's Conception of the State
of Nature," Frangois Tricaud suggests that "the state of
nature is a model (taking the word in such sense as
physicists and economists make use) whose function is not to
reproduce the true condition of mankind but to illuminate
it." (Frangois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of
Nature From 1640 to 1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in
G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan, editors. Perspectives on Thomas
Hobbes
,
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), page 110.) Similarly, in
"Hobbes and the Wolf Man," Paul Johnson claims that "the
state of nature for Hobbes is not a real state presenting
men with practical problems, but what we would now call an
ideal limiting case like the concepts of a pure inertial
state or a frictionless plane are in physics." (Paul
Johnson, "Hobbes and the Wolf-Man," In J.G. Van der Bend,
editor, Thomas Hobbes: His View of Man
,
(Amsterdam: Rodolpi,
1982), page 42.) Though I will present a more robust
discussion of the concept of the state of nature as "an
ideal limiting case" later in this chapter, at this point in
the discussion, I wish only to suggest that the single
individual persons or collective organizational units which
occupy (the various conceptions of) the state of nature can
similarly be understood to represent 'ideal limiting cases'
(akin to frictionless surfaces and widthless one-dimensional
lines) rather than any actually existing men and women or
historically instantiated governmental organizations.
16.
Hobbes, English Works , Vol . I, pages 66-67 (my emphasis).
17.
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 109.
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18 It should be noted that the three methods by which Hobbesbelieves a commonwealth can be generated will be discussedin chapter 4 of this dissertation.
19
. Seemingl y , the condition of civil war which follows thedissolution of a (civilized) COMMONWEALTH can be identified
as an instance of the state of nature-2, since we would
reasonably expect some sort of multiperson coalitions ordefensive groups to be manifested under such conditions.
20.Frangois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of
Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in G.A.J.
Rogers and Alan Ryan, editors. Perspectives on Thomas
Hobbes
.
page 111.
21. Indeed, with respect to the fourth source listed in the
previous sentence, the opening pages of Thucydides' History
Pelopenesian Wars
, an English translation of which
was executed and published by Hobbes during his early years,
contains a description of the social condition in ancient
Greece which fairly well approximates the descriptions of
the state of nature-2 which can be found in the thirteenth
and seventeenth chapters of Leviathan
, as well as in various
other locations throughout Hobbes's writings. See Hobbes,
English Works
, Vol VIII, pages 1-8.
22. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 77.
23. It is the opinion of the present writer that the
conventional interpretation of the prisoners dilemma (such
as that set forward by Gauthier in The Logic of Leviathan )
does not adequately reflect Hobbes '
s
analysis of the state
of nature since such an interpretation insufficiently
reflects the influence of the antisocial passions upon the
voluntary behavior of the inhabitants of that state. Thus,
while discussions of game theoretical strategies likely to
be employed by the paradigmat ical 1 y rational actors who find
themselves in prisoners dilemma type situations, while
significant and interesting in their own right, nevertheless
fail to capture the passionate character and the resulting
behavioral strategies which are likely to be employed by the
individuals involved. Thus, throughout the course of this
chapter, I will concern myself not with how human beings
considered as paradigmatical 1 y rational creatures would
choose to voluntarily act under such conditions, but rather
with how we would expect human beings of the constitutional
and behavioral character described by Hobbes to voluntarily
act if they were forced to interact with one another under
said conditions.
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. Descriptions of this more robust characteri zation ofstate of nature-1 can be found in sections 9 7 «->f ck *
of M Give (Hobbes, Man and Citir.en pages ^^2^
1^:® °f Chapter 4 of Book 2 of ?he Elemenfi’Af r.a„
illuminatf-igTr tn°th 131-134.), and perhaps most11 minatingly, m e sections entitled "Dominion Paternal
EZcation"^in t^ ^
Generation but by Contract," and "On
'
fHohhr- t ^ Chapter 20 of Leviathan.^ bbes, Leviathan
.
pages 128-130.) —
26. See, for example, Hobbes's footnote to Section 2 ofapter 1 of De_Cive, in Hobbes, Man and Citizen
, page 110.
27.
Hobbes, Man and Citizen
. page 118.
28.
Further, in D_e Give
,
Hobbes describes this condition ofwar as perpetual in its own nature," " because in regard ofthe equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by
victory. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
, page 118.), and in the
El ements
,
Hobbes claims that our knowledge of the behavior
of men in their natural condition is derived "both by the
experience of savage nations that live at this day, and by
our ancestors the old inhabitants of Germany, and other now
civil countries." (Hobbes, Elements of Law
,
page 73.) In the
corresponding passage from De Give
, Hobbes cites as an
example of those who dwell in a perpetual condition of war,
even in the present, "those of America," and as examples of
those who had previously endured such a condition those of
other nations which now indeed are become civil and
flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor,
nasty, and deprived of all that pleasure and beauty of life,
which peace and security are wont to bring them." (Hobbes,
Man and Citizen
,
page 118.)
29
.
Leviathan
,
page 77.
30.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 77.
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31.
Hobbes offers the opinion that ’’-in all
(Hobbes, ^viathan
,
page 106.) Similarly, in thecorresponding passage from the Elements
. Hobbes claims that
tb
°'d^^time, we read that rapine was a trade of life " evenhough cruelty was forbidden by the law of nature "
'
(Hobbes, Elements of Law, page 100.) And finally, in De
fi^iAo an^
"""
^ ofv ng, ^ d as It were a certain economy, which they calledXfloxpiKnv living by rapine; which was neither agaiLt thelaw of nature nor void of glory to those who exercised itMith)Valor, not with cruelty." Hobbes, Man and Citlxen page
Similarly, the opening pages of Hobbes's 1628 Englishtranslation of The History of Thucydides contains a briefdescription of the nomadic, precarious, and rather
unprofitable way of life practiced by the ancientinhabitants of the land "which is now called Hellas " It is
clear even to the casual reader that this description, bears
a more than superficial resemblance to the condition which Ihave designated Hobbes’s state of nature-2.
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feature of the Dialogue account of the state of nature-2
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family. Thus, according to the Dialogue account
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his servants who have been acquired and "saved" through
conquest, and (unlike the earlier accounts) subjects who
have voluntarily submitted themselves to the laws of the
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by a new captivity, where the servant having donehis endeavor to defend himself, hath therebvperformed his covenant to his former master^ andfor the safety of his life, entering into a new
covenant with the conqueror, is bound to his best
endeavour to keep that likewise.
(Hobbes, Elements of Law
,
pages 129-30.)
Similarly, in De Give
, Hobbes contends that
if the servant be taken prisoner, the old
servitude is abolished by the new; for as all
other things, so servants are also acquired by
was, whom in equity the lord must protect if he
will have them to be his.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen
, page 209.)
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[w]e see all countries, though they be at peacewith their neighbors, yet guarding their frontierswith armed men, their towns with walls and portsand keeping constant watches. To what purpose is'
neighboringpower. (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
^
page 99.)
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absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge most
conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live
in a condition of perpetual war, and upon the
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2 of De Give
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coasts and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are
compact within walls: and all for fear of neighboring
kingdoms and towns." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
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58. See my discussions of commonwealths (and families) by
acquisition and by preservation on pages 131-152 of chapter4 of this dissertation.
59. But note well Hobbes’s claim that
[i]f a man and woman, monarchs of two several
kingdoms, have a child, and contract concerning who
shall have the dominion of him, the right of thedominion passeth by the contract. If they contract
,
the dominion followeth the dominion of the
place of residence. For the sovereign of each
country hath dominion over all that reside
therein. (Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 130.)
60. See, for example, Hobbes’s claim that within
commonwealths, the dominion over a child
is decided by the civil law; and for the most part
but not always, the sentence is in favor of the
father; because for the most part commonwealths
have been erected by the fathers, not by the
mothers of families. But the question lieth now i
the state of mere nature; where there are suppose
no laws of matrimony.
. . .
(Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 128-29.)
such as those which exist within commonwealths.
61. In fact, a problem would seem to arise when we come to
consider Hobbes’s occasional references to ’’multitudes of
lawless men” (Hobbes, Engl ish Works
.
Vol . V, page 184.) and
"the manner of life there would be were there no common
power to fear [based upon] the manner of life, which men
that have formerly lived under peaceful governments use to
degenerate into, in a civil war.” (Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page
78
. )
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Specifically, a critic of my reconstruction of Hobbes's
state of nature might urge that a separate conception ofthis state which is historical (rather than hypothetical)
and which construes the actors or individuals who inhabit
this condition as utterly solitary (i.e. without any sorts
of social ties) should be included within my taxonomy.
To such a critic, I would reply that even in those
circumstances in which society has broken down, there do
nevertheless remain some residual social ties among men and
women. Thus, it is inconceivable that Hobbes would have
considered as a historical possibility an actually
instantiated war of each against all. Indeed, on page 78 of
Leviathan
, Hobbes denies that "there has even been" a
condition of war of this type.
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CHAPTER IV
VARIETIES OF HOBBES IAN COMMONWEALTH
A. Introduction
In the opening section of chapter 8 of De Cive
. Hobbes
draws a distinction between a natural government "which may
also be called acquired because it is that which is gotten
by power and natural force," and an instituted or framed
government "which receives its original from the consent of
many, who by contract and faith mutually given have obliged
each other. In this fourth chapter of my dissertation, I
will examine Hobbes's conceptions of a natural commonwealth
(which he divides into a commonwealth by acquisition or a
despotical government, and a commonwealth by preservation or
a paternal government), and a commonwealths by
institution. I will begin by discussing Hobbes's
conception of a commonwealth by acquisition.
B. Commonwealth by Acquisition
In Leviathan
, Hobbes proclaims that "dominion acquired
by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers
call despotic, from A£oic6tec which signifieth a lord or
master; and is the dominion of the master over the
servant." Hobbes specifies that
this dominion is then acquired to the victor when
the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of
death covenanteth, either in express words or
other sufficient signs of the will, that so long
as his life and the liberty of his body is allowed
him, the victor should have the use thereof at his
pleasure
.
1Significantly, the relationship which obtains between
the servant and the master (or between the citizen and the
sovereign in a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition) can properly be
characterized as a contractual one. Thus, in a commonwealth
by acquisition (though as we will later see, not in a
commonwealth by institution), the sovereign enters into a
contractual agreement with his subject(s) and is bound to
perform the terms to which he has agreed.
Moreover, in Leviathan
. Hobbes asserts that it is not^
the victory which giveth the right of dominion
over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is
he obliged because he is conquered, that is to
say beaten or taken, or put to flight; but
because he cometh in and submitteth to the
victor
.
In all three of his principal political works, Hobbes
is quick to distinguish between a servant, who is trusted
with his corporal freedom, and a slave who is not so
trusted. Thus, in De Give , he specifies "that there is a
confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of
pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his corporal
liberty," and that "not everyone who is taken in the war and
hath his life spared," is supposed to have "contracted with
his lord."® Indeed, Hobbes claims that those who have been
taken in war, who have had their lives spared, and who
continue to serve within "prisons" or "bound within irons,"
i.e. slaves, "offend not against the laws of nature if they
fly or kill their lord."^ Thus, Hobbes attempts to show
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that, the contractual bonds which characterize the
relationship between the servant and the master (or between
the subject and the sovereign within a COMMONWEALTH by
acquisition) are incurred as a result of a free choice on
the part of each of the contracting parties.
Although in each of his three principal political
works, Hobbes specifies that the sovereign by acquisition
enters into a contractual agreement with each of his
subjects, it is clear that such an agreement is not entered
into by both contractors upon equal terms. This claim is
most forcefully asserted in Leviathan where Hobbes states
that the victor is not "obliged by an enemy's rendering
himself, without promise of life, to spare him from this his
yielding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer
than in his own discretion he shall think fit."^ Thus, if M
has S at the point of a sword, and S offers to "strike a
deal" with M, M can choose to decline S's offer without
seriously endangering the loss of his life. Indeed, in this
situation M can immediately kill S if he chooses to do so.
Even if M does enter into a contractual agreement with S,
Hobbes seems clearly to be asserting in Leviathan , M can
discontinue honoring the covenant into which he has entered,
Q
whenever he thinks it discreet to do so.
Indeed, Hobbes defines or describes 'quarter,' taking
alive, or zoogria (Zwypla) as evading "the present fury of
the victor by submission and [compounding one's] life with
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ransom and service. Further, Hobbes specifies that the
person who "hath quarter, hath not his life given but
deferred till farther deliberation; for it is not yielding
on condition of life but to discretion
.
In the Elements of Law
, and especially in De Give,
Hobbes clearly underplays the sovereign-by-
acquisition's/master's "discretion" in determining how long
he will refrain from killing or placing his servant in
chains, and instead emphasizes that the subject’s obligation
to obey the sovereign is contingent upon the latter's
continuing to honor the terms of the contract into which he
had entered. Thus, in De Give
. Hobbes contends that^^
[t]he obligation therefore of a servant to his
lord, ariseth not from the simple grant of his
life; but from hence rather, that he keeps him not
bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives
from contract; but where is no trust there can be
no contract. . . There is therefore a confidence
and trust which accompanies the benefit of
pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his
corporal liberty. . . Wherefore such kinds of
servants as are restrained by imprisonment or
bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of
servant given above; because those serve not for
contract's sake, but to the end that they might
not suffer. And therefore if they fly or kill
their lord, they offend not against the law of
nature
.
Thus, the servant is contractually bound to obey the
master so long as the latter refrains from placing the
former in chains or prison. Since contractual bonds
presuppose trust, the servant who is committed to chains and
custody, and is thus no longer trusted, is thereby
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discharged of the obligation in foro interna to his quondam
master. Despite the unequal power relationship which
characterizes the agreement into which the sovereign or
master and the citizen or servant enter, it is significant
that in establishing a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition (or its
corresponding smaller scale analog), the sovereign does
enter into a contractual relationship with his subject or
servant. As we will later see, this is clearly not the case
when the commonwealth by institution is established.
C. Commonwealth by Preservation
Hobbes continues his presentation of natural (as
opposed to artificial) governments by discussing the "Rights
of Parents over their Children." In De Cive
. Hobbes begins
this discussion by criticizing those earlier writers who had
attempted to prove that a parent enjoys dominion over his
child simply because the former begat the latter "as if it
were of itself evident, that what is begotten by me is
mine."^^ In Leviathan
, he stoutly asserts that^^
the right to dominion by generation is that which
the parent hath over his children . .
.
[a]nd is
not so derived from the generation, as if
therefore the parent had dominion over his child
because he begat him; but from the child's
consent, either express or by other sufficient
arguments
.
Hobbes explains that mere generation does not confer
dominion since dominion is indivisible (i.e., since no man
can serve two masters). However, since two persons, namely,
a male and a female, "must concur in the act of
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generation, it is impossible that dominion should be
acquired by generation only.
Thus, Hobbes begins his argument against the claim that
generation automatically confers dominion of the generator
over the generated (i.e., of the parent over the child) by
claiming that dominion is indivisible since no man can serve
two masters. Indeed, he begins by stipulating that no human
being can be ruled by more than one natural person.
Secondly, Hobbes introduces the factual empirical claim that
two persons, namely a male and a female, are required to
generate or to bring into existence any individual child.
Thus, since two persons are jointly required to generate a
child, if mere generation of that child were sufficient to
confer dominion upon the generator, then both the father and
the mother would have a right to dominion over their child.
However, since sovereign power is indivisible, i.e., cannot
be distributed between two or among more than two people,
then it is not the case that merely generating a person
automatically confers dominion upon the generator.
Hobbes then informs his readers that "some" who have
recognized the indivisibility of sovereignty have attributed
such dominion "to man only as being of the more excellent
sex," or have ascribed "dominion over the child to the
father only, ob praBstantium sexus/' or have, "by reason of
the pre-eminence of sex," attributed lordship to the
father. He claims, however, that those who hold this
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position are clearly wrong, since "there is not always that
difference of strength or prudence between the man and the
woman as the right can be determined without war."^* Thus,
Hobbes's belief in the natural equality of human beings,
which was discussed in some detail in chapter 1 of this
dissertation, can again be seen to play a part in his theory
of sovereignty. Specifically, Hobbes claims that if there
existed significant natural differences between men and
women with respect to levels of physical strength or
(intellectual) prudence, then such differences would render
it the case that dominion over the child naturally attaches
to the stronger or the wiser (i.e., the male) parent.
However, since such natural divisions do not exist, dominion
over the child does not, "by reason of the pre-eminence of
sex, naturally attach to the male parent.
Strikingly, Hobbes claims that in "the condition of
mere nature," if the mother and the father make no contract
to establish dominion over their child, the dominion lies
"with the mother." For example, in De Give , he claims
that^®
by right of nature the conqueror is lord over the
conquered. By the right of nature, therefore, the
dominion over the infant first belongs to him who
is first in his power. But it is manifest that he
who is newly born is in the mother's power.
Thus, not only does Hobbes deny that dominion over the child
naturally adheres to that child's father, but moreover, he
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claims that dominion does, in some natural sense, belong to
the mother. Though one might initially be perplexed by
Hobbes's claim that dominion naturally belongs to that
child's mother, rather than to his father, one must remember
that Hobbes's discussion here concerns the relationship
between the mother, the father and the child in the state of
nature, specifically, in what I have earlier characterized
as the state of nature-1.
During his discussion of the origins of the
commonwealth by preservation, Hobbes specifies that in the
state of nature "it cannot be known who is the father, but
by the testimony of the mother. Thus, the state of
nature (i.e., the state of nature-1) is a condition not only
bereft of marital institutions, but moreover, a condition in
which relationships between men and women are, for the most
part, rather fleeting ones. Nevertheless, Hobbes explicitly
states that in order to retain the right of dominion over
the child, the mother must perform actions beyond that of
merely giving birth. Indeed, he remarks that since "the
infant is first in the power of the mother. . . she may
either nourish it or expose it. If she nourish it, it oweth
its life to its mother; and is therefore obliged to obey
her."^^ Thus, the obligation of the child to obey his
mother arises not from her having given birth to, but
rather, from her having taken the steps necessary to
preserve the life of her child.
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On the other hand, Hobbes claims that if the mother
exposes her child and if another person finds and nourishes
that child, then the child incurs an obligation to obey his
preserver. Hobbes explains that the child "ought to" obey
the person by whom his life is preserved "because
pi^fiserva t i on of life being the end, for which one man
becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise
obedience to him, in whose power it is to save or destroy
him."^^
Hobbes contends that in the "mere state of nature,
where there are supposed no laws of matrimony and no laws
for the education of children, "either the parents between
themselves dispose of the dominion over the child, or do not
dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right
passeth according to the contract. Thus, it is
conceivable that in the state of nature-1, a male and a
female who are jointly responsible for the generation of an
infant can contract to transfer dominion over the child from
the mother to the father. Moreover, such a contract can be
conceived as transferring dominion over the child without
transferring the right of nature of either of the
contracting parties. That is to say, such a contract can be
understood as transferring dominion over the child to one of
the parents (usually the father) without transferring
dominion over the mother. Indeed, Hobbes mentions that if a
man and a woman, who are monarchs of "two separate kingdoms
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and thus, who confront each other in the state of nature^*
have a child "and contract concerning who shall have
dominion over him, the right of dominion passeth by the
contract. Moreover, he cites the erroneous historical
example of the Amazons who (he claims) "contracted with the
men of neighboring countries to whom they had recourse for
issue 1.28
What I take to be an interesting feature of this
contract is that it is not necessary that both (or even one)
of the contracting parties be the parents of the child. By
this, I simply mean to point out that the mother (or by the
person who currently has the child under his/her control),
may enter into such a contractual relationship with any
(fully grown) person whatever, and thus it is not necessary
that she enter into this contract with the child's father.
(Indeed, as I suggested in the previous sentence, it is not
necessary that even one of the two persons who enters into
such a contract be the biological parent of the infant whose
proprietorship is being transferred. Thus, if a mother
abandons her child, the latter of whom is found and
preserved by person p (who, we may stipulate, is not
biologically related to the child), person p may enter into
a covenant with person q (who, we may also stipulate, is not
related to the child) through which guardianship of the
child is transferred to q in exchange for some other
benefit ) .
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Thus, Hobbes presents a rather involved account of the
manner by which a fully grown person comes to have dominion
over a child which may be summarized in the following
fashion: When a woman gives birth to a child, she may either
breed up, that is, support the preservation of that child,
or she may expose it to the elements, i.e., abandon it. If
she decides to exercise the former option, she thereby
retains dominion over her child by virtue of having
supported the latter's preservation. If she decides to
exercise the latter option, and if another person finds and
'breeds up" the abandoned child, that other person acquires
dominion over the child for the same reason. After having
acquired dominion over the child in one of these ways, the
mother or preserver may contract to transfer such dominion
to another person (presumably, in exchange for some other
benefit). Thus, dominion over an infant can be exchanged
through contract, provided that both of the contracting
parties are adults (and hence, capable of understanding the
mechanics of contract making and keeping), and that one of
the two contracting parties has dominion over the infant by
virtue of present possession.
Importantly, when the child comes to enjoy the full use
of his intellectual and physical faculties, he continues to
owe obedience to his preserver since, as Hobbes contends,
"it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved." Thus,
even though the infant child cannot be conceived of as
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entering into a contract with his preserver, once that child
reaches adulthood or the age of reason (or in any case, the
age at which he can be conceived of as understanding the
mechanism of a contract) he is to be understood as having
entered into a tacit contract to obey the person who has
preserved him.^^
We can therefore observe that Hobbes’s account of
patrimonial dominion or commonwealth by preservation
contains discussions of two distinct types of contract, the
first of which is employed to determine or "fix" dominion
over an infant child, and the second of which results from
the child’s acceptance of benefits which had been bestowed
upon him during his nonage.
D. Commonwealth by Institution
Hobbes claims that while in natural commonwealths, the
lord or the sovereign "acquires to himself such citizens as
he will," in institutive commonwealths "citizens by their
own wills appoint a lord over themselves, whether he be one
man or a company of men, endued with the command in chief."
He begins his discussion of a commonwealth by institution by
inviting his readers to consider the process by which a
multitude of men join together "of their own free will." In
fact, he commences chapter 18 of Leviathan by asserting
that^^
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[a] conmonwealth is said to be instituted when amultitude of men do agree, and covenant, every onewith every one that to whatsoever man or assLbly
rfohr; ® f fi"®" part, theight to present the person of them all, that is
uelTL their representative; every one, aswel he that voted for it, as he that voted
against it, shall authorize all the actions andjudgments, of that man or assembly of men, in thesame manner as if they were his own, to the endto live peacefully amongst themselves, and beprotected against other men.
Thus, we might imagine a multitude of ten men whom we might
designate pl-plO, each of whom retains his right of nature,
and none of whom has yet agreed to transfer his decision
making power to any other person. Hobbes is keen to
emphasize that even though the actions of many men can
concur to one end, such actions must be understood to
proceed from the several wills of the men who constitute
that multitude. Indeed, he asserts that ”[s]ince the
conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to
preserve peace and to make a lasting defense, it is
requisite that in those necessary matters which concern
peace and self defense, there be but one will of all
men.” Thus, we might imagine that each person pl-pIO,
residing in the state of nature of some variety,
individually desires that some state of affairs be brought
about. We might imagine, for example, that each person
recognizes that the course of a certain river must be
diverted before the flow from that waterway is able to cause
a severe flood in the plain in which all of them live. It
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would seem that according to Hobbes, even before any variety
of commonwealth is instituted, the various persons can (more
or less) spontaneously join together to help achieve some
common mutually beneficial goal.
In the example of the conforming of many wills to one
end, namely, to the end of diverting the course of the
immanent ly destructive river, each person desires that the
river be diverted, and each person separately and of his own
volition decides to enter into the cooperative project of
diverting the course of this body of water. That is to say,
in this prepolitical state, each person enters into this
project because he has a will to do so and not because he
had been instructed or ordered to do so by a sovereign
individual or council to whom he had formerly transferred
his decision-making power. However, Hobbes believed such
spontaneously initiated cooperative projects to be of
insufficient strength to form the basis for any long-lasting
4 i
or durable civil arrangement.
Surprisingly, Hobbes suggests that a number of men can,
in some cases, repulse attacks or defend territory without
being led by the will of a formally established permanent
sovereign power (although, as was mentioned earlier, in
order for any common goal to be achieved, some system or
order-issuing, and rule-following, even if it is exceedingly
rudimentary and evanescent, would need to be in existence)
35Accordingly, he contends that it is not enough
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should deaira shouldlast all the time of their life, that they be
limitoH ;• in by one judgment for aed time; as in one battle, or one war For
end^^*'
obtain a victory by their unanimouseavour against a foreign enemy; yet
or ““"“"nn enemy,he that by one part is held for an enemy is bi
bv°thrdifr ">nnt Leds,y the fference of their interests dissolve, andfall again into a war amongst themselves.
Moreover, he contends that if the actions of a multitude of
be directed according to their particularjudgments and particular appetites, they can
expect thereby no defense, nor protection, neither
against a common enemy, nor against the injuries
of one another. For being distracted in opinions
concerning the best use and application of their
strength, they do not help but hinder one another
and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to
nothing, whereby they are easily not only subduedby a very few that agree together; but also,
where there is no common enemy, they make war upon
each other, for their particular interests.
Thus, given the diversity of individual passions, and the
predominantly self-seeking behavior of human beings, it is
impossible that a multitude of human beings left to their
own devices, and thus unrestrained by any established
sovereign power, will naturally organize into cooperative
and defensible civic units. Indeed, Hobbes contends that
"there be something else required besides covenant, to make
their agreement constant and lasting: which is a common
power to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to
the common benefit. Ergo, Hobbes believed that in order
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to procure a more certain, safe, and comfortable life, a
number of men will enter into a series of contractual
agreements with one another to confer sovereign decision-
making power on a single individual or assembly.
Hence, we can imagine that person pi enters into a
covenant with person p2 which specifies that both
contracting parties agree to be bound by the decision of
some sovereign individual or assembly and to accept and
"authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man or
assembly of men. . . as if they were his own."^® Hobbes
asserts that in instituting the commonwealth, "each
individual enters into a contract with every other" so that
pi must be understood to contract with persons p3-pl0 as
well as with p2
.
(see my previous discussion of persons pj-
PlO on pp . 143-144) Moreover, Hobbes contends that in
entering into the contract, each party agrees to transfer
his decision-making power to the individual or assembly of
men which is selected by the greater part of that multitude.
Thus, after every man enters into a contract with every
other, an election is conducted in order to choose an
individual person or assembly as the depository of the
sovereign power.
Hobbes contends that after the individual enters into
the covenant with his fellow subjects, he agrees to obey the
natural person or group of natural persons that is offered
the gift of sovereignty by the majority of him and his
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fellow contractors. Indeed, Hobbes asserts that if this
contractor^^
oluntarily entered into the congregation of themthat were assembled, he sufficiently declaredthereby his will, and therefore tacitly
covenanted, to stand to what the major part shall
ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand
thereto, or make protestations against any oftheir decrees, he does contrary to his covenant
and thus unjustly. '
Moreover, Hobbes points out that the alternative to
accepting the decree of the greater part is life in the
state of nature "wherein [each man] might without injustice
be destroyed by any man whatsoever."^® Thus, Hobbes
proposes two reasons why a man should agree to be ruled by
whomever the majority chooses, even if the majority's choice
does not conform to his own. First, since this man has
entered into a contractual agreement, he is bound to perform
the terms to which he has agreed, in this case to accept as
his sovereign the man or assembly of men that is chosen by a
majority of the contractors. Second, Hobbes points out that
failure to accept as sovereign the man or assembly that is
chosen by a majority of the contractors will result in being
excluded from the incipient commonwealth, and thus,
returning to the solitary and uncertain conditions of the
state of nature. Indeed, in such a situation, one acts
justly and prudently by remaining within the commonwealth,
that is, by accepting as one's sovereign the man or assembly
which is elected or chosen by the majority.
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Hobbes cautions that it is not enough to obtain the
requisite security that every one covenants with the rest
"either by words or writing, not to steal, not to kill, and
to observe the like laws; for the pravity of human
disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well
known how little.
. . men are kept to their duties through
conscience of their promises
. Thus, Hobbes contends that
some coercive mechanism must be established which will
guarantee the keeping of contracts, as well as the keeping
of the natural and civil laws through the use of
punishments. Even though the individual members of a
multitude of men might uniformly enter into a cooperative
arrangement with the intention to follow the laws of nature
(which Hobbes claimed to be easily known to all men), Hobbes
believed that the self-serving passions of men would
eventually lead to law breaking, dissention, and eventually
the dissolution of this group. Further, Hobbes believed that
in order to prevent such an unappealing eventuality, it is
necessary to establish a sovereign mechanism which is of
sufficient power to guarantee that contracts are kept and
laws are obeyed. Once the sovereign is instituted, he can
then develop a system of penalties according to which the
punishment assigned to be administered to the person who
violates a given law is greater than the benefit which is
likely to be realized by the violator as a result of
breaking that law.
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If an effective system of penalties is in place,
individuals, who are able to observe that the penalties
assigned to the violation of laws exceed in severity the
probable benefits of violating them, and that such penalties
are likely to be imposed for violations, will be deterred
from violating these laws. Once a sufficient number of
citizens is so discouraged from breaking these laws, a
general climate of safety will ensue. This, in turn, will
lead to the further reduction of the number of violations of
the law, and thus, to the realization of a condition of
greater safety. This "climate of safety" can be understood
to result from the perception on the part of a substantial
portion of the commonwealth's (or COMMONWEALTH'S) populace
that the laws can be kept without running a substantial risk
of being harmed or being taken advantage of by one's less
conscientious fellow-citizens.
Clearly, however, this transformation from a condition
in which human beings are unwi 1 1 inq to keep covenants and
observe the other laws of nature, to a condition in which
they are so willing involves a bit of finesse on the part of
Hobbes. Indeed, Hobbes's account of this transformation
seems less than compelling for reasons which will be
detailed in the following two chapters. At this point in the
presentation, let it suffice to say that Hobbes does not
believe that the nature of the human organism will undergo a
transformation once a COMMONWEALTH is instituted. Indeed,
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after the COMMONWEALTH has been established, the Individuals
Who constitute that COMMONWEALTH will remain the
predominantly egoistic" creatures which they had been when
they inhabited*' the state of nature.
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CHAPTER V
THE GENERATION OF STATES
A. Introduction
Given the model of the state of nature which I
presented in chapter three, and the three types of
commonwealth which I discussed in chapter four, one can
conceive of nine possibilities of the manner in which a
commonwealth or a cooperative grouping can arise from the
state of nature. One can, for example, consider how a
commonwealth by acquisition might arise from the state of
nature-1, how a commonwealth by acquisition might arise from
the state of nature-2, and so on. These various
possibilities can be represented in the following fashion:
HOW A COMMONWEALTH BY
Institution Acquisition Preservation
CAN BE UNDERSTOOD TO ARISE FROM OUT OF THE
State of Nature-1 12 3
State of Nature-2 45 6
State of Nature-3 78 9
In this fifth chapter, I will examine how a commonwealth by
institution and how a commonwealth by acquisition can be
conceived as arising from each of the three conceptions of
the state of nature which we have seen to be contained in
Hobbes's works. Thus, in this chapter, I „i „ insider the
six modes of generation designated 1
, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 in
the above printed table.
Before beginning this exploration, a number of remarks
must be made. First, it should be noted that in this table,
the numerals 1 through 9 function merely as names of the
modes by which various types of commonwealth can be
conceived of as "growing out of" the various types of the
state of nature.
Second, when I refer to the establishment of a
commonwealth, it is not necessary that the type of grouping
I have in mind is a COMMONWEALTH of the state of nature-3
variety. Thus, in this chapter a 'commonwealth' will refer
to a fully-fledged COMMONWEALTH of the state of nature-3
variety, or to a small despotical or patrinomial group which
I have identified as being characteristic of the state of
nature-2.^ It should be noted that the latter type of
grouping can contain as few as two members; indeed, a two-
member grouping represents the limiting case of a paternal
or a despotical government.
Third, though this chapter could have contained
discussions of all nine of the modes of generation
represented in this table, I have decided to refrain from
presenting discussions of modes 3, 6, and 9. Even though, in
each of his three principal works of political philosophy,
Hobbes does discuss "preservation" as one of the three
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procedures by which a collective organizational unit can be
conceived to arise, I've decided to forego considering
inodes of generation 3, 6 and 9 precisely because these three
inodes bear little direct relevance to, and are thus
comparatively unimportant from the standpoint of the
foundation (or "establishment") and maintenance of such
actually existing modern political units as COMMONWEALTHS.
Finally, as I mentioned earlier in this dissertation,
the taxonomy which I present represents a reconstruction of
Hobbes's state of nature which I believe can legitimately be
culled from various of his texts. I admit that this taxonomy
represents my own reading or interpretation of Hobbes's
texts and that these divisions, as presented by Hobbes, are
far from distinctly drawn.
B. Mode 1
In his classic description of the manner in which a
2
commonwealth is instituted, Hobbes asserts that
[a] commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a
multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every
one, with every one, that to whosoever man or
assembly of men, shall be given by the major part,
the right to present the person of them all, that
is to say, to be their representative: every one,
as well he that voted for it as he that voted
against it, shall authorize all the actions and
judgments, of that man, or assembly of men, in the
same manner, as if they were his own, to the end,
to live peacefully amongst themselves, and be
protected against other men.
Thus, we might envision the rational though passionate human
beings who inhabit the state of nature-1 as instituting a
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commonwealth in roughly the following manner: «e might
imagine that persons p,, p, , p^, confront each
other in a condition where there exists neither a common
sovereign mechanism nor contractually-generated
interpersonal relationships of any kind (see the description
of the conditions which characterize the state of nature-1
in chapter 3 of this dissertation). It must again be
emphasized that the persons who inhabit the state of nature-
1 are to be conceived of as abstract human individuals who
exist in no particular historical epoch, and who are
considered as if inhabiting no specific geographical area.
In fact, as I attempted to make clear during my earlier
presentation of the three conceptions of the state of
nature, the state of nature-1 might properly be interpreted
as an analytic model which allows one to understand (or
assists one in understanding) how a number of abstract
individuals can be expected to interact with one another
when they are constrained by no sovereign power, and are
thus left to their own devices.
It must be remembered that the individual persons (or
natural human organisms) who inhabit the state of nature-1
are endowed with the faculty of reason and are thus able to
formulate instrumental plans or strategies intended to
secure themselves access to desired material objects, or to
bring into existence desired states of affairs. Further, it
must be remembered that Hobbes describes the behavior of
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human beings as being importantly influenced or determined
by the presence of such bodily "passions" as (1) a desire
for the possession of those objects which will provide
bodily sustenance, (2) a fear of violent death, and (3) a
ho£e to establish and maintain a condition of peace and
commodious existence. Finally, according to Hobbes, the
faculty of reason can best be understood as providing a
guiding role for the attainment of the material objects or
states of affairs which are the "particular objects" of the
various human passions. That is to say, for Hobbes, as for
Hume, a judgment of human reason can be understood to
motivate a human action only if that judgment is united with
or serves to guide an autonomously (and presumably,
previously) existing passion such a desire, an aversion, and
so on
.
It should be clear to us, as well as to those who
occupy the state of nature-1, that even though forming
cooperative groups could lead to the realization of greater
benefits than one could achieve on one's own, keeping to
oneself, that is, attempting to maintain a solitary
existence, constitutes the safer of the two options.
We will recall, moreover, that Hobbes draws a
distinction between moderate men "who are satisfied with an
equality of nature," and dominators "who take pleasure in
contemplating their own power in acts of conquest." Since
Hobbes includes individuals of the latter variety among
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those who inhabit the state of nature, we might reasonably
suggest that as time passes, such dominators will attempt to
demonstrate their presumed, though spurious, superiority
over other men through "acts of conquest" or instances of
offensive violence. Moreover, we might reasonably expect
^^^t such acts would, from time to time, be performed in
full view of other individuals so that these acts would be
sensed, noticed, and retained as memories within the
minds/sensory organs of both those who are the direct
victims of such violence and those who are simply interested
observers .
^
Thus, by the time the state of nature-1 has, in
essence, "played itself out" through the passage of time,
the resulting interactional situation will have developed
into a rather inhospitable forum. Suspicion of one’s
fellowmen will abound, an initial uncertainty concerning the
motives and probable voluntary behavior of one's fellows
will give way to a widespread perception that those around
one are unworthy of trust. Indeed, each inhabitant will
recognize that engaging in anticipatory activity constitutes
a necessary means to his continued survival . For this
reason, all or most men can be expected to engage in such
activity
.
Thus, Hobbes's striking description of the remarkably
civilized process by which "a multitude of men do agree and
covenant" to be bound by the decision of the sovereign upon
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whom the members of that multitude have conferred their
powers, strikes the reader as being entirely out of keeping
with the description of the state of nature which Hobbes
presents.^ If the individuals who occupy the state of
nature are forced to adopt and maintain an attitude of
vigilance and a generally-held willingness to attempt to
dominate others, it appears impossible to envision scenarios
in which offers to establish conditions of peace are not met
with jeers, rebukes or acts of anticipation.
One might suggest that this problem can be eliminated
if we consider the individuals who inhabit the state of
nature to be purely rational actors who are not affected by
such passions as pride and a desire for glory. Indeed, one
might aver that by eliminating such antisocial passions from
this model, human beings can be imagined to relate to one
another in a purely rational manner, can recognize the
benefits likely to be bestowed upon them as a result of
cooperative activity, and can thus put into practice such
strategies as are designed to institute a system of
cooperative group activity.
Although concentrating on a model of the state of
nature which construes human beings as rational actors whose
decisions are not affected by such passions as pride and a
desire for glory may provide a fruitful exercise in
determining if, and if so, how a group of purely rational
beings can be conceived as coming together to form a
163
cooperative union, such a strategy would be clearly
inappropriate to deal with the likely behavior of
individuals construed according to Hobbes’s anthropology. As
I mentioned in chapter 2 of this dissertation, Hobbes takes
as given that a significant, though never precisely
specified, proportion of human beings can be characterized
as dominators, and that the behavior or voluntary activity
of such individuals can be expected to profoundly affect the
behavior of those moderate men who dwell in their vicinity.
Given the previously described character of the fully
developed state of nature-1, it would seem virtually
impossible that a commonwealth by institution could be
®s^^t*lished among this "state's” inhabitants.
If, per impossible, such a miraculous transformation of
human nature could be effected, the establishment of a
commonwealth by institution from out of the state of nature-
1 might be envisioned as occurring in the manner indicated
on pages 142-149 of chapter 4 of this dissertation.
C. Mode 2
One can easily envision how a commonwealth by
acquisition might arise from out of the state of nature-1.
For example, we might propose that such a two-person
commonwealth would come into existence as the result of a
contract in which one man agrees to obey the directives of
another in order to avoid the present stroke of death.
Indeed, dominion "acquired by consent or victory in war,"
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war of each against all.
including presumably, the so-called
is described by Hobbes as^
that which some writers call despotical
. . . and
master over the servant,and this dominion is then acquired to the victor
when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke
1°"9 as his lifeand the liberty of his body are allowed him, the
victor shall use thereof at his pleasure.
Clearly, however, in the state of nature such an agreement
would be evanescent and precarious for at least two reasons.
In the first place, Hobbes believes that despotical
groupings of this type are held together by the servant's
fear of the master. That is, the servant agrees to serve the
master ostensibly because the master refrains (or refrained)
from killing him, but additionally because he fears (the
powers of) his master. Admittedly, servant S would have a
compelling reason to fear, and more significantly, to
promise to render obedience to master M precisely when M has
a clear advantage over him. However, once the covenant is
instituted, and M allows S a partial liberty, S ceases to be
in clear danger of immediate death (in the same sense that
he had been when a blade was situated next to his throat).
In a one-to-one encounter in the state of nature (that is,
one in which the master has no other servants or sons), S
would recognize that M is merely a human being and is thus
subject to a quick death (as is any other human being).
Recognition of this fact, coupled with the aforementioned
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overvaluing tendency which afflicts "almost all men,"^
would almost certainly lead S to eventually break the
covenant by refusing to obey, or by attempting to subdue or
destroy his putative master.
Secondly, it appears unreasonable to believe that M
would be imprudent enough to trust S with a partial liberty
in exchange for a pledge of obedience. Surely, M would
recognize that S will retain his cunning and his physical
power even after he has promised to obey M. Indeed, M has
little reason to believe that S will help to defend him when
he [M] commands such obedience, or even that S will not
attempt to subdue him "by force or wiles." Hence, we have
strong reason to believe that in the state of nature-1,, it
is more reasonable for M to plunge his dagger into S's
throat than it is to attempt to strike a deal for future
defense with his opponent. Clearly, since the fear of M
which S feels at that moment will surely diminish when S
later comes to consider the slender basis of his
relationship of servitude, M would be foolish not to slay
his adversary.
On the other hand, we might contend that if individual
S, who had previously been conquered by M, and who had
previously agreed to obey M (for as long as the latter
refrains from placing him in chains or other impediments to
corporeal motion), faces the further choice of either
remaining a part of the defensive grouping which is headed
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by M, or of attempting to compromise the integrity of this
group by defecting from, or by attacking the leader of this
group (and thus forfeiting the advantage of living within a
viable defensive grouping), S would be a fool to choose the
latter option. Since life in the state of nature-1 will, in
all likelihood, be deemed by S to be inferior to life as a
subject or a servant within a multi-person (if only a two-
person) grouping, S can, in all likelihood, be expected to
adopt the latter option since it represents, in effect, the
less unpleasant of the two available alternatives.
Furthermore, in this situation, S can be understood to have
entered into a contractual agreement with M, and as such, to
have bound himself through his own free decision to obey the
commands of M in exchange for M's having spared S's life and
M's continuing to refrain from placing M in fetters, bonds,
chains or other impediments to physical motion.
Therefore, although in this situation S would certainly
recognize that M is merely a human being and, as such, is
subject to a quick and relatively easily executed death, and
that S will inevitably confront M in a situation where the
latter is vulnerable to the aggressive attacks of, and the
physical destruction at the hands of the former, it is
plausible to suppose that S will have some reason to forego
the "benefits" of living a free and unencumbered independent
life in order to increase the probability of surviving
through a longer (though less unencumbered) existence as
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part of a (somewhat) viable defensive grouping. Conversely,
although M would surely recognize that S, if he is not
killed, will retain his cunning and his physical powers, and
thus, his capacity to utterly destroy M in an unguarded
moment, it would not thereby be irrational for M to propose
to enter into the above described covenant with S, and thus
to trust S with a partial liberty, (understood simply as M's
continuing to refrain from restricting the corporeal freedom
of S) For in this situation, M will likely perceive that S
will come to recognize that he [S] stands a better chance of
survival within a two-person group than he does on his own.
For this reason, M will have some reason to suppose that S
will refrain from attacking him [M] after this contract has
been made.
Importantly, the success of such a covenant would seem
to depend upon whether S is a dominator or a moderate, and
in fact, M's willingness to enter into such an agreement (or
to propose such conditions of peace) would seem to depend
upon whether M perceives S to be a dominator or a moderate.
Since a moderate is envisaged as a person who recognizes and
rightly values the benefits of peace and who "is satisfied
with an equality of nature," a moderate would seem to be
less likely than a dominator, to attempt to subvert the
social unit of which he is a part by attacking its leader
(that is, in our example, M)
.
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Thus, if in this scenario, M were to consider S to be a
moderate, he would be more willing to attempt to strike a
mutually advantageous bargain with S than he would be were
he to consider S to be a dominator. In fact, it seems that
if M knows that S is a dominator, he will be completely
unwilling (that is, will flatly refuse) to enter into such a
covenant with S. Crucially, one might reasonably maintain
that if M is uncertain as to whether S is a moderate or a
dominator, that is, if M does not possess a compelling
reason to believe that S is a moderate, M will, in all
likelihood, refrain from attempting to enter into a
contractual agreement with S. I believe this to be the case
since in this scenario, M cannot be certain that S is
sufficiently trustworthy to be relied upon to discharge the
responsibilities to which he will have previously agreed.
Thus, it seems evident that the success of, and even the
genesis of the contractual agreement which provides the
basis for a two-person commonwealth by acquisition depends
upon whether (1) M perceives S to be a dominator or a
moderate, and whether (2) S truly is a dominator or a
0
moderate
.
Unfortunately, Hobbes seems committed to a belief in
the impossibility (or in any case, the extreme difficulty)
of accurately identifying a person in the state of nature as
a moderate rather than a dominator despite the fact that in
at least a small number of cases, the information necessary
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to make such an identification would be disclosed to the
identifier via empirical observation. Thus, we might
suppose that even though a majority of the instances of the
type of encounter represented in the scenario above (namely,
that in which one person stands above another with a sword
drawn) would conclude with the former destroying the latter,
a sma 1
1
number of instances of this scenario would conclude
with M proposing a deal to S, S accepting M's deal and thus,
S's becoming subjugated to M's will.
Therefore, there does appear to exist some slim basis
^or expecting the generation of viable two-person despotical
defensive units from out of the state of nature-1. This is
true even though Hobbes's comments concerning the
possibility of identifying moderates in the state of nature,
and his expressed belief that even moderates can be expected
to act in an "anticipatory" fashion, serve to render such an
eventuality exceedingly remote.^
D. Mode 4
As we will recall from an earlier section, Hobbes
believed that a commonwealth is instituted "when a
multitude of men do agree and covenant ... to authorize
all the actions and judgments of whatsoever man or
assembly," is chosen by a majority of that multitude.^*'
Further, it has been noted that such a COMMONWEALTH^^ was
conceived by Hobbes as being created from out of some
preexistent matter (namely, the natural human beings who
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come to compose that political unit). Additionally, it has
been noted that Hobbes believed such units to be voluntarily
instituted by the various contracting parties, each of whom
enters into a covenant with all other contracting parties
(and each of whom thus becomes a citizen of the
COMMONWEALTH), though none of whom enters into a covenant
with the natural person or persons who become(s) the
sovereign of the newly-instituted COMMONWEALTH. In a famous
passage from Leviathan
, Hobbes claims that while the
individuals who enter into a COMMONWEALTH by acquisition do
so out of fear of the conquering party, the individuals who
decide to institute and enter into a COMMONWEALTH by
institution do so because they fear their fellow contracting
parties
.
A COMMONWEALTH by institution can be envisioned to
arise from out of the state of nature-2 in no fewer than two
•distinct ways. First, a COMMONWEALTH can be imagined to be
instituted when the natural persons who function as the
rulers of the various ’’families" that inhabit this condition
enter into contracts with one another; and second, a
COMMONWEALTH can be imagined to be instituted when all of
the natural persons, both servants and leaders, who live
within the bounds of some number of state of nature-2 type
units, enter into a contract with every other such natural
person. According to this second method of formation, all
contracting parties (who in this case are natural persons)
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agree to transfer their respective rights of nature to some
newly-instituted sovereign (the latter of whom enters into
no contractual agreement with any of the natural persons who
consent to become his subjects).
Though Hobbes is disinclined to believe that many
historical COMMONWEALTHS have been established through such
a smoothly executed conventional process, such a process
does constitute a legitimate procedure in which a
COMMONWEALTH c_an be brought into existence through the
voluntary acts of human beings. The more plausible of the
two previously-mentioned methods by which a COMMONWEALTH by
institution can arise from out of the state of nature-2 is
the first, that is, through a procedure by which the
respective leaders of each of several "families" enter into
a contractual agreement with each of the other leaders.
Through this procedure, each leader agrees to transfer his
decision-making power over both himself and his servants, to
some person who is not a party to that contract.
For example, we might imagine that (natural) person A^
who commands (natural) persons A
2
-Ajg
,
person
,
who
commands persons Bj-Bjg and person Cj
,
who commands persons
^2~^10 into a series of contracts with one another to
transfer the decision-making power of all of their
respective group members to some person D. (According to
this process, Aj will enter into a contract with Bp B^ will
enter into a contract with and Aj will enter into a
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contract with C^) . In such a scenario, not only does
transfer to D decision making power over himself [A^]
,
but
moreover, A^ transfers decision making power over Aj-Ajg, the
latter of whom had previously transferred their decision
making power to Aj through some earlier acts of their own.
Quite simply, in this scenario, natural persons Aj-A^g
are in no position to transfer their own decision making
power to D (or to any other person), since they have already
transferred such power to natural person A^. Hence, in this
(temporally later) contract, A^, and Cj act as agents or
repositories for the powers which had previously been
tranf erred to them by A2“A^g
,
B2~B^g and C2“Cjg
,
respectively.^^
This completed contract results in a transferral of
allegiance to D, so that after the contract has been made,
all of the members of the previously existing constituent
families come to be subject to the absolute will of D. This
is true even though A2, for example, does not directly
consent to such a transfer of allegiance, and irrespective
of whether A2 prefers to remain under the absolute control
of Ai.‘<
E. Mode 5
The most historically plausible manner by which larger
state of nature -2 type "families” can be envisioned as
resulting from the consolidation of smaller ones is through
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conquest. In a previously quoted passage from chapter 17 of
Leviathan
, Hobbes specifies that it is not^^
the joining together of a small number of men,
that gives them
. . . security; because in small
numbers, small additions on the one side or the
other, make the advantage of strength so great as
is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore
gives encouragement to an invasion.
Thus, when the master of a small family comes to notice that
an even smaller family in his group's vicinity stands
vulnerable to a successful invasion and conquest by his own
group, he is thereby "encouraged" to launch such an invasion
and attempted conquest. Such a manoeuvre might be undertaken
in the hope of making less probable an invasion of his own
family by the leader of a slightly (though significantly)
larger family (or defensive group) in his vicinity. Thus,
person M, the master of family A, which contains 7 members,
might launch an offensive attack against family B, which
contains 5 members, in order to prevent a suspected attack
upon family A by the leader of family C, a group which
consists of ten members. Thus, over the course of time, the
members of smaller state of nature-2 type groups can be
expected to be conquered by the members of, and to be
"absorbed into" larger state of nature-2 type groups.
Moreover, Hobbes points out that^^
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[t]he multitude sufficient to confide in our
determined by any certain number,but by comparison with the enemy we fear; and isthen sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is notot so visible and conspicuous moment, to determinehe event of war, as to move him to attempt.
Thus, after a family reaches a certain size (determined by a
comparison with the size of the other families in its
vicinity), it is no longer capable of being conquered by the
other families in its vicinity in a relatively effortless
and bloodless manner, and thus, is no longer vulnerable to
the indiscriminate offensive attacks of the leaders of such
groups. Purportedly, when a family reaches a particular
critical size, leaders of other groups are less willing to
risk the integrity of their respective group by attacking
the first group so that within that first group a certain
level of security is guaranteed. Thus, when a family
achieves some particular size, it ceases to be a state of
nature-2 type group, and becomes a fully fledged
COMMONWEALTH, though, as had been noted in Chapter 3 of this
dissertation, Hobbes does not make a special effort to
inform his readers precisely when this occurs
.
We might imagine that when person p, the leader of a
smaller state of nature-2 type group comes to recognize that
his group is on the verge of being overcome by a larger
state of nature-2 type group, he will choose to
contractually transfer his right of nature, as well as his
dominion over his subjects, to the leader of that larger
group. Such a strategy would have the advantage of saving p.
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as uell as his various subjects, from falling victim to>’
the offensive attacks of the members of that larger group.
This would clearly be a reasonable strategy to implement if
P does believe that the likely result of a confrontation
between (the members of) bis group and (tbe members of) the
larger group will be a wholesale slaughter of the former by
/ if he is a reasonable person wbo values
his continued existence and safety, p can be expected to
contractually transfer sovereignty over bis servants, as
well as his own right of nature, to the leader of the larger
group
.
However, if p is a dominator, whose reasoning process
IS frequently interfered with or vitiated by the incidence
of such violent passions as pride and an unrealistically
high level of self-esteem, we would expect the probability
of p's refusing to surrender to the leader of the larger
(aggressive) group to be greater than it would be if p were
a moderate. Since a moderate can be expected to maintain an
attitude consistent with the strength of his group vis-a-vis
that of the larger group, while a dominator can be expected
to exaggerate his own group's chance of successfully fending
off an attack by the larger and stronger group, a dominator
can be expected to be more willing than a moderate to mount
a struggle in the face of overwhelming odds, (and in all
likelihood, to procure the slaughter of many or all of his
subjects
)
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It is perhaps for reasons of this type that Hobbes
allows to subjects or servants within state of nature-2 type
units the option of using "one's own reason in time of
danger to save his own life, either by flight or submission
to the enemy as he shall think best
. . .
."18
Specifically, if q is a subject within a small group headed
by p, if q recognizes that p is about to enter their group
into a defensive battle with a larger group (which in all
likelihood, in q's estimation, will result in the
destruction of the members of that group (including q)),
then q is permitted to either flee from his group, or to
submit to the command of the enemy, despite p's directive
that he [q] engage in battle. This is a situation which will
purportedly not arise (or will arise far less frequently)
within a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH since the latter type of
group can be expected to possess adequate means of defense
to render unreasonable q's contention that his group will
certainl y be completely destroyed if it engages in battle
with some rival COMMONWEALTH, (and thus, to render void or
unacceptable g's claim to refuse to obey p's command to
enter into battle based upon the foresight of his own (that
is, q's own) immanent destruction)^^
Thus, if within the state of nature-2, a situation
arises in which p, the leader of a small group S is given
the opportunity to either (1) submit to the leadership of,
or (2) refuse to submit to the leadership of, and thus to
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zard a war of his group s against soma larger and stronger
group L, and if the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of S's
members being destroyed if it engages in battle with L, then
the rational strategy for p to pursue is to submit to the
will of his adversary. However, if p refuses to enter into a
contractual agreement with the leader of group L, then q, a
subject within S, would be fully justified in refusing to
honor the terms of the contractual agreement into which he
had previously entered with p.
Thus, as a member of a state of nature-2 type grouping,
q is given greater leeway in determining whether, in
situations where his group is under attack, he will choose
to remain a member of, or to defect from his group than he
would be afforded were he a member of a fully fledged
COMMONWEALTH
.
Even though, at the expected locations in his various
political writings, Hobbes fails to advance an unambiguous
criterion which serves to distinguish large "families" from
small COMMONWEALTHS, and at one point in Leviathan refers to
cities and kingdoms as "but great families,"^® it is clear
that the means of defense against external attackers are
much more robust within COMMONWEALTHS than they are within
f ami lies.
Given the emphasis Hobbes places upon the individual’s
(in principle untransferable) right to guard against or
obviate his own (violent) death, and to resist the
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directives of even his sovereign in extremis
,
it can be
plausibly asserted that if the subject has strong reason to
believe that remaining a part of his present COMMONWEALTH
will result in his immanent (and seemingly, immediate)
death, while choosing to defect from his COMMONWEALTH will
have the effect of preserving his life, he is permitted to
exercise the second option. This would be true even though
he had previously entered into a contractual agreement to
obey the directives of his sovereign. However, it can be
equally plausibly asserted that within a COMMONWEALTH, a
subject would, except in extremely unusual circumstances, be
required to preserve the integrity of his COMMONWEALTH, to
obey the directives of his sovereign, and thus, to refrain
from breaking the contractual agreement into which he had
previously entered.
F. Mode 7
A COMMONWEALTH can be conceived to be instituted from
out of the state of nature-3 when the sovereigns who
respectively command each of a number of COMMONWEALTHS come
to transfer their decision-making power over themselves and
their respective subjects to some other natural person or
set of natural persons. By virtue of this new contract, the
recipient of this transfer of power comes to be sovereign
over all of the natural persons who had formerly comprised
the various constituent COMMONWEALTHS (sovereigns and
citizens alike). This mode of generation will, in all
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likelihood, approximate that described earlier as MODE 4,
the primary difference being that by MODE 4, a
COMMONWEALTH is brought into existence from the individual
persons or the preexistent matter which compose state of
nature-2 type families, while by MODE 7, a COMMONWEALTH is
established through the consolidation of two or more
previously existing COMMONWEALTHS. Thus, by MODE 4, a
COMMONWEALTH is formed from two or more families, while by
MODE 7
,
a COMMONWEALTH is formed from two or more
COMMONWEALTHS. As with MODE 4, the most plausible manner by
which a COMMONWEALTH can be conceived as being instituted
from two or more already existing COMMONWEALTHS is through a
contract in which the sovereigns of two or more already
existing COMMONWEALTHS (rather than all the natural persons
who constitute those COMMONWEALTHS) enter into a contract
with each other. In such an agreement, each contracting
party promises to transfer the decision-making power over
all the members of his COMMONWEALTH (himself included) to
some common newly established sovereign power.
G. Mode 8
Probably the most historically plausible manner by
which a COMMONWEALTH can be conceived as arising from, or
being formed out of some combination of already existing
COMMONWEALTHS is by conquest in an organized, bona fide war
in which actual fighting occurs. As mentioned above, wars
waged between the artificial groups known as COMMONWEALTHS
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are likely to be conducted with a greater degree of
regularity, predictability and routini zation than are likely
to be those which are conducted between families. Moreover,
it seems that the sovereign of one COMMONWEALTH can engage
in war with another COMMONWEALTH while continuing to
preserve a relatively normal and peaceful state of affairs
within the boundaries of his own territory. By contrast, it
is difficult to imagine a significant degree of "domestic
tranquility" being maintained within the artificial units of
the state of nature-2 variety, especially since such units
are described as having weak if any established safeguards
the encroachments of the members of other groups.
Though COMMONWEALTHS have, throughout history, devoted
a substantial amount of resources to the fortification and
defense of their territories and borders, it has of course
happened that COMMONWEALTHS have been defeated and conquered
by rival COMMONWEALTHS. Moreover, it confronts us as an
empirical fact, and Hobbes was certainly willing to admit,
that not all COMMONWEALTHS are equally mighty, and that not
every COMMONWEALTH faces every other on strictly equal
terms. Indeed, Hobbes admits that if a weaker prince makes a
disadvantageous bargain or agreement with a stronger one,
due to considerations of fear, he is bound to honor that
agreement. As such, Hobbes acknowledges a clear
distinction between weaker and stronger COMMONWEALTHS.
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However, despite the fact that some COMMONWEALTHS are
capable of defeating in battle and conquering other
COMMONWEALTHS, we would expect that the supreme commander of
the armed forces, that is, the sovereign of the former type
of COMMONWEALTH, will normally undertake such offensive
attacks only after he has engaged in a sustained
deliberative process in which he carefully weighs the
probable benefits and disadvantages involved in initiating
such an action. This will be true since we can expect the
borders of even relatively small and weak COMMONWEALTHS to
be fortified with some means of defense against external
aggressors, and to be guarded by the members of a standing
army
.
Thus, because even weak and small COMMONWEALTHS can be
expected to stage some defensive resistance when attacked by
an encroaching army, the commander of that encroaching army
will, in all likelihood, think twice before deciding to risk
the lives of his subjects and a loss of some portion of his
COMMONWEALTH'S military resources. Nevertheless, it is
conceivable that new COMMONWEALTHS will, from time to time,
be formed as a result of the (bellicose) interaction between
various COMMONWEALTHS in the international forum.
Clearly, the sovereign of a larger COMMONWEALTH can be
conceived as extending his/its dominion over a smaller
COMMONWEALTH as the result of a contract entered into by the
sovereigns of the respective (that is, the larger and the
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smaller) COMMONWEALTHS after the forces of the larger
COMMONWEALTH have defeated (the forces of) the smaller
COMMONWEALTH in a military battle.
Moreover, one could envision the sovereign of the
smaller COMMONWEALTH choosing to voluntarily enter into a
contact with the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH even
before any military action has been undertaken. Such a
contract, which would effectively entail a transfer of
sovereignty over the citizens as well as the sovereign of
the smaller COMMONWEALTH to the sovereign of the larger
COMMONWEALTH, would most likely be entered into in the hope
of saving from death and lesser physical damage the citizens
within that smaller COMMONWEALTH.^^
In Chapter 21 of Leviathan
.
Hobbes claims that^^
[t]he liberty
,
whereof there is so frequent and
honorable mention ... is not the liberty of
particular men; but the liberty of the
commonwealth : which is the same that every man
then should have, if there were no civil laws, nor
commonwealth at all. And the effect of it also be
the same, namely a condition of perpetual war.
"The Athenians and the Romans," Hobbes goes on to inform his
readers
,
were free; that is, free commonwealths; not that
any particular man had the liberty to resist their
own representative; but that their representative
had the liberty to resist, or invade other people.
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Until the point in time at which the sovereign of the
smaller COMMONWEALTH relinquishes, via contract, to the
sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH the sovereignty over
his subjects, the former continues to possess "the liberty
to resist, or invade other people [sc. the people who do not
belong to Ms COMMONWEALTH]." However, once he agrees to be
bound by the decisions of the sovereign of the larger
COMMONWEALTH, he thereby transfers or renounces the liberty
which he had previously possessed to resist the will of the
latter. Even though the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH
might allow the (former) "sovereign" of the smaller
COMMONWEALTH to exercise some limited control over his
former subjects, absolute control over both the former
sovereign and his former subjects belongs to the sovereign
of the larger COMMONWEALTH.
H. Concluding Remarks
Thus completes my presentation of the most plausible
methods by which the Hobbesian commonwealth by institution
and the Hobbesian commonwealth by acquisition can be
conceived as arising from each of the three varieties of the
state of nature. In the sixth and final chapter of this
dissertation, I will further examine the likelihood that
commonwealths of the earlier described varieties, once
established, will remain in existence for any extended
period of time, especially in light of Hobbes's apparent
insistence that dominators will be present within any
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sizable group of human beings. I will then explain why I
take Hobbes’s asseveration that any sizable group of human
beings will contain the type of natural persons referred to
as dominators [whose antisocial tendencies are incorrigible,
and whose disruptive influence upon the social order is
seemingly ineradi cabl e , to effectively render unworkable
the type of governmental apparatus suggested by this author.
During this portion of my discussion, I will explain why I
construe Hobbes's model of a viable governmental apparatus
to be eminently unworkable
, and why the inevitable presence
of dominators would serve to undermine the solidarity of
virtually any political grouping which is composed of
Hobbesian men.
185
NOTES
1. This same point was made in endnote #this dissertation. 13 to chapter 3 of
2. Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 110.
3. Hobbes, Leviathan, page 75. Hobbes adds in the
corresponding passage from the 1668 Latin edition of
^viathan that "there are those who from pride and ator glory would conquer the whole world." (HobbesLeviathan
.
page 75.)
desire
.The retention of such memories would appear to have the
effect of making the onlooker (or the victim of such
assaults) even less likely to attempt establishing
cooperative enterprises precisely by providing him with an
assurance that there exist within his milieu persons who are
unequivocally undeserving of his trust. Thus, the moderateindividual's initial hesitancy to enter into potentiallydestructive (though potentially beneficial) ventures with
other persons comes, over time, to be more pronounced and todevelop into an attitude of suspiciousness and uncertainty.
Further, since within the state of nature-1, persons can be
conceived as being in competition with one another for the(temporary) control of desired objects, it can be expected
that such competitive struggles will give rise to a
widespread diffidence" of one's fellow men and foster a
widespread "endeavour to destroy or subdue one another."
(Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75.)
5 . The seeming incompatibility of these two descriptions
becomes abundantly clear when one compares, side by side,
Hobbes's description of the state of nature contained in
paragraphs 3 through 9 of Chapter 13 of Leviathan (See
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 75-76.) and Hobbes's description of
the manner by which a commonwealth is instituted in
paragraphs 1 through 3 of Chapter 18 of the same work.
(Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 110-111.) Additionally, see my
extended discussion of Hobbes's Leviathan derivation of the
state of nature on pages 61-75 of this dissertation, as well
as my discussion of Hobbes's commonwealth by institution on
pages 142-149 of this dissertation.
6. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 103. See my extended discussion of
commonwealth by acquisition on pages 131-135.
7 . See Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 75.
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8. The latter factor determining the success
endeavor, and the former factor determining
contractual endeavor is actually undertaken
of such an
whether such
or initiated
a
9. Interestingly, while discussing the conditions whichprevail in the state of nature in Chapter 13 of Leviathan
.Hobbes claims that because of the diffidence with whichin the state of nature regard each other
men
there is no way for a man to secure himself so
reasonably as anticipation, that is, by force or
wiles to master the persons of all men he can, solong till he see no other power great enough to
endanger him, and this is no more than his own
conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.
Also because there are some that taking pleasure
in contemplating their own power in acts of
conquest, which they pursue farther than their
security requires, if others (that would otherwise
be glad to be at ease within moderate bounds)
should not by invasion increase their powers, they
would not be able, long time, by standing on their
own defense to subsist. And by consequence, such
augmentation over men being necessary to a man's
conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
(Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 75.)
What can immediately be gleaned from this passage is the
claim that in order to survive in the state of nature, even
moderate men must engage in the augmentation of dominion
over other men, that is, in the extension of servitude over
other men so that effective defensive groupings can be
established. Clearly, in this passage, Hobbes is
interpreting the necessity of the formation of such groups
from the perspective of the person who is "forced" to extend
his dominion over other persons, that is, from the
standpoint of the conqueror or the potential or probable
master
.
However, one would do well to remember that in order
for a two-person commonwealth by acquisition to be
cont ractua 1 1 y established, one of the two members will have
to agree to obey the orders of, and thus, to become
subservient to, the other. Even though, in this passage,
Hobbes stresses the benefit that will accrue to the master
of a commonwealth by acquisition by virtue of his commanding
one or more potential defenders, one might additionally
point out that those men who are conquered do, in all
likelihood, stand a better chance of survival (or survival
for a longer period of time) than they would had they not
been offered, and had they not accepted the terms proposed
by their conqueror/master.
187
as
10.
Hobbes, Leviathan
. page 110.
11.
That IS, such a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH since a stateof nature-3 variety COMMONWEALTH appears to be the type ofunit which results from the process of institution.
12
.
Leviathan
. page 127.
13.
Given the conditions which characterize mode ofgeneration 4, we could maintain the conceit that each
citizen of the resulting COMMONWEALTH enters into a
contractual agreement with every other citizen in no fewerhan t_wg ways. First, we could interpret the group leaders
Aj,
,
and C, as entering each of their respective(contractually established) subordinates into a (separate)
contract with each of the other citizens of the resultingCOMMONWEALTH. This could be imagined to take place preciselybecause the respective group leaders (A,, B,
,
and C, ) hadpreviously been granted the authority to act on behalf of
each of their subordinates (specifically, through the
transfers of right which established the state of nature-2
type groups A, B and C). According to this interpretation,
each of the natural persons {Aj-A^q}, {B.-B,g}, and {C,-C,n}',
can be understood to enter into a separate contract with
each of the other natural persons who become citizens of the
newly instituted COMMONWEALTH, but can, in every case, be
imagined to do so through the agency of his respective group
leader (viz, A^
,
Bj
,
or Cj ) . As such, A^
,
Bj
,
and O would
essentially function as the (respective) contractually-
established custodians of the natural decision-making powers
of the subjects within "families" A, B, and C.
Alternatively, in order to buttress the claim that in
the new 1 y- es t ab 1 i shed COMMONWEALTH, each citizen enters into
a contractual agreement with every other citizen, we could
specify that immediately before the members of the three
previously existing "families" A, B, and C coalesce into the
newly established COMMONWEALTH, the group leaders A^ B^
,
and C^ free their respective subordinates from the contracts
which had previously established the subordinate status of
the latter. (Recall Hobbes's claim of page 86 of Leviathan
that one can be freed from a covenant by being forgiven) If
this were to happen, then each of the (formerly) subordinate
natural persons, upon being forgiven by his group leader,
would thereby recover his right to rule himself, which he
could then immediately transfer to the newly-established
(or, soon-to-be established) sovereign.
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however,
musrbe''Loked^upon^L''beinrrrath''''^'''’''®^^*'^°"'Since, at least in its lit^K=.i ^ leather perilous one
introduces a condition of momentary
' 1 awl essnlss^l^d all
b^-^ breakd^r
covenant, andihul :no:uraged o^L“"“ir'i""d“V“"®enter into this covenants f, ° similarly decline to
the present ^LfdJ s^^r^atr^n^^^ °*
natura persons who belongs to the groups he^derby euUer
hi !w *1 f’ person D. I consider this second method to
nlrln
plausible of the two from a Hobbesian
Lcessitl''tharan^^l^hh®°^"®® clearly be no
COMMONWEALTH Ltlll° h citizens actually take part in thecommonwealth establis ing covenant. On the contrary itwould be true that since the servants within the three
..nf combine to form the COMMONWEALTH have already
contracts with the leaders of their respectivffamilies, such subjects are in no condition to transferdecision-making power over themselves to any other person
r^oht^^^f longer possess their respective'ig s o nature or powers of self- determination.
..omm-iff
textual^ confirmation of the claim that Hobbes wasco itted to a transitivity of covenanting," see thisauthor s statement that
[s]ince
.
. . both the servant himself, and all
that belongs to him are his lord's, and by the
right of nature every man may dispose of his ownin what manner he pleases; the lord may either
^c pledge, or by testament convey thedominion he hath over his servant, according to
his own will and pleasure.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
page 208.),
as well as his assertion that
seeing the servant and all that is committed to
him is the property of the master, and every man
may dispose of his own, and transfer the same at
his pleasure, the master may therefore alienate
his dominion over them, or give the same by his
last will, to whom he lists.
(Hobbes, Elements of Law
,
page 129.)
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Additionally, see Hobbes's remark that
the master of the servant is the master of all he
holdeth his life of his master,by the covenant of obedience, that is, of owning
and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do.
(Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 131.)
15.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 107.
16.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 107.
17.
And, in all likelihood, being killed as a result of.
18.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 132.
19.
But note what Hobbes has to say about men of a naturally
timorous nature on page 142 in chapter 21 of Leviathan
.
20.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 132.
21.
For textual confirmation of the claim that Hobbes was
committed to a "transitivity of covenanting," see endnote
# 14 of the present chapter of this dissertation.
22. Or in which there is a strong threat of such an actual
war
.
23.
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 86.
24.
An additional relevant factor might be the expectation of
the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH that after he
enters into a contract with the sovereign of the larger
COMMONWEALTH, the latter will permit the former to continue
to exercise some control over his former subjects (that is,
those natural persons who had formerly been subjects within
the smaller COMMONWEALTH). Such a concession would be
granted to the (former) sovereign of the smaller
COMMONWEALTH through an act of grace. That is to say, in
such a scenario the sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH
would not forward as a term of the contract into which he
enters with the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH the
demand that the latter grant to the former absolute
sovereignty over his former subjects. Rather, in such a case
the sovereign of the larger COMMONWEALTH would grant to the
sovereign of the smaller COMMONWEALTH limited regulative
powers over his former subjects, while retaining absolute
dominion over all of the subjects within the newly
consolidated SUPERCOMMONWEALTH.
25.
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 139-140.
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26. Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 140.
27.1 believe that the view regarding the nature of
Pa-^enthetioal statement canbe legitimately attributed to Hobbes. For example. In
Le^iath^, Hobbes claims that because of "thestubbornness of [their] passions," those men who "will
strive to retain those things which to [themselves] are
superfluous and to others necessary.
. . cannot be
corrected. [my emphasis] (Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 95.)Moreover, Hobbes describes such men as stubborn, insociable,
f reward and—
i
ntractable
.
(Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 96.)
In the corresponding passage from ^ Give , such men areportrayed as "being incorrigible [my emphasis] by reason ofthe stubbornness of [their] affections." [ "neque prx
affectum contumacia corrigi potest.''} (my emphasis)](Hobbes, ^ Citizen , page 141; Hobbes, Opera Latina.
Vol. II, page 187.)
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CHAPTER VI
THE WORKABILITY OF HOBBES’S SYSTEM
A. The Objectives of Hobbes's Political Project
Hobbes famously described the faculties of human nature
to consist of bodily strength, experience, reason and
pass i on . ^ It is the opinion of the present writer that in
recent years, several commentators on Hobbes have failed to
recognize the significance of the passions, and especially
the passions which Hobbes designates "the perturbations of
the mind which frequently obstruct right reason"^ in
determining the content or character of human behavior.
As we will recall from an earlier discussion, Hobbes
was of the opinion that nature rendered human beings unfit
for life within collective organizational units, and that
certain of these human beings, whom we have been calling
dominators, are especially unsuited to conform to the norms
of behavior required within such units. It is my
contention that the "antisocial passions," which purportedly
affect all human beings, but which are described as being
especially prominent among dominators, constitute the most
significant feature which militates against the
establishment and maintenance of such organizational units
as (Hobbesian) "families" and bona fide COMMONWEALTHS.
In chapter 5 of this dissertation, I presented a
discussion of why it seems plausible that extremely small,
i.e. two person defensive groupings (if such groupings could
come to be established) would stand a slight chance of
persisting for any extended period of time. During the
course of the remainder of this chapter, I will explore how
plausible it is that somewhat larger social groupings
composed of Hobbesian men and women will remain viable and
durable units.
During the course of his writings on political
phi 1 osophy
,
Hobbes attempts to provide answers to the following six
crucial questions:^
(1)
. What is the nature of human beings?
(2)
. Given the nature of human beings, why do men form
commonweal ths?
(3)
. In what manner are commonwealths formed, or, in what
manner can commonwealths be conceived of as being
formed?
(4)
. Why do commonwealths remain in existence (rather than
quickly dissolving)?
(5)
. What strategies and structures must the sovereign of a
commonwealth implement in order to make most probable
the continued existence of the COMMONWEALTHS?
(6)
. How must citizens behave in order to make most probable
the continued existence of the COMMONWEALTH?
In the next several paragraphs of this chapter, I will
review and discuss why Hobbes believed that organized
political units, in this case, specifically of the state of
nature-3 variety, can be expected to remain in existence (or
persist over time). I will then present what I take to be
Hobbes's answer to the sixth of these questions (6), that
is, to the question of how citizens must behave in order to
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make most probable the continued existence of the
COMMONWEALTH to which they belong.^
I will conclude this dissertation by discussing these
issues in light of the conception of human nature which
Hobbes forwarded so that I might determine whether Hobbes's
answers to the aforementioned descriptive and prescriptive
questions are consistent with his view of the human
organism.
B. Why Hobbes Thought Commonwealths Remain in Existence
Purportedly, Hobbes offered his philosophy of politics
in order to demonstrate why human beings are obliged to obey
the directives of the sovereign of the COMMONWEALTH to which
they belong. Specif ical 1 y , Hobbes believed that citizens are
bound to obey their sovereign not because they have
(necessarily) entered into an explicit contractual agreement
to do so, but rather because being a citizen within a
COMMONWEALTH involves the performance of duties which are
tantamount to those which one would incur were one to enter
into such an explicit contractual agreement.® This belief
is perhaps most clearly enunciated in chapter 17 of
Leviathan where Hobbes proclaims that the unity which
combines the numerous men who compose the COMMONWEALTH "is
more than consent or concord," and is rather^
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a real unity of them all in one and the same
person, made by covenant of every man with every
man, in such manner as if every man should say to
every other man, I authorize and give up my right
of governing myself to this man.
. . on this
condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and
authorize all his actions in like manner.
Hence, even though a citizen might not enter into an
explicit contract of the above-specified variety, he does,
nevertheless, by virtue of constituting part of the matter
of the COMMONWEALTH (and of course, by virtue of benefitting
from the advantages which are made possible by the existence
of that COMMONWEALTH) owe a debt of allegiance to the
sovereign of that COMMONWEALTH. Therefore, Hobbes's theory
of political obligation can be understood to have
significance not only for those men and women who can be
imagined to have explicitly entered into covenants which
effectively establish very small multi-person defensive
units, but moreover, to those natural persons who have been
born into, or who otherwise find themselves to be part of an
already established or existing COMMONWEALTH.
Of course, Hobbes famously offered the opinion that a
properly regulated COMMONWEALTH, if it is not destroyed by,
or incorporated into some rival COMMONWEALTH, can be
expected to endure perpetually.^ When considering this
issue in the present chapter, we will be less concerned with
the question of how precisely the COMMONWEALTH under
consideration came to be established, and will instead
concentrate upon whether the COMMONWEALTH can be expected to
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contain sufficiently strong cohesive forces to prevent the
self-seeking and socially disruptive tendencies of its
constituent members from rending it asunder, that is, from
effecting its dissolution.
Surely, when a servant within a state of nature-2 type
grouping takes the time to observe and consider the nature
of the organizational unit of which he is a part, as well as
his own level of physical and intellectual power vis-a-vis
that of his master (that is, his group's leader), he will
soon come to recognize the rather thin basis of the
relationship of servitude in which he finds himself
involved. Even though the servant can be assumed to have
entered into some type of contractual agreement with his
master, he will doubtless recognize that he confronts his
master on approximately equal terms qua adult human being,
and that his relationship of servitude to his master is
based entirely upon conventional (i.e., contractual) rather
than natural factors. Moreover, the servant, especially if
he happens to be a member of a two-person group, cannot fail
to be struck by the fact that his master is extremely
vulnerable to physical attacks, and indeed is susceptible to
a relatively quick and easily accomplished destruction by
any other adult (including the servant himself). Finally, as
I mentioned in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, Hobbes draws
a clear distinction between (1) slaves, who are not trusted
by, and who are thus kept imprisoned or shackled in bonds.
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chains or other impediments to corporeal motion by their
masters, and (2) servants, who are trusted by their masters
and, as such, are afforded a degree of corporeal freedom. It
seems clear that a servant, by virtue of being trusted by
his master, and by virtue of being afforded a certain level
of corporeal freedom, is in a favorable position to strike
out against and to attempt to kill his master.
Indeed, as I suggested earlier in this dissertation,
one might plausibly suggest that in many cases, this
recognition on the part of the servant, especially if he
happens to be part of a two person grouping, will encourage
him to disobey the orders of his master or to attempt to
kill his master. Surely, the servant's exercising such a
strategy, which would involve his failing to discharge the
obligation which he had earlier taken upon himself through
the contractual apparatus, would almost certainly have the
effect of destroying the integrity of his group.
^
The situation within larger groupings, and especially
within fully-fledged COMMONWEALTHS, would be somewhat
different for a variety of reasons. In the first place,
since the internal peacekeeping and punitive mechanism
within the COMMONWEALTH will certainly be more organized,
more highly developed and more ominous a presence than will
be the case within smaller groupings, we might reasonably
expect that citizens within COMMONWEALTHS would be less
likely to believe that they can strike out against their
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sovereign (or their master) with impunity than would be
servants within "f ami 1 ies
.
Secondly, as was mentioned in Chapter 3 of this
dissertation, a citizen of a COMMONWEALTH will likely enjoy
a much more comfortable, creative and predictable mode of
existence than will a natural person who constitutes part of
a state of nature-2 type social unit. Since the citizen
within a COMMONWEALTH can be supposed to have the perception
that his physical safety is not in danger, while the subject
within a Hobbesian ’’family” cannot be assumed to be assured
of his own continuing physical safety, the former will, in
all likelihood, come to recognize the profound value of the
social grouping of which he is a part. In turn, the citizen
will likely come to desire that his COMMONWEALTH continues
to exist in the future, and will thus be motivated to take
all reasonable (or necessary) steps to support the continued
existence of his COMMONWEALTH. By contrast, the subject
within a ’’family” will, in all likelihood, not feel such a
devoted commitment to preserving or maintaining the
integrity of his social group. Since we might reasonably
contend that the servant within a ’’family” will often
(correctly) perceive that his social group is insufficiently
robust and stable to be reckoned upon to adequately preserve
his life, save him from a violent death at the hands of an
assailant or provide him with a requisitely tranquil social
situation to enable him to procure for himself the means for
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psycnoiogical ly) comfortable existence, he
will therefore feel a much weaker stake in seeking to insure
that his present social group continues to exist.
Additionally, and related to the latter point, Hobbes
indicates that a servant within a '’family" will be much more
apt than a subject within a COMMONWEALTH to encounter
situations where he is justified to disobey the directive of
his group leader, and thus ostensibly fail to discharge the
obligation which he had earlier incurred upon himself. Since
human beings enter into social or political groups
principally for the sake of assuring their own physical
safety and saving themselves from the prospect of suffering
a violent death, and since a smaller social or political
grouping can be assumed to provide to its members a weaker
or less frequently manifested level of physical safety (and
protection from suffering a violent death) than is available
within a COMMONWEALTH, natural persons who live within
families can be assumed to have a somewhat weaker and less
steadfast commitment to preserving the integrity of their
group than can members of fully fledged COMMONWEALTHS.
Admittedly, an individual's degree of commitment to
preserving the social or political grouping of which he is a
part should not be thought of as a bivalent quality
according to which an individual either does or does not
have a strong motivation to do all he can to preserve the
integrity of his group. Rather, the degree of commitment to
such a goal, and in fact, the absence of an individual's
tendency to defect from his group, can be assumed to be very
low within (highly unstable) two person groupings, somewhat
greater within large state of nature-2 type "families," even
greater within comparatively weak COMMONWEALTHS, and the
highest within strong COMMONWEALTHS.^^
Thus, we may assert that a person's degree of
commitment to the active preservation of the group to which
he belongs will gradually vary from a very low level within
two person defensive groupings^^ to a very high level
within highly developed, well-regulated state of nature-3
type units, (which Hobbes believed, at the very least, to be
within the organizational capability of human beings)
Even though Hobbes was somewhat unspecific about what
precisely differentiates a large state of nature-2 type
"family" from a small fully fledged COMMONWEALTH, he was
nevertheless committed to the position that life within a
state of nature-3 type COMMONWEALTH is characteristical 1 y
more comfortable, tranquil and creative than is life within
a state of nature-2 type "family."
C. Why Should the Citizen Obey?
In A Review and conclusion to Leviathan Hobbes
expresses the belief that with respect to subjects within
existing governments, there exists a reciprocal relation
between protection and obedience. That is to say, according
to Hobbes, if an individual finds himself living under a
200
government which is sufficiently powerful to preserve the
and to protect the individual from the
aggressive attacks of either his fellow citizens or the
citizens of some external power, then the individual owes
allegiance to the sovereign of his COMMONWEALTH.^^ Lurking
behind his pronouncement concerning the reciprocal relation
bstween protection and obedience is Hobbes's recognition
that life within any effective COMMONWEALTH is vastly
superior to life in the state of nature,^® or more
relevantly from an historical standpoint, to the type of
life which awaits a man who lives in a condition of civil
war similar to that which existed in Britain in the 1640s.
According to Hobbes, given the character which social
relations can be expected to assume in a condition where men
who had previously lived under an effective sovereign
authority find themselves bereft of such a sovereign
mechanism, reason dictates that men who currently live under
an effective sovereign authority endeavor, to the utmost of
their abilities, to prevent the occurrence of a condition of
the former (sovereignless and inhospitable) type. One
reasonable means of avoiding such an unappealing eventuality
is to willingly obey and support the efforts of one's
sovereign whenever the latter is able to effectively
maintain a condition of peace and safety.
Thus, if a man finds himself in a position where he can
either willingly submit to the authority of the present
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sovereign, who is capable of maintaining the public order,
or else refuse to submit to the authority of that existing
sovereign (by openly rebelling against, or by otherwise
failing to obey the directives of that power), that man
would be a fool to pursue the second option. Since in this
example, the alternative to submitting to the established
sovereign involves the establishment of, or the reversion to
a condition in which the danger of violent death is probable
and omnipresent, one would be well advised to pledge one's
allegiance to the existing government. We must now examine
how well this explanation holds up when subjected to further
scrutiny
.
Hobbes believed that the main factor or the main
feature of the human organism which causes men and women to
enter into, and to remain members of a COMMONWEALTH is fear,
either that of one's group leader, or of the human beings in
one's vicinity, or of the prospect of returning to a less
1
7
hospitable social condition.^
During his discussion of covenants and oaths in chapter
14 of Leviathan , Hobbes notes that even though "the force of
words" is "too weak to hold men to the performance of their
covenants," there are, nevertheless, "two imaginable helps
to strengthening it." And these are
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either a fear of
one's word, or a
to need to break
too rarely found
the pursuers of
pleasure; which
the consequences of breaking
glory or pride in appearing not
it. This latter is a generosity
to be presumed on, especially in
wealth, command or sensual
are the greatest part of mankind.
Rather, opines Hobbes, in most of these instances, "the
passion to be reckoned upon is fear."^® As Hobbes further
points out, such fear can be of powers invisible or of one's
fellow men, and "even though the former be the greater
power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater
fear."^^
In this respect, Hobbes claims that sovereignty by
institution differs from sovereignty by acquisition "only
[sic] in this, that they who choose their sovereign, do it
for fear of one another and not him they institute but" in
the case of sovereignty by acquisition, "they subject
themselves to him they are afraid of . "In both cases,"
he concludes, "they do it for fear."^^
Since Hobbes voiced his agreement with the ancient
maxim Salus populi suprema lex that is, the safety
of the people is the supreme law, and thus the primary
responsibility with which the sovereign is charged, and
since most reflective citizens will come to realize that
even a minimally effective sovereign will guard the public
order, maintain a condition of safety for his/its citizens,
and thus deliver each citizen from the strong likelihood of
suffering a violent death (the surrmum malum, after all, for
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human beings), many or most of these citizens will come to
realize that each citizen possesses a strong reason to
support the efforts of his existing sovereign. A desire to
save oneself from a violent death, coupled with a
recognition of the above mentioned fact can be expected to
motivate many reflective citizens to act in the appropriate
fashion, that is, to indeed support the efforts, and follow
the directives of the existing sovereign.
We must keep in mind, moreover, that each citizen is to
be conceived as having entered into a contractual bargain in
which he has agreed to be bound by the will of the
sovereign; to fail to do so would, after all, be a violation
of the terms of his contract, and thus, constitute an unjust
action. This would surely have some motivational force upon
the citizen's eventual action. Nevertheless, the most
pressing factor which motivates a citizen to become a part
of, or to remain a part of his COMMONWEALTH, is a fear of
his fellow citizens, and specifically, a fear of the effects
of the unpredictable actions of his present fellow citizens.
This being said, I will now move on to actually consider the
viability of COMMONWEALTHS which are composed of Hobbesian
men and women.
D. How Compelling is Hobbes's Advice to Citizens of
Commonwealths?
It would seem that the maintenance of the internal
order within such a multi-person unit as a modern
204
COMMONWEALTH depends upon (A) the perception among a
substantial majority of its citizens that the existing
sovereign enjoys a sufficient level of support among a
sufficient proportion of the population to enable him to
insure that such citizens will not fall victim to death or
serious injury due to internal strife (or external
aggression), and (B) the actual willingness of a substantial
majority of its citizens to actively discharge the
obligations which they have (formerly) incurred by virtue of
having entered into an actual or hypothetical social
contract^^. Specifically, citizens could be understood to
discharge such obligations by acting in accordance with the
directives issued by the sovereign, and thus, by actively
obeying those pronouncements which can be identified as the
public will” or the will of the sovereign.
We must recall at this point that Hobbes considered one
of the preeminent benefits of life within an organized
COMMONWEALTH to be the ability to safely observe the laws of
nature (in foro externo) with the assurance that the
behavior of most of one's fellow citizens will conform to
the civil law (which ideally encompasses the laws of
nature). Hence, with the establishment of the COMMONWEALTH
comes a level of predictability (with respect to the
behavior of the natural persons in one's vicinity), which is
absent, or at the very least, much less able to be counted
upon, in the state of nature (-2).
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It quickly becomes clear to us, however, that (1) the
sum of the actual (combined) physical power wielded by the
natural human being (or human beings) who constitutes (or
constitute) the sovereign^* ^ the actual combined
physical power of the natural human beings whose function it
is to regulate the public peace within that COMMONWEALTH
pales in comparison with (2) the actual (combined) physical
power wielded by the members of the COMMONWEALTH who
constitute neither part of its sovereign mechanism nor part
of its peace-keeping force. Thus, from one standpoint,
each citizen who composes a part of, or dwells within an
existing COMMONWEALTH, has more to fear from his fellow
than he does from either the sovereign or from
those who have been designated by the sovereign to maintain
a condition of internal peace. For this reason, it can be
inferred that each citizen has a compelling pragmatic or
prudential reason to agree to be bound by the will of the
sovereign, provided that the latter does command a
sufficient level of obedience to maintain the public order.
Unfortunately, however, it appears that in offering his
advice to sovereigns and citizens, Hobbes is essentially
"preaching to the converted ." (or, at any rate, to those
who are capable of being easily convinced and converted) By
this, I mean that within his political writings, Hobbes can
be understood to be attempting to convince his readers that
behavior which has the effect of destabilizing one's
206
COMMONWEALTH should be avoided or suppressed. Thus, if the
ideas contained in his writings are to be effective, that
IS, if such ideas are to have practical value, Hobbes must
appeal to, and attempt to alter the behavior of those men
and women whose actions are frequently of a socially
disruptive nature. Indeed, in order for Hobbes’s
recommendations to have a beneficial effect upon the
condition of existing COMMONWEALTHS, he must somehow
convince those whom we have been referring to as dominators
that they should recognize that they are fundamentally
(naturally) equal to all of their adult fellow citizens, and
that, for the sake of fostering a harmonious and smoothly-
run COMMONWEALTH, they should resolve to suppress their urge
to demonstrate their supposed natural superiority over other
jn
men and women.
While the arguments contained within Hobbes's writings
can easily be imagined to convince moderate men, that is,
men who are satisfied with an equality of nature (with their
fellow men), these arguments will be reckoned somewhat less
effective in convincing dominators, whose imperialistic,
socially disruptive passions were described by Hobbes as
being ineliminable natural constituent features of such
dominators' corporeal selves. Thus, if they are to
effectively serve the function for which this author
intended them, Hobbes's arguments must have the power to
alter the attitude, or at the very least, the behavior of
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dominators- However, since the behavior of dominators was
regarded by Hobbes to be incorrigible, unalterable, and not
susceptible to appeals to reasoned principles, Hobbes's
prescriptions would seem to be precluded from having the
desired effect upon the constituent nature, and the level of
overall stability of the COMMONWEALTH.
Unhappily, the presence of dominators within the
COMMONWEALTH would have the additional undesirable effect of
rendering even moderate men unwilling to observe the types
of principles suggested to citizens by Hobbes in Leviathan
and other of his political writings. Specifically, given
Hobbes's commitment to the belief that dominators will be
present within any sizable social grouping, and thus, within
every COMMONWEALTH, and more relevantly, given the eventual
recognition, on the part of the moderate men who populate
that COMMONWEALTH, that dominators are present within their
COMMONWEALTH, even moderate men, fearing that they might be
taken advantage of by such dominators, will in all
likelihood, be deterred from acting in a peaceable, mutually
accommodating fashion.
As mentioned above, the established sovereign s ability
to effectively preserve the public order, and thus to
maintain the viability of the COMMONWEALTH, depends upon the
perception on the part of a substantial majority of that
COMMONWEALTH'S citizens that their sovereign does indeed
possess the requisite level of public support to preserve a
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Moreover, if the sovereign is unabl
e
condition of peace.
to maintain the citizens' confidence by convincing them that
the civil order is not in danger of breaking down, and if
the citizens confidence in the sovereign falls below some
critical level, the public order will in fact begin to break
down. One could easily imagine how an atmosphere of
uncertainty, fostered by a lack of the sufficient degree of
public confidence in the ability of the sovereign to force
his subjects to honor their contracts and observe the civil
laws, would lead even moderate men who are uncertain that
they can "bank upon" lawful behavior on the part of their
fellow citizens to "err on the side of safety" by failing to
discharge thei
r
contractual obligations. Consequently, in
this scenario, even moderate men, (i.e. those who harbor a
sincere desire and willingness to foster the continued
existence of the COMMONWEALTH by following the directives of
the sovereign)
,
can be expected to be prompted by the
urgings of fear to behave in such a manner as will, in all
likelihood, foster that COMMONWEALTH'S dissolution. Indeed,
in this respect, a kind of "domino theory of the
commonwealth's dissolution" can be imagined to be
manifested
.
By this, I mean that if doubts of this kind initially
appear among a small number of (even moderate) citizens of
some COMMONWEALTH, it is plausible that such doubts could,
and in all likelihood, would, gradually spread to larger
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and larger segments of the population and eventually cause a
sufficient degree of social instability to destroy the
COMMONWEALTH. These initial doubts can be imagined to spread
throughout the population in no fewer than three ways:
first, by the dissemination of rumour and word of mouth;
second, through an unwillingness on the part of citizens to
observe the civil laws of the COMMONWEALTH; and third,
through an unwillingness on the part of citizens to repose
the degree of trust in one's fellow citizens which is
necessary to maintain a strong and viable COMMONWEALTH.
While the first method of transmission can be imagined to be
primarily of a verbal nature, the attitude associated with
the second and the third methods of transmission from one
citizen to another will be manifested primarily in behavior,
which will be observed by those natural persons within the
diffident citizen's (or citizens') environment.^^
Of course, we (or Hobbes) could specify that within a
well regulated COMMONWEALTH, the sovereign will provide
effective means to suppress the socially disruptive passion-
based behavior of dominators, thus eliminating a significant
source of social instability within that grouping. That is,
even though we might concede that the behavior of dominators
is not subject to correction or alteration through rational
persuasion or reasoned argumentation, we might nevertheless
maintain that part of a COMMONWEALTH'S effective internal
peace-keeping mechanism consists of provisions for the
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coercive suppression of such passion-based socially
disruptive behavior. However, at this juncture, we must
seriously ask ourselves how effective such provisions can be
expected to be.
Indeed, to contend that the formation and maintenance
of an internal peace-keeping mechanism which is capable of
effectively controlling or constraining the socially
destructive passion-based behavior which dominators would
otherwise exhibit is a relatively easy or unproblematic
process, seems to seriously underestimate the tenacity of
such dominators’ passions. Even though the effectiveness of
such a mechanism to suppress or control the behavior of the
citizens of a COMMONWEALTH can be assumed to vary inversely
with the percentage of dominators who constitute that
COMMONWEALTH,^^ Hobbes's classic descriptions of the
behavior characterist i c of dominators clearly indicate that
the problem of dominators will significantly affect any
social grouping.
Interestingly, although he is frequently represented as
a proponent of repressive authoritarian methods of
governing, Hobbes's political philosophy actually reflects a
concern with allowing a substantial amount of freedom to the
citizens of the COMMONWEALTH.^^ Moreover, it would seem
that even though the exercising of a requisite level of
social control to convince the citizens that they are safe
to carry on the conduct of daily life is a necessary
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constituent feature of any effective governmental
organization, it would additionally appear that in many
actually exercising this level of social control
could have effects of a seriously counterproductive or
destabilizing nature. Indeed, a rather serious problem can
be envisioned to emerge when we consider that, on the one
hand, the sovereign or leader of a COMMONWEALTH can be
expected to need to employ some rather severe authoritarian
methods of governing in order to effectively suppress the
socially disruptive behavior of dominators while, on the
other hand, the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH whose sovereign
routinely employs such methods are likely to resent the
severity of such measures. Citizen resentment can be
expected to arise precisely because such severe
authoritarian measures are likely to be perceived by both
the dominators and the moderates within the COMMONWEALTH as
constituting overly harsh restrictions on personal liberty.
That is to say, by inadvertently creating the perception
that he and his agents are exercising unjustifiably harsh
methods of social control (methods of social control which,
in all likelihood, will be necessary to keep the socially
disruptive behavior of dominators in check), the sovereign
is likely to undercut the freely given support of his
citizens, the latter of which is, after all, required to
insure the COMMONWEALTH'S continued existence. Hence, the
problem related to the suppression of the behavior of
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dominators within COMMONWEALTHS can be understood to be two-
pronged: In the first place, it is doubtful that methods of
social control which are adequate to suppress the antisocial
behavior of dominators can be formulated and implemented,
and in the second place, even if such methods could be
developed and successfully implemented, it seems likely that
the utilization of such methods would result in an
unintended diminution of public support for the program of
the sovereign- Simply, the employment of the severe
authoritarian methods which are necessary to accomplish this
task is likely to be resented by much of the citizenry. In
turn, the employment of these techniques would, in all
likelihood, have the effect of eroding the citizens' support
for their sovereign. Finally, such an erosion of citizen
support would likely bring disastrous effects upon the
COMMONWEALTH precisely because (1) the persistence of such
citizen support is necessary to foster the continued
existence of the established COMMONWEALTH and because (2)
such citizen support cannot be extorted from those citizens
but rather, must be freely given.
E. Is Hobbes's Justificatory Project Successful?
Needless to say, there is something artificial or
unrealistic about Hobbes's account of the generation of a
COMMONWEALTH by institution. As was noted in chapter 5 of
this dissertation, Hobbes provides a detailed description of
the remarkably civil process by which a multitude of
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Hobbesian natural persons who inhabit the same geographical
region come to peacefully agree to obey and be bound by the
will of some designated sovereign authority. In this
respect, an obvious criticism of Hobbes's position is that
one can hardly expect the predominantly self interested,
death aversive individuals who inhabit the state of nature-1
to willingly attempt to forge a peace-keeping agreement with
those who live in their vicinity, especially in light of the
fact that such individuals lack a guarantee that their
overtures to peace will not be met with violence. Quite
simply, in the state of nature-1, one cannot expect
Hobbesian individuals to assume the enormous personal risks
that are involved in taking upon oneself the role of
peacemaker
.
A fairly likely response to this objection on the part
of a supporter of Hobbes is that although we should not
expect a COMMONWEALTH by institution to arise from out of
the state of nature-1 in the manner indicated by this
author, Hobbes's account of the institution of such an
"artificial" COMMONWEALTH is not intended to chronicle an
actually instantiated historical event, but is meant rather
to demonstrate why men and women who find themselves living
within actually existing COMMONWEALTHS have an obligation to
obey their sovereign. In light of this, we might claim that
Hobbes's account is intended not to describe the genesis of,
but rather to justify the continued existence of an
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established COMMONWEALTH and to shed light on the nature of
the social bonds which unite or tie a number of disparate
individuals into one coherent social unit. Thus, political
philosophers as well as men and women who dwell within
COMMONWEALTHS are to regard the obligation of the citizens
to the sovereign of their COMMONWEALTH as being identical to
that which would be explicitly acknowledged were a disparate
group of solitary individuals to form a society "by
institution" in the manner indicated by Hobbes. If this is
true, then Hobbes’s main objective in discussing
COMMONWEALTH by institution is not to describe to the
citizen the actual process by which his COMMONWEALTH was set
up, but rather, to show the citizen how he must behave in
order to make most probable his own long and relatively
fulfilling life (and importantly, to show the citizen how he
must conceive of his relationship to his sovereign).
Although such a defense of Hobbes's position does
possess a certain degree of plausibility, I contend that
this account is still flawed since it fails to take adequate
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account of the human behavioral tendencies which would,
in all probability, effectively prevent the COMMONWEALTH by
institution being formed in the manner indicated by Hobbes.
That is to say, even if we (correctly) conceive of Hobbes's
project not as one of explaining the actual historical
process by which COMMONWEALTHS are instituted, but rather as
one of explaining the basis of the citizen's obligation to
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obey his sovereign (and of convincing the citizen that he
should behave in a particular fashion), Hobbes in his
account nevertheless fails to acknowledge that human
antisocial tendencies and an abiding uncertainty among the
citizens of a COMMONWEALTH that their fellow citizens will
act in the required manner, will very likely^® prevent
citizens from confidently complying with the directives of
their sovereign. Moreover, given man's self-seeking
tendencies, man's apparent willingness to violate contracts
when he believes that he may do so without being detected,
and the very evident constraints which limit the natural
power of even the mightiest of sovereign "persons," we may
conclude that the prospect of any COMMONWEALTH existing for
a substantial period of time is rather bleak.
Granted, even though the project of justifying
allegiance to an already existing social institution stands
a greater chance of success than that of demonstrating that
such an institution arose from a general convention attended
by a multitude of human beings who do not enjoy the benefit
of any social ties, even the former task will strike the
reader as a formidable one given Hobbes's rather extreme and
inflexible conception of human nature. Indeed, given the
divisive behavioral tendencies which Hobbes attributes to
human beings, and given the fact that Hobbes believed such
tendencies will remain a constituent part of the human
organism even after they have "entered into" a COMMONWEALTH
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instituting social agreeinent, one would have little reason
to simultaneously accept Hobbes's conception of human nature
(and behavior) and the proposition that socially established
COMMONWEALTHS will endure for any sustained period of time.
Upon recognizing this truth, however, a significant problem
with Hobbes's philosophy of politics glaringly emerges.
Specifically, we must acknowledge as an empirically
verifiable truth that COMMONWEALTHS do persist, in some
cases for hundreds of years. We might better understand the
nature of this difficulty by considering the following
argument
:
(1) If Hobbes's conception of human nature is correct, then
COMMONWEALTHS should not be expected to persist for
substantial periods of time
(2) COMMONWEALTHS do (as a matter of fact) persist for
substantial periods of time
(3) Therefore, Hobbes's conception of human nature is
incorrect
.
Hobbes's harsh conception of human nature and his dismal
assessment of human associative potential, if accurate,
would appear to render unworkable any long-lasting
collective social unit such as a COMMONWEALTH.
Though Hobbes had little praise for the manner in which
theretofore existing COMMONWEALTHS had been designed or
organized, he nevertheless believed that he had introduced
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monumental innovations into the science of governing.
Indeed, Hobbes famously insisted that civil philosophy is
"no older than my own book De Cive .”^^ and rather
immodestly observed that^®
[t]ime, and industry, produce every day new
knowledge. And as the art of well building isderived from principles of reason, observed byindustrious men, that had long studied the nature
of the materials, and the divers effects of
figure, and proportion, long after mankind began,
though poorly, to build: so, long time after men
have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect,
and apt to relapse into disorder, there may
principles of reason be found out, by industrious
meditation, to make their constitution, excepting
by external violence, everlasting. And such are
those which I have in this discourse set forth.
Thus, Hobbes believed that the principles of justice and
sovereignty which he propounded in Leviathan and De Give ,
could be employed by an interested ruler or sovereign to
prevent his (i.e., the latter's) COMMONWEALTH from
dissolving or being torn asunder by internal destabilizing
influences
.
Though Hobbes clearly maintained that a COMMONWEALTH
organized in accordance with his own prescriptive principles
could, barring a successful external invasion, be expected
to endure perpetually, he was much less sanguine about the
possibility of COMMONWEALTHS not organized in accordance
with his principles enjoying such success. Additionally,
Hobbes believed that no society which existed either in his
own time or in earlier stages of history was or had been
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organized in accordance with his principles, and in
Leviathan
,
he expressed his fervent hope that his "short"
book would someday find its way^^
into the hands of a sovereign who will consider ithimself.
. , without the help of any interested or
envious interpreter: and by the exercise of entire
sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching ofit, convert this truth of speculation, into the
utility of practice.
Notwithstanding his rather sel f -vaunting pronouncements
on this issue, Hobbes could hardly have denied that many of
the COMMONWEALTHS which have been established over the
course of history have, for whatever reason, managed to
endure, in some cases for hundreds of years, despite not
having been organized in accordance with his own propounded
political principles. However, given Hobbes’s generally
pessimistic estimate of human associative potential
,
his
contention that human beings are born naturally i^fit for
life within societies, and his stark view of the influence
of the socially disruptive human passions upon individual
persons (as well as upon social groups that are composed of
such persons), such a result should not have obtained.
Indeed, the fact that COMMONWEALTHS have, as a matter of
fact, been chronicled to have endured for substantial
periods of times seems strikingly inconsistent with Hobbes’s
presuppositions, especially in light of his claim that his
principles of political organization have never been put
into effect by a sovereign or civil ruler. Thus, we are left
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with the conclusion that Hobbes's philosophical anthropology
or theory of human nature portrays human beings in
unjustifiably harsh colours; for if a significant proportion
of human beings were as naturally self-interested and
rapacious as Hobbes contends, virtually any human social
enterprise would be doomed from the start.
F. Concluding Remarks
A careful reading of his philosophical writings reveals
that Hobbes forwards no fewer than three distinct
conceptions of the pre-political situation which he labels
"the natural condition of humankind," or "the state of
nature." By examining the relevant passages from The
Elements of Law
,
De Give and Leviathan , Hobbes's three
principal works of political philosophy, I have shown that
Hobbes's state of nature should not be interpreted as a
single invariant concept but rather as a series of three
distinct heuristic or expository models. It is my contention
that Hobbes's complex model of the state of nature gradually
took shape during the course of his political writings as
Hobbes successively attempted to imagine how human beings,
whom he believed to be endowed with a specific invariant
human nature, would behave when subjected to differing
levels of social control and individual freedom. It is
important to realize that even though the representative
units involved in the various conceptions of the state of
nature do differ from conception to conception, the
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natural qualities attributed to individual persons remain
constant across the three conceptions. It is precisely the
fact that human nature remains constant irrespective of
whether the individual under consideration (1) lives in or
constitutes part of a COMMONWEALTH, (2) lives in or
constitutes part of a "family,” or (3) is considered to
inhabit the state of nature-1 which militates against the
successful formation and maintenance of any collective
social enterprise, (even one as putatively stable as a fully
fledged COMMONWEALTH)
In the final analysis, the internal consistency of
Hobbes's system is undermined by this author's forwarding an
unjustifiably severe doctrine of human nature and behavior.
I characterize Hobbes's doctrine of human nature as
"unjustifiably severe" precisely because it appears highly
improbable that human associative groupings composed of such
biological organisms could (1) be instituted or established
in accordance with any of the techniques indicated by Hobbes
throughout the course of his writings or (2) remain viable
units even if such units were brought into existence either
in the manner indicated by Hobbes, or through some other
method. This first point of inconsis tency (1) would
seriously impugn Hobbes’s project of demonstrating that
viable social or political units can be conceived as arising
in accordance with the processes indicated in his writings,
while the second point of inconsistency (2) would cast
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serious doubt upon Hobbes's justificatory project of
convincing the interested reader that he [the latter] has a
compelling reason, and is indeed obligated, to support the
efforts of the established sovereign mechanism in the area
where he dwells, by scrupulously complying with the
directives of that sovereign.
Though Hobbes might be reckoned by some to have offered
sage advice to those men and women who are confronted with
the choice of either (A) complying with the directives of
their existing sovereign or of (B) refusing to comply with
such directives and thus helping to foster the degeneration
of the COMMONWEALTH to which they belong, we must conclude
that the philosophical basis of Hobbes's propounded
prescription is seriously undercut by his refusal to embrace
and urge as accurate a conception of human nature which will
allow for the formation and maintenance of viable,
*Tiu 1 1 i pe rson units. In the absence of his offering such a
conception, we must conclude that Hobbes's philosophical
project of convincing men and women that they have a
compelling reason to obey the directives of their sovereign,
stands a dim chance of success.
Because Hobbes endorses a model of the human organism
which renders extremely unlikely the possibility of viable
and sustained human associative groups, Hobbes's
recommendation that citizens of existing COMMONWEALTHS
should take all the steps necessary to preserve the given
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regime by obeying the laws and supporting the cause of their
sovereign, strikes this reader as a wel 1
-conceived strategy
for guaranteeing one's own demise and destruction. For if
Hobbes's severe model of the human organism were accurate,
acting in such a "prosocial" manner would almost inevitably
lead to being taken advantage of, and perhaps being
destroyed by the hostile (or perhaps merely preemptive or
anticipatory) acts of other men.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this
dissertation is that in presenting his philosophy of
politics, Hobbes forwards an unrealistically or
unjustifiably harsh conception of the nature of human
beings, a conception which, if taken seriously, would
prevent this author from insisting that stable and secure
political units such as COMMONWEALTHS could be consistently
established or maintained.
The most obvious solution to this predicament is to
revise one's conception of human nature and human
associative potential to a model which is more in keeping
with what has been shown to be the case throughout the
course of human history, and which is more amenable to the
formation and maintenance of stable social groupings. To do
so would not require the theorist to forward a conception of
the human organism which construes such beings as naturally
sociable, or as capable of forming (much less spontaneously
forming) stable multi-person groups in which each individual
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member lives in perfect harmony with every other.
Unfortunately, the limited scope of this research project
prevents the present writer from offering specific concrete
answers to the question of how the theorist’s conception of
human nature can be changed so as to more faithfully reflect
the truths which we see manifested before us, and to salvage
Hobbes's descriptive and prescriptive projects from the
charges of irrelevance and unworkability
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NOTES
l.See, for example, Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
page 109.
2. Or "perturbationes animi . " See Chapter 12 of De Homine in
Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
pages 55-62.
3. For textual confirmation of the first claim made in this
sentence, namely, that Hobbes was of the opinion that nature
rendered human beings unfit for life within collective
organizational units, see Hobbes's contention that "man is
made fit for society, not by nature
, but by education."
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
page 110.) For textual
confirmation of the second claim, specifically, that certain
human beings, whom we have been calling dominators, are
especially unsuited to conform to the norms of behavior
required within collective organizational units, see my
extended discussion of the behavior of dominators in Chapter
2 of this dissertation. In order to see that Hobbes did not
consider human beings to be naturally sociable creatures,
one need only read "The Author's Preface to the Reader" and
section 2 of chapter 1 of De Cive
.
(Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
pages 95-106; 110-113) Additionally, see Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 108-109; Hobbes, De Cive
,
pages 167-169, and Hobbes,
Elements of Law
,
pages 102-103.
4.1 attempted to present Hobbes's answer to the first of
these questions (1) in the first chapter of this
dissertation, Hobbes's answer to the second of these
questions (2) in the second chapter of this dissertation,
and Hobbes's answer to the third of these questions (3) in
the third, fourth and fifth, chapters of this dissertation.
At various points throughout this dissertation, I have
endeavored to show why Hobbes believed that citizens of
organized political units can be expected to actually remain
parts of such units; thus, at various places throughout this
dissertation, I have presented what I take to be Hobbes's
answer to the fourth of these questions.
5.
Though considerations of brevity prevent me from
presenting a full-scale discussion of Hobbes's answer to
question (5), above, it should be noted that Hobbes's advice
to sovereigns of political units can be found primarily in
chapters 22-30 of Leviathan . (Hobbes, Leviathan , pages 146-
233. )
6.
And, of course, since the laws of nature require that one
actively perform in a manner consistent with this 'as if'
consideration
.
7.
Hobbes, Leviathan , page 109.
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8. See Hobbes, Leviathan
.
pages 220-221.
9 . See my explanation of why this might plausibly be supposed
to occur in the paragraph which begins with the words "Inthe first place," on pages 165-166 of this dissertation.
10. I judge this to be a reasonable expectation since (1) a
stable state of nature-3 type COMMONWEALTH will almost
*^®*^tainly contain a more sophisticated and more reliable
punitive and peace-keeping apparatus than will a relatively
unstable state of nature-2 type "family," and since (2) the
citizens or the subjects within the respective type of
grouping will, in all likelihood, form accurate beliefs
regarding the effectiveness and reliability of the peace
keeping apparatus of their own group via empirical
observation
.
11.
Even though a state of nature-2 type "family" can be
expected to provide its members with some degree of
protection against the predatory attacks of external
aggressors, because such groups are described by Hobbes as
being unstable and factious units, and because human beings
living within such units are described as being deprived of
the bases or prerequisite conditions for a commodious
existence, a subject within such a unit can be supposed to
believe that he has much less to lose if his present social
group were to dissolve that he would be were he a citizen
within a fully fledged COMMONWEALTH.
12.
"Strong COMMONWEALTHS" can be characterized as those
COMMONWEALTHS in which the citizens possess the greatest
degree of confidence in the state's ability to insure their
own physical safety, are able to most fully enjoy the fruits
of science, industry and the trappings of a "commodious"
society, and most fully understand that their relatively
comfortable, stable, and anxiety-free lifestyle is directly
attributable to living within such a political unit.
13.
Which were conceived by Hobbes as theoretically possible,
though seldom actually existing historical units. Recall
Hobbes's discussions of Adam's relationship to Cain in The
Questions concerning Liberty. Necessity and Chance on pages
183-184 of Vol . V of Engl ish Works , and on page 344 of Vol
.
VII of English Works .
14
.
Leviathan
,
p. 490. See also Hobbes, Leviathan , page 144:
Hobbes, Engl ish Works , Vol. IV, pages 420-25; Hobbes,
English Works , Vol. V, pages 178-80; and Hobbes, Eng 1 i sh
Works
,
Vol. VII, page 344.
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15
.
According to Hobbes, this includes the obligation to
"protect in war the authority, by which he is himself
protected in time of peace." (Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 490.)
Hobbes explains that a citizen incurs such an obligation
because "he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve
his own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy
him, by whose strength he is preserved." (Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 490
. )
16.
That is in a conception of the state of nature other than
the state of nature-3.
17 Admi ttedl y , asserting that Hobbes believed fear to be the
main or preeminent factor which motivates men and women to
enter into, and "persuades" them to remain members of the
COMMONWEALTH, does not do f ul 1 justice to Hobbes's thoughts
on this topic. For example, in a famous passage from the
final paragraph of chapter 13 of Leviathan
,
Hobbes claims
that "(t)he passions that incline men to peace are fear of
death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious
living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them."
(Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 78.) Thus, Hobbes mentions a desire
for the means necessary for a commodious life and a hope to
obtain the material trappings which characterize such a
lifestyle as among the passions which incline men to seek
peace through the establishment of a COMMONWEALTH.
Significantly, however, in this oft-quoted passage Hobbes
lists the "fear of death" as the first passion which
inclines men toward peace.
18
.
Hobbes
,
19 Hobbes
20 Hobbes
21 Hobbes
22 Hobbes
23 Hobbes
Leviathan
,
Leviathan
,
Leviathan
,
Leviathan
,
Leviathan
,
Leviathan
,
page 87
.
pages 87-88
page 88.
page 88.
page 127
.
page 127
24. See Hobbes, Elements of Law , page 179; Hobbes, Leviathan,
page 219, and Hobbes, English Works , Vol . V, page 178.
25. With one’s fellow citizens in the case of sovereignty by
institution, and with one's sovereign in the case of
sovereignty by acquisition.
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26 I make this claim in full knowledge of the fact that
f
i"" Hobbes’s system, the human being who singly composes,or the human beings who collectively compose theCOMMONWEALTH'S sovereign constitutes, in its political
capacity, an artificial (as opposed to a natural) personNevertheless, it should be noted that within this sentence
am referring to the natural (as opposed to the artificial
or contractually established) power which is possessed bythe natural human beings who comprise the sovereign, the
sovereign's peace-keeping agents, etc.
2 7 . Admi t t ed 1 y , this statement would be patently false were
we considering an authentic democracy of the varietydescribed by Hobbes on pp . 109-110 of The Elements of Law .
Nevertheless, it must be recalled that Hobbes consistently
maintains that, with respect to governmental effectiveness,
monarchies are superior to aristocracies and aristocracies'
are superior to democracies. Thus, we must conclude that
Hobbes's preferred type of government is one in which the
above recounted statement is true, that is, a government in
which the combined physical power of the natural persons who
constitute the citizenry surpasses the combined physical
power of the natural persons who constitute the sovereign
and the sovereign's peace keeping forces. Note well,
however, Hobbes's somewhat inflated claim in The Author's
Preface to De Give that although he has endeavored "to gain
a belief in men that monarchy is the most commodious
government," it is the "one thing alone I confess in this
whole book not to be demonstrated, but only probably
stated." (Hobbes, Man and Citizen
,
page 104.)
28. Of course, this fact makes it imperative that the
sovereign somehow manages to "win over the hearts," or
maintain the support of those men and women whom he governs;
for if the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH take the time to
consider that the total physical power of the governed
exceeds (perhaps far exceeds) that of the sovereign and
his/its minions, such citizens will come to recognize that
the sovereign's ability to maintain the public order will
depend directly upon the citizens' willingness to behave as
if the sovereign does indeed possesses the actual physical
power to compel them to observe the civil laws, (and thus,
to discharge their contractual obligation) Hence, the
citizens' fear of their sovereign's power can be recognized
to rest on a rather shaky or uncertain basis, specifically
upon the widely-held belief that the sovereign can maintain
the requisite level of support among the populace [or the
citizenry]. In this sense, we can understand that the
sovereign's power to control the actions of his/its citizens
is not a natural quality, but rather something which is
artificially generated (and sustained) through the
contractual apparatus.
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29. It should be noted that Hobbes did not believe that adirect reading of his political writings would provide the
most likely mode of transmission of his ideas to the
majority of the citizens of the commonwealth. Rather, Hobbes
registered the belief that his ideas regarding sovereignty
and obedience should be proclaimed to the common people in
sermons delivered by clergymen who are to learn the tenets
of Hobbes's political philosophy while at university. Such a
conviction lies at the basis of Hobbes’s contention that
Leviathan should be adopted by, and taught to students by
the members of the faculty of English universities. (See
Hobbes, Leviathan
.
page 496.)
30.
As John Robison has pointed out to me, such arguments can
also be used to persuade moderates to keep dominators in
check. Of course, one would expect that moderate citizens
would actively take steps to control the behavior, or to
restrict the corporeal motion of their social 1 y-disruptive
dominator fellow citizens, only when they are called upon to
do so by their sovereign, (or by his authorized
representative)
31.
Recall Hobbes's pronouncement that the "[r]eputation of
power is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of
those that need protection." (Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 51.)
32. See endnotes # 37 and # 38, below.
33. If for the sake of argument, we were to conceive of a
COMMONWEALTH composed solely of moderate men who "are
satisfied with an equality of nature," who recognize the
profound benefits of living in a condition of peace, and who
are able and willing to consistently act in accordance with
the directives of the sovereign (as encapsulated in his
COMMONWEALTH'S civil laws), we would have some reason to
believe that this COMMONWEALTH is an effective and stable
unit. We would expect this to be the case since the
citizens' level of suspicion that the sovereign is unable to
effectively maintain public order will, in all likelihood,
be rather low. This characteristic, i.e. the low level of
suspicion among the populace, would be attributable to the
fact that most or all of the citizens within this
COMMONWEALTH are motivated, and are generally recognized to
be motivated, to support the efforts of their sovereign by,
among other things, refraining from attempting to disobey
the sovereign's directives.
However, for Hobbes, such a harmonious social condition
would constitute an unattainable ideal state since, as has
been mentioned a number of times already in this
dissertation, this author was committed to the position that
any sizable grouping of human beings will contain some
(never precisely specified) percentage of dominators.
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34. So that COMMONWEALTHS which contain smaller percentages
of dominators can be expected, all other things being equal,
to contain more effective means of internal peace keeping
(and behavioral control !) than COMMONWEALTHS which contain
smaller percentages of dominators.
35. See, for example, Hobbes, Leviathan
,
page 229, especially
the sections entitled "Good Laws, What?” and "Such as are
Necessary .
”
36. Given the aforementioned differential in the level of
combined physical power between (1) the sovereign and the
members of the sovereign's peace keeping forces, and (2) the
members of the citizenry, and the likely recognition of such
a differential on the part of a large number of those who
comprise the latter category (2), we must conclude that such
support cannot be physically extorted from the members of
the citizenry but must, rather, be freely offered.
37. It should be noted that the word 'would' in this sentence
is being used conditionally. To wit, in this sentence, I am
claiming (among other things), that if Hobbes's doctrine of
the human organism were accurate, then it would be the case
that a COMMONWEALTH by institution could not be formed in
the manner indicated by Hobbes, (barring the occurrence of
exceptionally preternatural conditions--see endnote # 38,
bel ow)
.
38. It should be noted that I am employing the phrase 'will
very likely' and not simply the term 'will' in this sentence
since the latter usage would, in this context, indicate
demonstrative certainty. That a collection of Hobbesian
human beings could spontaneously come together, and
subsequently live with each other in perfect harmony for the
remainder of all their natural lives is, strictly speaking,
possible despite Hobbes's frequently trumpeted
^
pronouncements concerning man's antisocial nature and man s
natural unfitness to form, to follow the laws of, and to
remain members of collective organizational units.
Strictly speaking, it is not impossible that upon
entering into the social contract, the sovereign and the
citizens of the newly-instituted COMMONWEALTH will, despite
their f requently-remarked-upon antisocial nature, live
together in perfect accord.
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On the other hand, given Hobbes's straightforward
pronouncements concerning man's antisocial nature (which
were discussed at great length earlier in this
dissertation), it seems overwhelmingly more likely (1) that
the human antisocial tendencies would prevent a collection
of Hobbesian men from forming societies in the manner
indicated by this author, and (2) that a recognition of the
human antisocial tendencies on the part of most or all of
the citizens of a COMMONWEALTH, accompanied by an abiding
uncertainty regarding the future behavior of one's fellow
citizens and a fear of losing one's life in a violent
encounter, would discourage many if not most citizens of the
COMMONWEALTH from confidently complying with the directives
of their sovereign.
Obviously, because one cannot draw conclusions in this
matter with demonstrative certainty, one must be satisfied
to make claims concerning what is plausible or probable
given Hobbes's repeatedly stated proclamations concerning
human nature and human behavior.
39.
Hobbes, Engl ish Works
,
Vol . I, page ix.
40.
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 220-221.
41.
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
pages 243-244.
42. So that the representative unit in the state of nature-1
is the individual natural person, the representative unit in
the state of nature-2 is the small unstable social group
which Hobbes designates the "family," and the representative
unit in the state of nature-3 is the COMMONWEALTH.
43.
Providing such an alternative model of human nature might
prove difficult within the parameters of Hobbes's overall
system, since in his writings, this philosopher did expend a
good deal of effort in order to demonstrate that his model
of human behavior follows directly from that of his
mechanical view of human perception and conation (or
motivation). (See chapters 1-2 of this dissertation)
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